All Assemble: Order and Disorder in Law, Politics, and Culture by El-Haj, Tabatha Abu
  
949 
ALL ASSEMBLE: 
ORDER AND DISORDER 
IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 
Tabatha Abu El-Haj* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is December 22, 2011.  A gathering of citizens stands holding 
hands to form a human chain around a large, square, yellow tent.  
They are members of Occupy Albany, a group that believes that “the 
voice of the People is drowned out by the corrupting influence that 
concentrated economic power exerts on the government”—and that 
this largely explains the economic crisis the United States has faced 
since 2008.1  Their demand?  A “true democracy, unshackled from 
the corrosive influence of concentrated economic power.”2  The yel-
low tent the crowd protects has housed the group’s informational 
materials for weeks.  On this particular winter evening, the collective 
stands in still formation for several long hours.  As the sun begins to 
set, there is movement.  Seemingly spontaneously, members of the 
group, smiling and confident, lift the tent.  Thus begins a procession 
through the streets of Albany.  Protestors trail the tent, chanting and 
carrying handmade signs that read, “This is What Democracy Looks 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University School of Law.  This Article has greatly ben-
efitted from the comments of Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, Anne Goble, Alex Geisinger, Debo-
rah Gordon, and Genevieve Lakier.  I would also like to thank Al Brophy, Noah Feldman, 
Sarah Barringer Gordon, and Howard Engelskirchen for encouraging me to undertake 
this project and Larry Kramer, William Forbath and Bill Novak for helping me to concep-
tualize the original research design.  Finally, I wish to extend a special thanks to Timothy 
Zick for his thorough and insightful comments.  I would not have been able to complete 
the research without Meghan Kelley’s and John Cannan’s excellent assistance. 
 1 Press Conference, Occupy Albany (Dec. 2011), available at http:// 
www.occupyalbany.org/working-groups/political-strategy/press-conference. 
 2 Id.  For more on the grievances of the movement see  THE GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC (NYU 
SCHOOL OF LAW) & THE WALTER LEITNER INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT THE LEITNER 
CTR. FOR INT’L LAW & JUSTICE (FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL), PROTEST AND ASSEMBLY RIGHTS 
PROJECT, SUPPRESSING PROTEST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. RESPONSE TO 
OCCUPY WALL STREET 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT]. 
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Like” and “We Aren’t Camping. We are Building a Revolution.”3  The 
crowd weaves through Albany’s rush-hour traffic for more than an 
hour. 
Flash back two hundred years to a different winter evening.  It was 
January 24, 1793, and a group of seafarers had taken to the streets, 
with an ox head—the remains of a public meal that had been held in 
front of the State House.  Based on newspaper accounts (rather than 
a YouTube video), historian Simon P. Newman recreates the scene: 
Following the great civic feast a group of seafarers took possession of the 
horns of the roasted ox and marched with them to the liberty pole that 
stood in the newly named Liberty Square.  Once there these impover-
ished men announced their intention of paying to have the horns gilded 
and mounted atop the liberty pole, in honor of the Boston celebration 
and the event it commemorated.4 
The procession was the final one on a day in which residents of Bos-
ton celebrated a military victory by the French revolutionaries.  The 
choice to celebrate the French Revolution was an implicit critique of 
the Federalist administration’s perceived aristocratic tendencies.  The 
uniformed butchers, who carved the meat at the public meal, were 
described as “carving up the ox on the ‘Altar of Democracy.’”5 
As in Albany, the Boston crowd transformed a mundane object in-
to a political symbol by marching it through the city streets.  Alt-
hough violence did not in fact occur either night, the specter of both 
disorder and violence was clearly present in both—in Boston due to 
the crowd, the alcohol, and the dwindling daylight, while in Albany 
due to the politics, the traffic, and the police presence. 
The history of outdoor assembly in the United States is one of 
continuity and discontinuity.  While citizens have periodically taken 
to the streets in inconvenient and risky ways throughout our history, 
our contemporary attitudes, as evidenced in law, practice, and public 
discourse, stand in stark contrast to the attitudes of previous genera-
tions of Americans.  Contemporary Americans value individual free-
dom and various sorts of expression far more than previous genera-
tions, but our fears of the disorder associated with outdoor gatherings 
are undermining the right of peaceable assembly and the critically 
important form of political participation it safeguards. 
 
 3 For a video of the procession, see #Occupy Albany:  D22:  The Day of Eviction, VIMEO (Dec. 
27, 2011, 9:40 PM), http://vimeo.com/34275304. 
 4 SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET:  FESTIVE CULTURE IN THE 
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 2 (1997). 
 5 Id. at 123.  
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By comparing the recent experience of the Occupy movement 
with the experiences of ethnic, religious, and labor assemblies in the 
late nineteenth century, this Article seeks to develop two themes.6  
First, it seeks to remind us that outdoor assembly is ever present in 
American history and that such assemblies are inevitably messy and 
inconvenient.7  Frequently, they create a risk of disorder, and occa-
sionally even lead to violence, especially against property.8  The Alba-
ny procession, which by historical standards was quite orderly and un-
threatening, for example, ended with police officers pepper spraying 
protestors and destroying their tent with a chainsaw.  Second, it uses 
this history to open up a conversation about the reasons that toler-
ance of the disruption associated with outdoor gatherings is necessary 
to sustain the central functions of a form of political participation 
that has been with us from time immemorial. 
Contemporary Americans are exceedingly wary of the risks pre-
sented by crowds.  Disorder—from increased traffic and trampled 
grass to police confrontations and smashed windows—makes most of 
 
 6 This Article is the third in a series in which the first focused on changes in our under-
standing of the contours of the right of assembly.  Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right 
of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009) [hereinafter Abu El-Haj 2009].  The second re-
counted changes in the ways that municipalities regulate outdoor gatherings, situating 
this change in a pattern of similar regulatory changes with respect to other political prac-
tices.  Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People:  Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Abu El-Haj 2011].  This Article primarily addresses 
the nature of public assemblies and changes in public attitudes toward them as evidenced 
in law and public discourse, but also explores how this has affected both the right and 
practice of assembly. 
 7 Until recently, among First Amendment scholars, other than myself, only Timothy Zick 
has forcefully argued that outdoor public expression remains important, raising concerns 
about the fact that speakers are increasingly displaced from public places through law, 
policing, architecture, and social and political force.  See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF 
DOORS:  PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES, at xii (2009).  Recent 
years, however, have seen renewed interest in the protection of dissenting collective ac-
tion.  See, e.g., RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE:  
SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT 
FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 2–7, 152 (2012) (documenting the rise in reluctance of of-
ficials to be confronted by dissenters and overuse of security concerns as a justification for 
preventing protestors such access, and arguing that while the speech and assembly provi-
sions of the First Amendment do not provide a right to an audience with government of-
ficials and access to government spaces, the Petition Clause, at least in some circumstanc-
es, does). 
 8 See, e.g., John D. McCarthy et al., Policing Disorderly Campus Protests and Convivial Gatherings:  
The Interaction of Threat, Social Organization and First Amendment Guarantees, 54 SOC. PROBS. 
274, 275 n.2, 280 (2007) (noting as common sociological knowledge that “[p]ublic gath-
erings of all kinds have the potential to become disorderly” even as “only a relatively small 
percentage . . . of political protest gatherings in the United States . . . involve violence 
against property or person”). 
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us extremely nervous.  Any hint of a risk of violence, however inci-
dental, frankly terrifies the public, the police, and lawyers. 
The result is that Americans today accept a high level of regula-
tion of outdoor assembly.  This is evident in the laws to which assem-
blies are subject, the responses of local governments to outdoor as-
semblies, the decisions of courts, and the public’s attitudes toward 
the crowds associated with movements such as Occupy. 
Our intolerance of disorder, well short of violence, has implicated 
our constitutional freedoms.9  It facilitates a constitutional order that 
undervalues outdoor assembly and undermines democratic participa-
tion. 
Outdoor assembly has a variety of unique attributes as a form of 
political participation—perhaps most importantly, it is social by defi-
nition.10  Ideas and political commitment alone turn out to be poor 
motivators for political engagement.11  Political participation is, in-
stead, importantly driven by relationships with others.12  Congregat-
ing outdoors for both social and political ends is, therefore, im-
portant because it is a face-to-face experience of citizenship—one 
that is especially significant for dissenters. 
Gathering outdoors, however, inevitably involves complications, 
some more serious than others.  For one, the very fact of collecting 
outdoors, typically in urban spaces, causes inconvenience.  For an-
other, disruption of ordinary routines is often necessary to challenge 
that which is taken for granted.  Politically, disruption can be an es-
sential element of the power of congregating together, especially for 
dissenting groups.  Disruption of ordinary routines—even mundane 
traffic routines—however, creates risks, including, albeit rarely, the 
 
 9 See Kuznetsov v. Russia, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), App. No. 10877/04 ¶ 44, 
Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. (Oct. 23, 2008) as quoted in SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra 
note 2, at 54 (“[A]ny demonstration in a public place inevitably causes a certain level of 
disruption to ordinary life, including disruption of traffic . . . it is important for the public 
authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the free-
dom of assembly . . . is not to be deprived of all substance.”). 
 10 See generally Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates and Associations:  Theoretically and Empir-
ically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 82 (2014) (noting that a 
“foundational sociological finding . . . is that information rarely prompts political activity 
unless it is transmitted through personal ties”). 
 11 Id. 
 12 See, e.g., Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media:  Technology, the Public Sphere, and Po-
litical Change, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 28, 34–35 (2011) (discussing a sociological study of the 
1948 U.S. presidential election that found that “mass media alone do not change people’s 
minds;” rather, ideas transmitted in the media must be “echoed by friends, family mem-
bers, and colleagues” before political beliefs are formed). 
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risk of violence, typically incidental and directed at property.13  Be-
cause disorder is inherent to the practice of assembling outdoors, 
tolerance of this risk is essential to protecting this important avenue 
of political participation. 
A quick read of the First Amendment’s text might lead one to 
conclude that like the freedom of speech, the right to assembly, lim-
ited as it is by the word peaceable, “does not encompass the right to 
cause disruption.”14  While courts today regularly define peaceable 
narrowly, for example, by defining nonviolent, illegal action as un-
peaceable, this is a distinctly modern interpretation. 
 As with all language, the term peaceable is not self-defining.  Nine-
teenth-century American law accommodated the inconveniences as-
sociated with assemblies, regulating only when they descended into 
disorder just short of violence.15  Contemporary constitutional law, by 
contrast, upholds virtually all means devised by government officials 
to quash the disruptive elements of assemblies, so long as they do not 
engage in content or viewpoint discrimination.16 
The Article’s ultimate purpose is provocative.  While contempo-
rary law’s intolerance for mob violence, and anything even remotely 
approaching it, is laudable, it has not been without its costs.  The his-
tory of public assembly poses a challenge to our apparent decision to 
value safety above all else.  In our understandable nervousness about 
disorder and condemnation of violence, we have lost sight of the fact 
that disorder and disruption arise out of the very nature of assem-
bly—a crowd out of doors being policed by government officials.  
Perhaps more critically, we have lost sight of the fact that for dissent-
ers, in particular, disruption is central to the efficacy of public pro-
test.17  While unlawful and violent actions on the part of gatherers ob-
viously must be addressed, a robust right of assembly would seem to 
require a recalibration of the balance. 
Like free speech, free assembly needs breathing room, needs 
room for disorder and tolerance of the related, if low, risk of violence 
 
 13 Cf. SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 72–82 (documenting violence on 
the part of police in response to Occupy Wall Street). 
 14 Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 198 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 15 See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 16 Interestingly, international and European human rights laws are in certain, critical re-
spects closer to nineteenth-century American law than contemporary American law when 
it comes to protecting assemblies in public spaces.  Cf. SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 54–61 (summarizing international norms including tolerance for 
disorder and incidental violence and a presumption against permit requirements). 
 17 See infra notes 486–87 and accompanying text.  
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that comes with it.  Our democracy is diminished when assemblies are 
significantly regulated in advance.  By allowing authorities to ritualize 
and sanitize the act of assembling together outdoors, courts have 
permitted authorities to sap assemblies of their ability to “impress 
their strength upon the public mind” as well as their ability to be po-
litically life-changing events for participants.18  Robbed of spontaneity 
and agency, much of the experience and power of the people out-
doors is lost.  Moreover, both the experience and the political value 
of gathering outdoors are undercut when authorities are able to phys-
ically and symbolically marginalize these important moments of polit-
ical participation.  Finally, participating in protest action is chilled 
when local police use a wide array of minor offenses to arrest protes-
tors, even when it is done out of a sincere belief in their obligation to 
maintain order. 
The Article consciously focuses not on historically momentous ex-
amples of the people outdoors (the Boston Tea Party, Martin Luther 
King’s March on Washington, or historic Vietnam protests).19  In-
stead, it recounts a host of mundane and long-forgotten controversies 
over outdoor assembly from the nineteenth century primarily involv-
ing ethnic, religious, and labor groups.  It does so for two reasons.  
First, the extraordinary builds on the ordinary.  Second, the im-
portance of public gathering does not depend on whether the gath-
erers achieve their ends or become a major political, social, or reli-
gious movement.  Rather, the importance lies in the continuing 
availability and vibrancy of outdoor assembly in the repertoire of 
American politics and in the unique experience for participants of 
gathering as political actors. 
The removal of Occupy Albany, even the movement itself, is likely 
to be forgotten within the decade.  Still, for participants and for our 
democracy, the very presence of citizens gathered in public has been 
valuable.  The gatherings have offered important opportunities for 
participants to develop a collective identity through new relation-
ships, shared experiences, and ongoing discussion.  They have served 
as a reminder of the possibility and power of mass mobilization, and 
they have shifted political debate, as evidenced by the widespread use 
of the dichotomy between the ninety-nine percent and the one per-
cent.   
 
 18 Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719, 722 (Kan. 1888). 
 19 For a quick recap of some of these momentous marches, see KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 7, 
at 122–26 (describing key marches between 1880–1980 and the petitioning element in-
volved in them). 
Apr. 2014] ALL ASSEMBLE 955 
 
Part I uses the recent experience of the Occupy movement as a 
window into assembly today.  After a brief overview of the move-
ment’s origins, goals, and use of public spaces, it focuses on the legal 
order within which Occupy was forced to operate.  Occupy’s experi-
ence provides a point of comparison for the history of outdoor as-
sembly in the nineteenth century recounted in Part II. 
Through the stories of various ethnic, religious, and labor assem-
blies in the late nineteenth century,20 Part II illustrates that nine-
teenth-century Americans were more tolerant of the disorder created 
by the people outdoors and discusses the ways that nineteenth-
century law accommodated the inherent tension between order and 
disorder, between a right of peaceful assembly and the concomitant 
risk of unlawful assemblies.  Specifically, it shows that nineteenth-
century law was more tolerant of the inconvenience associated with 
the people outdoors because Americans at the time—both ordinary 
citizens and those involved in the legal system—placed great value on 
the right of assembly as a privilege and immunity of American citi-
zenship.  The constitutional right of assembly, as such, was more ro-
bust, even though the right was not enforceable in federal courts and 
even though, by our standards, nineteenth-century Americans were 
quite intolerant of many First Amendment freedoms that we value 
today (in particular, individuality and free exercise of religious liber-
ty).  Finally, Part III describes the origins of contemporary attitudes 
toward public assembly. 
The Article concludes with the suggestion that the history re-
counted here raises serious questions about whether we have gone 
too far in the direction of order.  It suggests that it is time to revisit 
the political value of discord and explores reasons to embrace the in-
convenience and disorder associated with the people outdoors, in-
cluding the risks of incidental violence.  In doing so, it offers some 
preliminary thoughts as to how a more robust right of assembly could 
be adapted to modern conditions. 
 
 20 The history presented in this Article is based on comprehensive Ph.D. dissertation 
research in which local newspapers, court documents, Salvation Army records, and the 
municipal codes of thirty-three of the one hundred most populous American cities in 
1880 were systematically reviewed.  For a full account of the methodology as well as 
primary and secondary sources see Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People:  Trans-
formations in American Democracy (1880–1930) 11–15, 376–98 (Sept. 2008) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author). 
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I.  OUTDOOR ASSEMBLY TODAY 
Americans have assembled in public places for political, religious, 
civic, and social ends for over two hundred years.21  As Justice Owen 
Roberts remarked in 1939, “Wherever the title of streets and parks 
may rest, . . . time out of mind, [they] have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.”22 
Physical demonstrations are not a relic of the past.  Despite popu-
lation growth, globalization, and the rise of the Internet, Americans 
have not given up on gathering outdoors.23  Even before Occupy 
emerged, tens of thousands participated in labor demonstrations in 
Wisconsin and elsewhere in the Midwest to protest efforts to quash 
public unions.24  Protesters in Madison, Wisconsin, deliberately de-
signed Walkerville, in June 2011, to evoke comparisons with 
“Hoovervilles,” the shantytowns constructed during the Great Depres-
sion, which were named to draw attention to President Herbert Hoo-
ver’s perceived failure to address widespread social and economic suf-
fering.25 
Occupy, the most widespread and persistent recent phenomenon 
of Americans taking the streets officially began on September 17, 
 
 21 Cf. City of Chicago v. Alexander, No. 11 MC1-237718, 2012 WL 4458130, at *15–19 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2012) (listing significant assemblies that have taken place on Chicago’s 
Grant Park since its dedication to the public in 1835). 
 22 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 23 Some might ask whether the people gathering outdoors is outdated.  Do we need demon-
strations in the world of Twitter and Facebook?  Perhaps, nineteenth-century Americans 
tolerated the disorder created by the people outdoors because the people outdoors were 
more important in an era when elections were more problematic.  On the other hand, 
large-scale social and political change has yet to happen without people taking to the 
streets in great numbers, preferably with energy and spontaneity.  As the recent experi-
ences of the Arab Spring only too vividly demonstrate, Facebook and Twitter alone will 
not carry the day.  People, not talk, make history.  See James Glanz & John Markoff, Egypt 
Leaders Found ‘Off’ Switch for Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/technology/16internet.html (describing Hosni 
Mubarak’s shutdown of internet access in response to protests).  Recent experience ap-
pears to vindicate Professor Zick’s assertion that the evidence shows that, notwithstanding 
the rise of virtual spaces, the people continue to choose to exercise their First Amend-
ment rights in public.  See ZICK, supra note 7, at xii (criticizing First Amendment scholars 
for having “abandon[ed] the field [of public expression] for trendier subjects and agen-
das”). 
 24 See Peter Grier, How Long Can Wisconsin Protesters Occupy the State Capitol?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Feb. 28, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/The-Vote/2011/
0228/How-long-can-Wisconsin-protesters-occupy-the-State-Capitol (describing a sit-in in 
the Wisconsin State Capitol). 
 25 See Greg Botelho, Wisconsin Activists Create Walkerville to Taunt Governor, Tout Change, CNN, 
June 5, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/05/wisconsin.walkerville.  
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2011, with Occupy Wall Street.26  Inspired by recent international pro-
tests, the movement “used the occupation of public space and mass 
demonstrations to call attention to a wide array of shared concerns” 
about income inequality and the pervasive influence of special inter-
ests on our government.27 
Its most distinctive practice was the introduction of a nightly as-
sembly wherein participants debated political but also strategic and 
administrative concerns.  In Zuccotti Park, some recount, “[O]ne 
could witness—and quickly become part of—dozens of simultaneous 
small group conversations about student debt, veterans’ post-
traumatic stress, or the complexities of credit-default swaps, 
‘fracking,’ and more.”28  Night and day, “[p]eople filled the walkways 
and sidewalks surrounding the occupation . . . . They ate, chatted, 
held spontaneous teach-ins and occasionally nasty fights.”29   
The General Assembly, in turn, gave birth to the practice of en-
camping in prominent places to attract attention but also encouraged 
those who came from far afield to stay and participate.  Replicas of 
Occupy Wall Street quickly popped up in cities across the country.30 
These occupations around the nation have functioned as a re-
minder that “[p]ublic political assemblies . . . serve democracy by 
bringing individuals together to speak directly to each other, ex-
change ideas, [and] confront ideological and political difference.”31  
By “creat[ing] the physical and discursive space necessary for political 
debate on issues of public interest” these occupations became places 
where new ideas and political identities emerged, where activists were 
born and rejuvenated.32 
Quite unlike the ritualized marches on Washington or the signifi-
cantly confined protests at recent political conventions, the Occupy 
assemblies evidenced an energy and spontaneity that was unusual and 
 
 26 SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 6; see also id. at 14 (noting that “Oc-
cupy Wall Street began in the context of an intense period of mass social mobilization 
around the globe” in which “[m]any countries erupted in mass protest . . . in a way rarely 
seen previously”). 
 27 Id. at vi. 
 28 Understanding Occupy, 11 CONTEXTS 12, 13 (2012). 
 29 People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857, 861 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2012) (quoting Quinn Nor-
ton, Scenes from the Occupation:  Before and After the Wall Street Eviction, WIRED, Nov. 16, 2011, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/zuccotti-before-after/all). 
 30 See SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (“Occupy protests formed in 
Washington D.C., Oakland, California, and Anchorage, Alaska, among many others in 
the United States.”). 
 31 Id. at 51. 
 32 Id. 
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inspirational to many.33  Among other things, many occupations pro-
ceeded without obtaining required permits from local authorities.34 
Cities, however, soon tired of the inconveniences associated with 
the Occupy movement.  They focused in particular on the long-term 
tent cities that occupations around the country had set up. 
Local and constitutional law was on their side, and cities quickly 
were able to contain, and in some cases even disperse, the gather-
ings.35  In Philadelphia, for example, while Mayor Michael A. Nutter 
was initially quite tolerant of Occupy Philadelphia, offering the group 
an open permit and a waiver of the insurance fees that normally ap-
 
 33 For more on the cabining of protests, see Abu El-Haj 2009, supra note 6, at 548–52 
(demonstrating the extensive regulations, requirements, and conditions that confine or 
burden large gatherings and political protests in Washington, D.C., and other cities na-
tionwide). 
 34 Occupations in Albany, Augusta, New Haven, Portland, Rochester, Sacramento, and Tuc-
son proceeded without permits for various lengths of time.  See Mitchell v. City of New 
Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242–44 (D. Conn. 2012) (discussing that Occupy New Haven 
set up in the Upper New Haven Green, located near Yale’s old campus, without any ap-
plication for a permit from the City of New Haven and stayed there for several months); 
Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1112–13 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 
2012) (noting Occupy Sacramento did not have a permit for overnight occupations of 
Cesar Chavez Plaza Park in early October 2011 and that the City rejected its application 
for such a permit in November 2011); Miller-Jacobson v. City of Rochester, 941 N.Y.S. 2d 
475, 481 n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 2012) (stating that Occupy Rochester never ap-
plied for a permit); Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 
6747860, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011) (noting that members of Occupy Tucson, located 
in Armory Park in downtown Tucson, did not seek a permit from the City of Tucson be-
fore gathering at the site); Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at 
*2–3 (D. Me. Dec. 12, 2011) (noting that Occupy Augusta’s members assembled regularly 
in Capitol Park, strategically in view of the Maine State Capitol, without ever applying for 
a permit); City of Albany v. Occupy Albany, No. 1:11-cv-1524 (NAM/ATB), 2012 WL 
4485693, at *2, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (noting Occupy Albany began its occupation 
of Academy Park on October 21, 2011, but did not obtain a permit from the City until 
December 7, 2011, although this permit did not allow an encampment); see also Denis C. 
Theriault, City to Occupy Portland:  No More “Unpermitted” Meetings in Director Park, 
PORTLAND MERCURY (June 15, 2012, 6:09 PM), 
http://www.portlandmercury.com/BlogtownPDX/archives/2012/06/15/city-to-occupy-
portland-no-more-unpermitted-meetings-in-director-park (noting that after Occupy Port-
land was cleared from its original encampments in November of 2011, members of the 
group continued to regularly assemble without a permit in Director Park until the City is-
sued a notice on June 15, 2012, announcing that it would no longer allow these unper-
mitted meetings); see generally SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 119 
(“Most of Occupy’s public marches and rallies in New York City have not been carried out 
with the permits required by local law.”). 
 35 See, e.g., SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at vii (“While after just two 
months city authorities dismantled many of the high-profile around-the-clock Occupy en-
campments that initially defined the movement, regular marches, demonstrations, and 
assemblies continue in many places, including New York City.”). 
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ply, the city and its leaders eventually changed their tune.36  On No-
vember 25, 2011, fifty-one days after the encampment began, officials 
notified Occupy Philadelphia that it would need to clear Dilworth 
Plaza within forty-eight hours.  A new, renewable, thirty-day permit 
was issued for the less central Thomas Paine Plaza.  The new permit 
limited assembly to the hours of nine a.m. to seven p.m. and allowed 
only three small canopies, which had to be disassembled each day.37  
Other cities took less conciliatory approaches.  In Oakland, city offi-
cials simply cleared the plaza where movement participants had en-
camped.  Other cities followed suit.38  There is even evidence that 
these cities moved in concert, consulting in advance with one another 
about how best to dismantle their occupations.39  Removal actions 
were only the most dramatic final step in cities’ efforts to quash the 
Occupy movement. 
Pervasive regulation ensured that the movement had conflict with 
cities long before their efforts to remove the encampments.  Right 
from the start, Occupy Wall Street clashed with city officials over ac-
 
 36 In several cities, including Augusta, New York City, and New Haven, mayors started out 
not enforcing permit requirements but then changed their minds.  See, e.g., Anthony M. 
DeStefano, City Eyes Permits for Occupy Wall Street, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 2011, 
www.newsday.com/news/new-york/city-eyes-permits-for-occupy-wall-street-1.3263993 
(“Mayor Michael Bloomberg indicated the city was about to start taking a tougher line 
with the Occupy Wall Street movement, perhaps by requiring permits for marches and 
demonstrations.”). 
 37 See Miriam Hill et al., Police Clear Occupy Encampment, 52 Arrested, THE INQUIRER (Nov. 30, 
2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/20111130_Police_order
_Occupy_Philly_to_leave_Dilworth_Plaza.html (reporting that “Mayor Nutter initially 
embraced the protest, arranged for his staff to meet with the movement’s representatives, 
and even provided electricity for their computers,” but that “Nutter began losing patience 
with the protesters as problems mounted at the site, including public urination, other un-
sanitary conditions and one reported sexual assault”); Tina Susman, Another One Gone: Oc-
cupy Philly Camp Joins List of Cleared Camps, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2011, 6:54 AM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/11/occupy-philly-camp-
dismantled.html (noting that Occupy Philadelphia set up in Dilworth Plaza on October 6 
and remained there until police evicted the protesters from that location on November 
30, 2011, after protestors rejected the city’s offer of a permit that did not include over-
night hours for a nearby location). 
 38 See OWS Camp Crackdown Coordinated by US City Mayors, RT (Nov. 15, 2011, 5:28 PM), 
http://rt.com/usa/occupy-crackdown-oakland-mayor-419 (noting that concurrent with 
the City of Oakland’s clearing of Occupy Oakland’s gathering at Frank Ogawa Park, other 
cities, including New York City, Albany, Denver, and Salt Lake City, conducted Occupy 
sweeps as well). 
 39 See Joe Coscarelli, Oakland Mayor Jean Quan:  Eighteen Cities Discussed Occupy ‘Situation,’ N.Y. 
MAG. (Nov. 15, 2011, 2:38 PM), www.nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2011/11/cities-
conferenced-about-occupy-situation.html (explaining that the Mayor of Oakland admit-
ted to participating in a conference call with eighteen other cities regarding the Occupy 
movement and noting that the recent crackdowns on Occupy in Oakland, San Francisco, 
Denver, New York City, and Chapel Hill seemed to have been coordinated). 
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cess to parks and streets.  There were mass arrests on the Brooklyn 
Bridge for failing to have a parade permit and engaging in disorderly 
conduct by interrupting traffic.40  These arrests were quickly succeed-
ed by a controversy over whether Zuccotti Park could lawfully be 
cleared, given that it was a privately owned public space subject to a 
zoning permit requiring it to be open to the public around the 
clock.41  This question proved to be particularly intricate under the 
First Amendment’s convoluted public forum doctrine.42  More nota-
bly, the question only arose because when the original assembly ar-
rived at the city’s park, the park was closed.43 
Occupy Albany’s access to Academy Park was similarly complicat-
ed by questions of ownership because that park is partially owned by 
the state and partially owned by the city.  Until December 22, city of-
ficials had generously, to their minds, allowed the assembly to remain 
in the city’s portion of the park, refraining from prosecuting those 
who broke the curfew or other park rules.44  New York’s Governor, by 
contrast, had ordered state police troopers to arrest members of Oc-
cupy Albany as necessary.45  More than eighty demonstrators were 
charged with disorderly conduct and trespass by state police in No-
 
 40 See Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (considering the claim 
of unlawful arrest by members of Occupy Wall Street who were arrested on the Brooklyn 
Bridge). 
 41 SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 7; see generally John D. McCarthy & 
Clark McPhail, Places of Protest:  The Public Forum in Principle and Practice, 11 MOBILIZATION 
229, 232–34 (2006) (reviewing the recent trend to privatize large portions of what were 
once public places). 
 42 For a comprehensive analysis of the difficult legal issues involved in applying First 
Amendment rights to Occupy Wall Street, see Nancy Scola, Lawyers for Occupy Wall Street 
Wade Through ‘Legal Morass’ of First Amendment Rights at Zuccotti Park, CAPITAL, Oct. 18, 
2011, www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2011/10/3788610/lawyers-occupy-wall-
street-wade-through-legal-morass-first-amendmen?page=all.  Similar questions regarding 
when private spaces become public forums that are constitutionally required to be open 
for First Amendment activity also arose in Pittsburgh.  See BNY Mellon, N.A. v. Occupy 
Pittsburgh, No. GD 11-025549, 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty Dec. LEXIS 17, at *28–29 (C.P. Alle-
gheny Cnty. Pa. Feb. 2, 2012) (holding Mellon Green to be private property). 
 43 See SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (“When protesters arrived on 
Wall Street on September 17, they found that the New York Police Department (NYPD) 
had closed off much of Wall Street with metal barricades.  Protesters ended up gathering 
in nearby Zuccotti Park, a one-square-block plaza in the financial district in lower Man-
hattan.”). 
 44 See City of Albany v. Occupy Albany, No. 1:11-cv-1524 (NAM/ATB), 2012 WL 4485693, at 
*2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (recounting negotiations between the city and the demon-
strators in the Fall of 2011). 
 45 Michael Virtanen, Occupy Rents Office Space, THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 10, 2012, at 5 (noting 
that “Albany officials let [Occupy Albany] stay in Academy Park . . . while Cuomo insisted 
state police enforce an 11 p.m. curfew in adjacent state-owned Lafayette Park”). 
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vember 2011.46  The spontaneous procession in Albany discussed in 
the Introduction was precipitated by the arrival of a court order, em-
powering local law enforcement to clear Occupy Albany’s tents, in-
cluding the informational tent, from Academy Park, in which the 
group had been encamped for three months.47 
Occupy’s experience amply demonstrates the ways that cities to-
day regulate virtually all assemblies, including those that are peaceful 
and minimally inconvenient.  Individuals and organizations that wish 
to demonstrate, parade, or speak in public, must typically obtain a 
permit from government officials well in advance.48  Occupy Albany, 
in particular, was required to navigate a complex legal landscape 
governing the group’s access to Academy Park, the complexity of 
which was exacerbated by the fact that the park is partially owned by 
New York State and partially owned by the city and thus subject to two 
separate regulatory authorities.49 
Even where permits are not required or have been issued, assem-
blies may be dispersed for actual and anticipated disorder, including 
obstructions of vehicular or pedestrian traffic.50  In New York City, au-
thor Naomi Wolf simply questioned a police officer’s account of the 
conditions of a permit issued to Occupy Wall Street, and she was ar-
rested for obstructing pedestrian traffic.51  Stories such as Wolf’s are 
not uncommon.52  Typical charges include trespass, disorderly con-
 
 46 Id. (estimating 130 people had been arrested by the state). 
 47 This information was obtained from lawyers participating in Occupy Albany.  See also Oc-
cupy Albany, 2012 WL 4485693, at *4 (noting that “[o]n December 22, 2011, the City 
filed a verified petition and commenced a special proceeding seeking to enjoin respond-
ents from continuing an encampment within Academy Park”). 
 48 See Abu El-Haj 2009, supra note 6, at 548–54 (describing constitutionally enacted regula-
tions with which prospective demonstrators must first comply in order to legally gather in 
urban spaces); see also KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 1–4, 31–35 (detailing recent efforts 
to restrict protesters’ access to government officials in the name of security, and arguing 
that it is essentially in an effort to drown out dissenting opinions); ZICK, supra note 7, at 
190–96 (comprehensively explaining wide range of ways that outdoor gatherings are con-
trolled today); McCarthy & McPhail, supra note 41, at 230–32 (describing the public fo-
rum doctrine and regulatory practices, including policing strategies, for managing politi-
cal demonstrations of contemporary municipalities). 
49  See E-mail from John Cannan, Research and Instructional Services Librarian, Drexel Uni-
versity School of Law, to Author (Feb. 25, 2014) (on file with author) (“New York State 
owns Lafayette Park and Albany City owns Academy park.  The two are side by side.”). 
 50 For a comprehensive analysis of the strategies employed against Occupy protestors in 
New York City, see generally SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2. 
 51 Id. at 117, n.20 (describing the incident). 
 52 See id. at 73–75 (documenting a police strategy of arresting protestors for minor offenses 
such as blocking traffic and obstructing justice). 
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duct, and unlawful assembly.53  Another example hails from Denver, 
in which city police arrested protestors for an array of violations, in-
cluding obstructing the streets, disobeying a lawful order, impeding 
traffic, disturbing the peace, and improperly honking car horns.54 
The movement’s transformative potential, whatever it may have 
been, was significantly undercut by such regulation and the constitu-
tional doctrine that largely sanctions them.  While one can only spec-
ulate about Occupy’s full potential, given its influence on political 
discourse even with its shortened lifespan, it is not implausible to be 
concerned that it might have been more influential if it had not been 
moved indoors by cities.55 
Contemporary First Amendment doctrine is particularly tolerant 
of permit requirements.  Cities’ standing permit ordinances are gen-
erally upheld against constitutional challenge as necessary to ensure 
that city life can continue in an orderly fashion despite political 
demonstrations, meetings, and parades.56  Both permanent and tem-
porary permit requirements for outdoor gatherings are generally ana-
lyzed as regulations of the time, place, and manner of speech rather 
than assembly.57  While the state cannot prohibit free speech rights in 
 
 53 See, e.g., People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2012) (assessing 
charges of trespass, disorderly conduct, and second degree obstruction of governmental 
administration); Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294, 
at *1 (Mass. Super. Nov. 17, 2011) (explaining that Occupy Boston sought a declaratory 
judgment that the city’s trespass and unlawful assembly statutes could not be applied to 
them insofar as they were exercising First Amendment rights). 
 54 See Occupy Denver v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 11-cv-03048-REB-MJWW, 2011 WL 
6096501, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Dec. 7, 2011) (noting that all charges for offenses, such as im-
proper use of a car horn, were subsequently dismissed). 
 55 Cf. SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 14 (“In a relatively short span of 
time, the Occupy movement altered national political discourse . . . . News coverage of 
income inequality increased five-fold between September and November, a fact some 
commentators attributed to Occupy.  During the week of November 14, 2011, when some 
of the largest U.S. Occupy encampments were evicted, Occupy-related stories accounted 
for approximately 13 percent of total U.S. news media coverage.  However, after the evic-
tion of most encampments, the movement suffered a decline in mainstream media visibil-
ity that it has struggled to overcome.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 56 See, e.g., Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Permits allow 
the government to arrange a public forum ‘so that individuals and groups can be heard 
in an orderly and appropriate manner,’ and ‘enforcement of a permit system inevitably 
requires taking cognizance of content.’” (quoting Kroll v. U.S. Capitol Police, 847 F.2d 
899, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal emphasis omitted))). 
 57 See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (upholding the Chicago Park Dis-
trict’s permit requirement as a valid time, place, and manner regulation and rejecting the 
suggestion that, as a prior constraint, it was subject to the procedural safeguards of 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 
(1941) (upholding New Hampshire’s permit requirement as a valid regulation of the 
time, place, and manner of public assembly). 
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public forums such as parks and streets (unless it can meet a strict 
scrutiny test),58 it can regulate the time, place, and manner of such 
speech, using statutes that give limited discretion to officials,59 so long 
as the justification for such regulation is not content-based, the regu-
lation is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental inter-
est,” and the regulation “leave[s] open ample alternative channels for 
communication.”60  Maintaining order, preventing traffic jams, and 
ensuring security are all considered significant governmental inter-
ests.61 
Forced to frame their right to gather as a right to speak in a public 
forum, at every turn, when Occupiers went to court seeking the pro-
tection of the First Amendment, they were disappointed.62  Gather-
 
 58 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (explaining the presumption of ac-
cess to public forums); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (explaining that the streets and parks are “quintessential public forums”); see also 
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management:  The History and Theory of the Public Fo-
rum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1749–52 (1987) (summarizing the doctrinal structure, estab-
lished in Perry, which distinguishes between public, nonpublic, and limited public fo-
rums). 
 59 See, e.g., Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (explaining that the licensing official must not “enjoy[ ] 
unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit”); 
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969) (striking down an or-
dinance where the decision to grant or withhold a permit was “guided only by [the 
Commissioners’] own ideas of ‘public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, 
morals or convenience’” and the guarantee of free speech and assembly was “contingent 
upon the uncontrolled will of an official”). 
 60 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[I]n a public forum the gov-
ernment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected 
speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental in-
terest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the in-
formation.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984))). 
 61 See, e.g., Occupy Fresno v. Cnty. of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 859 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (ex-
plaining that permit requirements “promote public health, safety and welfare” and allow 
cities to anticipate competing uses); Occupy Minneapolis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 866 F. 
Supp. 2d 1062, 1070 (D. Minn. 2011) (“Notably, the Court agrees with the County that it 
has a significant interest in controlling the aesthetic appearance of the Plazas.” (internal 
quotation omitted)); Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 
1022, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that regulating traffic flow was a significant interest). 
 62 See, e.g., Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1111 (E.D. Cal. 
2012) (granting the city’s motion to dismiss); Waller v. City of New York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 
541, 544–45  (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2011) (holding that the “movants have not demon-
strated that the rules adopted . . . are not reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 
permitted under the First Amendment”); Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. Civ-11-1432-
D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011) (“[T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs 
have not made a sufficient showing of likely success on the merits of their claims of im-
proper enforcement action by the City in derogation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment 
rights.”).  They have not been alone in presenting this argument in court unsuccessfully.  
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ings that inconvenience traffic (pedestrian and vehicular) or trample 
pristine lawns have been successfully cast as disorderly and, therefore, 
constitutionally subject to regulation.  In Boston, for example, a trial 
court concluded that the city’s regulations were “narrowly tailored to 
further the Conservancy’s substantial interest in offer[ing] beautiful, 
well-cared for spaces as well as to ensure unobstructed public access 
to the parks for all.”63 
The few cases Occupy has won have amounted to short-lived victo-
ries that turned on factual quirks.64  The federal district court in Ida-
ho, for example, upheld Occupy Boise’s constitutional right to main-
tain a symbolic tent city on grounds of the old Ada County 
Courthouse, but its decision turned importantly on evidence that the 
relevant statute had been adopted specifically in response to the 
movement.  In the court’s view, the Governor’s interpretation “cre-
ate[d] the appearance that the State [was] stretching to shut down a 
political message—a tent city—presented in a public forum.”65  Cities 
like Nashville and Trenton were rebuffed by courts for implementing 
new regulations specifically in response to their local Occupy groups 
 
See, e.g., Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding constitu-
tional a “no-demonstration zone” at the 2004 Republican National Convention). 
 63 Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, slip op. at 20 (Mass. Super. Dec. 7, 2011) 
(internal quotation omitted); see also Occupy Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (finding 
ordinance narrowly tailored to the following asserted government interests:  “(1) the 
general public’s enjoyment of park facilities; (2) the viability and maintenance of those 
facilities; (3) the public’s health, safety and welfare; and (4) the protection of the City’s 
parks and public property from overuse and unsanitary conditions”); accord Clark, 468 
U.S. at 296 (“It is also apparent to us that the regulation narrowly focuses on the Gov-
ernment’s substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in an 
attractive and intact condition, readily available to the millions of people who wish to see 
and enjoy them by their presence.  To permit camping—using these areas as living ac-
commodations—would be totally inimical to these purposes, as would be readily under-
stood by those who have frequented the National Parks across the country and observed 
the unfortunate consequences of the activities of those who refuse to confine their camp-
ing to designated areas.”). 
 64 A notable exception to this characterization was the experience of Occupy Fresno, which 
was able to obtain an injunction against the city because the trial court held that requir-
ing a permit for an assembly of less than ten persons is unconstitutional in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.  See Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 859–60 (“The Ninth Circuit appears to hold 
that permit requirements for groups of fewer than ten individuals are unconstitutional or 
constitutionally infirm, whereas those for groups of fifty or greater are narrowly tai-
lored.”).  The judge, however, found the city’s curfew constitutional since the occupiers 
could assemble overnight on the city’s sidewalks.  Id. at 864. 
 65 Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 829–30 (D. Idaho 2012); cf. Occupy Columbia v. 
Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 558 (D.S.C. Dec. 16, 2011) (“[C]ontent-based restrictions may 
be imposed in a traditional public forum where there is ‘a clear and present danger that 
[the speech] will bring about the substantive evils that [government] has a right to pre-
vent,’ . . . and where the restrictions are narrowly drawn to serve that compelling state in-
terest.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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without following proper procedures.66  Similarly, Occupy Columbia’s 
initial successes in court were the result of the fact that the city had 
no official permit requirements or rules governing overnight use of 
its parks.67  After a federal court issued an injunction against Colum-
bia, however, it adopted regulations similar to those in other cities.68  
Those regulations were promptly upheld against constitutional chal-
lenge.69  Not all rules adopted in direct response to an occupation, 
however, were held unconstitutional.  In New York City, a local court 
ruled that the owners of Zuccotti Park had not violated the Constitu-
tion when they implemented rules prohibiting camping and sleeping 
in the park in response to Occupy Wall Street.70 
The First Amendment arguments available to Occupy are so lim-
ited that in one instance, the lawyers for Occupy simply abandoned 
any reliance on the First Amendment, arguing instead that their tents 
were protected by the Fourth Amendment, which prevents unreason-
able seizures of property, and by the Fifth Amendment, which pre-
vents deprivation of property without due process, generally in the 
form of a hearing.71  They lost on those grounds as well. 72 
 
 66 See ACLU-NJ Wins Temporary Restraining Order in Favor of Occupy Trenton Protesters, AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., Nov. 7, 2011, http://www.aclu-nj.org/news/2011/11/07/aclu-
nj-wins-temporary-restraining-order-in-favor-of-occupy-trenton-protesters (“[Judge Jacob-
son] explained that the Occupy Trenton demonstrators ‘are entitled to have restrictions 
on their constitutionally protected activities imposed by rulemaking and not informal ac-
tion targeted at their demonstration.’” (citing Occupy Trenton v. Zawacki, No. C-72-11 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mercer Cnty. Nov. 7, 2011)); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion at 2, Occupy Nashville 
v. Haslam, No. 3:11-cv-01037 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 31, 2011) (noting that the city “creat-
ed by mere fiat . . . and without following required procedures—ad hoc restrictions on use 
of a public forum . . . to prohibit free speech”), available at http://www.aclu-
tn.org/pdfs/OccupyNashvilleMotionTRO.pdf. 
 67 See Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 561–62 (noting that although unwritten policies at times can 
be constitutional, “the court [was] not convinced that this [unwritten, no-camping] policy 
[was] content-neutral and [was] applied equally to all persons and groups on the State 
House grounds”). 
 68 See Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11–cv–03253–CMC, 2011 WL 6698990, at *1 (D.S.C. 
Dec. 22, 2011) (“The Board met and ‘unanimously passed an emergency regulation . . . 
prohibiting use of the State House grounds and all buildings located on the grounds for 
camping, sleeping, or any living accommodation purposes.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 69 See id. at *4–7 (upholding the Board’s interests and means used to achieve those inter-
ests). 
 70 See Waller v. City of New York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544–45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2011) 
(“[M]ovants have not demonstrated that the rules adopted by the owners of the proper-
ty . . . are not reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions permitted under the First 
Amendment.”). 
 71 See, e.g., Henke v. Dep’t of Interior, 842 F. Supp. 2d 54, 56 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Eschewing any 
reliance on the First Amendment, Plaintiffs argue that their tents are protected from sei-
zure and destruction by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”). 
 72 Id. 
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The Occupy movement’s legal losses were particularly exacerbat-
ed by the fact that under current law, the movement was not effec-
tively able to argue that local ordinances had infringed the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of peaceable assembly.73  The array of ad-
vanced regulations occupations around the nation confronted are 
probably best understood, not as speech regulations, but as direct, 
prior restraints on assembly—conduct explicitly protected by the First 
Amendment.  Yet, advocates for Occupy were foreclosed, by existing 
Supreme Court free speech precedent, from arguing that these per-
mit requirements constituted prior restraints.74 
Instead, operating within the confines of a doctrine that sees 
speech and assembly as fungible, lawyers for Occupy framed Occupy 
as a movement “engaged in protected speech” and its encampments 
as expressive conduct.75  Local authorities responded that Occupy’s 
ability to use the Internet and social media constitute adequate alter-
natives to its assembling.76  And, courts largely accepted those argu-
ments, asserting that the ability to disseminate a message is an ade-
quate substitute for the ability to gather in order to form and express 
that message.77  Even the few courts that focused on alternative spaces 
 
 73 See, e.g., Occupy Maine v. City of Portland, No. CV-11-549, 2012 WL 368333 (Me. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 31, 2012) (analyzing plaintiff’s interest as expressive conduct subject to reasona-
ble time, place, and manner restriction notwithstanding plaintiff’s assertion of right to 
free assembly); Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, slip op. at 21 (Mass. Super. 
Dec. 7, 2011) (noting that plaintiffs had sought “a declaration that their occupation . . . is 
protected as free speech, assembly, [and] association”); see generally 5 RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.54 (4th ed. 2008) 
(“When the government limits the rights of persons to communicate in public, it is most 
common for courts to examine the governmental action in terms of the freedom of 
speech rather than the freedom of assembly.”). 
 74 See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (rejecting suggestion that park’s 
permit requirement constituted a prior constraint on speech). 
 75 Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 246 (D. Conn., 2012); accord Occupy 
Bos., No. 11-4152-G, slip op. at 11–13 (analyzing whether the First Amendment protected 
plaintiffs’ conduct insofar as they claim that the “occupation and habitation of Dewey 
Square is expressive conduct and a symbol” of economic inequality). 
 76 Cf. Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (rejecting the City’s argument with the comment that 
“[t]here is something unsatisfying about telling a movement that aims to make visible an 
often unseen, ignored population that it should content itself with forms of communica-
tion that are only seen when someone seeks them out”). 
 77 See, e.g., Miller-Jacobson v. City of Rochester, 941 N.Y.S.2d 475, 481 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe 
Cnty. 2012) (“There [were] ample alternative channels for communication of infor-
mation by plaintiffs [because] [t]hey may protest and disseminate information in the 
Park during the permitted hours as well as in other public forums, the Internet, and tra-
ditional and social media.”); see also Bl(A)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 
(1st Cir. 2004) (finding that “many other opportunities for demonstrations existed” and 
that these were adequate notwithstanding fact that “none of them were within sight and 
sound of the delegates assembled” because, inter alia, “[a]t a high-profile 
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for assembling, for the most part, accepted that any other possible lo-
cation constitutes a satisfactory alternative because the law fails to 
provide them with a comprehensive rubric by which to measure 
whether substitute spaces are adequate.78 
Of equal concern, the public largely appeared unfazed by the 
movement’s experience.  This appears to be because it does not value 
outdoor assembly and thus focuses almost exclusively on the disorder 
associated with it.  It was not uncommon to read editorials about the 
Occupy movement in the following vein: 
Too often, we see public events marred by the angry outbursts of mis-
guided protesters of one political stripe or another who demand atten-
tion.  Not only do these disruptions breach proper decorum, but they ac-
complish little or nothing because they more than likely alienate 
everyone else in attendance.  In other words, the protest message falls on 
deaf ears.  So what is the point? Simply to cause trouble?  In Iowa, we be-
lieve, we are better than this.79 
The wider public appears more tolerant of the disorder associated 
with sporting events than that associated with politics.80  Even sup-
porters of the movement struggled to articulate the value of assembly 
 
event . . . messages expressed beyond the first-hand sight and sound of the delegates 
nonetheless have a propensity to reach the delegates through television, radio, the press, 
the internet, and other outlets”).  But see Occupy Maine, 2012 WL 36833, at *33 (noting 
that adequate alternatives existed for plaintiffs insofar as they could demonstrate on public 
streets, sidewalks and other places throughout the city); Occupy Fresno v. Cnty. of Fres-
no, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 863 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that adequate alternatives existed 
because the assembly could move to a sidewalk, which is outside of the jurisdiction of the 
park, and has no similar permit requirements). 
 78 See Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, slip op. at 21 (accepting the city’s view that Occupy Bos-
ton’s ability to camp on distant Harbor Islands provided an adequate alternative forum). 
Elaborating a rubric for such an analysis is beyond the scope of this project, but location, 
duration, timing, and historic symbolism would at a minimum be significant factors to 
consider.  See City of Chicago v. Alexander, No. 11 MC1-237718, 2012 WL 4458130, at *27 
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2012) (finding that the City of Chicago lacked adequate alternative 
places for large demonstrations to gather at night).   
 79 Disruptive Protest Strategy Seems Counterproductive (Editorial), GLOBEGAZETTE.COM (Aug. 30, 
2012, 12:02 AM), http://globegazette.com/news/opinion/editorial/disruptive-protest-
strategy-seems-%20counterproductive-editorial/article_e92d7dae-f25f-11e1-950e-
0019bb2963f4.html. 
 80 See Cleve R. Wootson Jr., CMPD:  Charlotte Might Need Bigger Protest Spaces for DNC, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 24, 2012, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/
05/24/3262306/police-learn-lessons-from- nato.html#.UuqBAnewLd0 (quoting a Univer-
sity of Chicago economist as saying, “‘I think 2012 is a particularly bad time because we’ve 
gotten into this Occupy fever . . . [Political events like NATO or the DNC can be] very 
disruptive.  You’ve got to cordon off a large area of the city.  If you have a Super Bowl in 
Charlotte, you’re not going to have a big section of people looking to protest’”). 
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and frequently felt the need to downplay the disruption it has 
caused.81 
While the public, and most of us in the legal academy, take for 
granted that cities can and do extensively regulate public assemblies, 
today’s pervasive regulation is a radical break from earlier regulatory 
approaches.  The earlier, much simpler regulatory regime was not 
just a product of its time.  It was instead bolstered by a popular com-
mitment to a robust right of assembly and a belief in the value of as-
sembly even in the face of potential disorder and real risks of vio-
lence.  A reminder as to this history is particularly timely in this 
regard. 
II.  OUTDOOR ASSEMBLY AS A PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY OF CITIZENSHIP 
American streets and public places have, indeed, been used “time 
out of mind . . . for purposes of assembly,” including to discuss public 
questions.82  While both the regulations to which outdoor gatherings 
have been subject and the constitutional protections available to 
them have radically changed, important similarities remain between 
contemporary and historical assemblies.  Attitudes toward crowds, 
particularly political crowds, however, have changed dramatically. 
Political crowds played a central role in the American Revolution 
and in the democratic politics that emerged after the Founding.83  
Throughout the period, Americans tolerated a relatively high degree 
of disorder associated with crowds.84  For example, a newspaper de-
scription of a nighttime procession in Philadelphia on Independence 
Day in 1795 makes clear that the burning in effigy of John Jay, in a 
politically fraught context with counterdemonstrators nearby, did not 
constitute a per se risk of violence or disorder, subject to dispersal.85 
 
 81 See, e.g., Jeremy Kessler, The Closing of the Public Square, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 12, 2012, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/node/97901/print (stressing that Occupy has, by and 
large, been a peaceful, orderly civic moment). 
 82 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 83 See Abu El-Haj 2009, supra note 6, at 554–61 (identifying a range of contexts that brought 
early Americans into the streets, including elections, national holidays, political crises and 
public meetings); ZICK, supra note 7, at 26–31 (describing the history of political mobs 
and riots in the Revolutionary period). 
 84 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 26–27 (2004) (explaining that Whig ideology allowed for a constitution-
al mob which was permitted by custom to exercise a reasonable amount of violence in the 
face of governmental oppression of customary constitutional rights); ZICK, supra note 7, 
at 27 (noting that during the Revolutionary period “[s]o long as [crowds] did not serious-
ly threaten public order, . . . [they] were not only tolerated but generally supported”). 
 85 See Abu El-Haj 2009, supra note 6, at 563–64 (recounting a description of the parade as 
“peaceable” even though it “nearly did descend into violence”). 
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Americans’ toleration of the disorder associated with the people 
outdoors lasted well into the late nineteenth century.  Streets re-
mained important places for political, social, and, increasingly, ethnic 
gatherings into the late nineteenth century,86 and Americans valued 
unfettered access to public space for civic and political purposes, 
viewing it as a central privilege and immunity of American citizen-
ship. They did so even though judicial enforcement was intermit-
tent.87  In sum, through the nineteenth century, as the stories that fol-
low show, civic and political “use[s] of the streets and public places” 
were indeed understood to be “part of the privileges, immunities, 
rights, and liberties of citizens.”88 
Order was not the order of the day, both with respect to outdoor 
assembly and generally.  Before recounting the controversies that 
would emerge in the face of increased immigration and the begin-
nings of industrialization, it is important to understand the legal re-
gime regulating outdoor assembly at the time.89 
From the Founding through the late nineteenth century, Ameri-
can authorities were formally limited to the criminal law in their ef-
forts to regulate outdoor assemblies.  Officials were only entitled to 
interfere with assemblies that could justifiably be charged with unlaw-
ful assembly, riot, or breach of the peace.90 
The legal threshold for disorder, moreover, was quite high.  Gov-
ernment officials were required to show that they were responding to 
actual breaches of the peace.  In 1863, the Superior Court of Judica-
ture of New Hampshire noted “that the common law in respect to ri-
ots [might be] inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions . . . [if] 
mere political demonstrations and parades, unattended by violence, 
actual or threatened, are held to be riots, or unlawful assemblies.”91 
 
 86 See id. at 559 (explaining that “[b]y the mid-nineteenth century, workers, poor people, 
racial minorities, and social movements all used city streets to further their political 
goals”). 
 87 Federal courts were not available for the assertion of First Amendment claims against 
states until 1925.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes 
we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by 
the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental per-
sonal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.”).  
 88 Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. 
 89 The details of the nineteenth-century regulatory regime as well as its transformation are 
recounted in Abu El-Haj 2011, supra note 6, at 42–45.  That history is a distillation of dis-
sertation research into the question.  See Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 105–31. 
 90 See Abu El-Haj 2009, supra note 6, at 561–69 (reviewing common law at the time); see also 
Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 105–18 (recounting common law and reviewing municipal 
codes in the study’s sample). 
 91 State v. Russell, 45 N.H. 83, 85 (N.H. 1863). 
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Although nineteenth-century judges and juries were consistently 
tolerant of the disorder associated with crowds, the law at the time 
distinguished between types of crowds, only some of which were con-
stitutionally protected.  Outdoor music and other types of individual 
expression were not considered central to the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizenship.  In the South, the assembly of blacks (free and en-
slaved) was restricted.92  Finally, as we will see, religious assemblies, to 
the degree that they were cast as outside of American political tradi-
tions, struggled to access the protection of the right of peaceable as-
sembly. 
White (and ethnic) Americans who gathered in city streets, 
squares, and greens for core political and civic purposes, however, 
were unencumbered by regulation as the law protected a right to un-
restricted access so long as the assembly was peaceful. 93  Such groups 
were not required to ask permission prior to exercising their right of 
assembly, and the government was not considered entitled to regu-
late in anticipation of possible disorder.  As late as 1881, most of 
America’s largest cities—cities including Detroit, San Francisco, St. 
Paul, Chicago, and Denver—did not require citizens seeking to as-
semble outdoors to obtain permission in advance.94 
The introduction of permit requirements for outdoor assemblies 
profoundly undercut this default presumption in favor of outdoor 
 
 92 For example, in Tennessee “[a]ll assemblages of slaves in unusual numbers, or at suspi-
cious times and places, not expressly authorized by the owners, [were] held and consid-
ered an unlawful assemblage.”  Leetch v. State, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 87, 88 (Tenn. 1858).  
Similarly, New Orleans forbade public addresses by “colored person[s]” absent “written 
permission from the Mayor.”  John W. Wertheimer, Free-Speech Fights: The Roots of 
Modern Free-Expression Litigation in the United States 143 (Jan. 1992) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author) (internal citation omitted).  
For more on restrictions placed on gatherings of slaves and free blacks in the South in 
the Antebellum period, see JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE:  THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM 
OF ASSEMBLY 30–33 (2012). 
 93 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 105–31 (documenting the rise of the permit system and 
comparing it to earlier legal regulation based on an extensive study of municipal ordi-
nances from a sample of the most populous American cities). 
 94 See DETROIT, MICH., REV. ORDINANCES chs. XXXII–L (1884) (regulating streets, alleys, 
public places, and public property); S.F., CAL., GENERAL ORDERS OF THE BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS Order 1588 (1884) (regulating construction and use of streets and public 
sidewalks); ST. PAUL, MINN., MUNICIPAL CODE arts. XXXIX, XLV, LXXVII–LXXVIII 
(1884) (regulating licenses, parks, streets, alleys, public grounds, and sidewalks); CHI., 
ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. XLII §§ 1686–1703 (1881) (regulating parks and public 
grounds); DENVER, COLO., ORDINANCES ch. IX, art. 2 (1881) (regulating sidewalks).  For 
a more systematic analysis of rise of permit requirements, see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, 
at 131–85. 
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gatherings of the people (narrowly construed).95  The controversies 
surrounding the introduction of advance regulation of outdoor gath-
erings provide a window into nineteenth-century attitudes about out-
door gatherings.  Those who sought access believed that they too 
should be entitled to the robust constitutional protections afforded 
to political crowds. Experiences in New York City and Grand Rapids 
illustrate the tradition of outdoor assembly from which the Occupy 
movement descends, but also reveal a fundamental disjuncture be-
tween prevailing attitudes toward both the disorderly potential of 
outdoor assembly and the value and scope of the constitutional right 
of assembly.  As these stories unfold, we will see that the contempo-
rary understanding is both broader and narrower than that from 
which it broke. 
A.  Privileges and Immunities in the Wake of Rioting 
New York City was the first city to pass an ordinance requiring citi-
zens who sought to assemble in public to request permission in ad-
vance from local officials.96  Although the first ordinance produced 
limited controversy given its limited scope, subsequent developments 
gave rise to a public debate about the constitutional implications of 
the regulatory change.  The debate—in newspapers and legislative 
halls—illuminates both attitudes toward outdoor assemblies and the 
ways that tolerance for disorder was framed by a particular under-
standing of the constitutional privileges and immunities involved. 
Since 1790, when the Census Bureau began keeping population 
counts, New York City has been the largest city in the United States.97  
The city’s first permit requirement for assemblies in public was 
 
 95 One other limit is perhaps worth noting:  The presumption of access was frequently with-
drawn for the Sabbath.  See, e.g., KAN. CITY, MO., CHARTER AND ORDINANCES, art. I § 3 
(banning processions with music on Sundays) (1864); RICHMOND, VA., CHARTER AND 
ORDINANCES ch. 44, § 20 (1875) (prohibiting parades with musicians “between the hours 
of eleven o’clock in the forenoon and two o’clock in the afternoon of Sunday”). 
 96 The history presented in this Section is based on local newspaper accounts of the 
incidents found in the 19th Century U.S. Newspapers Digital Archive along with second-
ary sources.  In addition, the Salvation Army National Archives and Research Center pro-
vided a few relevant details.  Finally, eight editions of New York City’s municipal codes 
between 1823 and 1931 were systematically reviewed.  For a full account of the 
methodology, see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 10–15. 
 97 See Campbell Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities & Other Urban Places in the United 
States: 1790 to 1990, (U.S. Census Bureau Population Division, Working Paper No. 27,  
1998), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/
twps0027.html. 
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passed in 1810, long before any other American city, but was limited 
to certain religious gatherings.98 
Fundamental changes to New York City’s regulatory framework 
would not arise until 1872, when the first significant regulation of 
nonreligious gatherings was passed.99  The change was prompted by 
ethnic parades that degenerated into riots in 1870 and 1871.100   
Prior to the 1870s, outdoor assemblies that did not involve reli-
gious worship were governed only by criminal law—specifically the 
crimes of unlawful assembly, riot, and breach of the peace.101  Alt-
hough the city had numerous ordinances regulating the public’s use 
of streets and other outdoor spaces—including ones governing pub-
lic markets, commerce, gambling, ball playing, and kite flying on 
streets and in public places—only one ordinance had potential, am-
biguous implications for nonreligious gatherings.102  The ordinance 
in question prohibited the beating of drums or other instruments 
“for the purpose of attracting the attention of passengers, in any 
street in the City of New York, to any show of beasts or birds or other 
 
 98 Passed in response to a certain Johny Edwards, a street preacher whose outdoor religious 
services apparently provoked disorder with some frequency, the ordinance simply banned 
religious gatherings in the city’s streets.  See Wertheimer, supra note 92, at 139 (“In July of 
1810, . . . the New York Common Council passed an ordinance mandating that from that 
time forward, ‘no assembly or assemblies of persons shall be permitted . . . under the pre-
tense of public worship’ in the streets or parks of New York City.” (internal citation omit-
ted)).  Within a month, however, it was amended in response to objections from local 
clergymen.  The revised version provided an exception for clergymen of any “regularly es-
tablished congregation.”  Id. at 139 n.22 (quoting VI N.Y.C., N.Y., MINUTES OF THE COMMON 
COUNCIL, 1784–1831, at 268–69 (1917) (emphasis added).  A subsequent amendment 
criminalized the act of disturbing any assemblage permitted under the ordinance.  See 
N.Y.C., N.Y., BY-LAWS AND ORDINANCES ch. XXV, § 6 (1839) (“No person shall disturb, 
molest or interrupt any clergyman or minister who shall have obtained permission ac-
cording to the fourth section of this title, or who shall be performing the rites of baptism 
as permitted by the fifth section of this title, or shall commit any riot or disorder in any 
such assembly, under the penalty of twenty five dollars for each offence.”).  The ordi-
nance was not challenged in litigation until the 1930s when it was ultimately upheld.  The 
ordinance is best understood as akin to the ordinances banning assemblies on the Sab-
bath, and an example of the lower protection offered to assemblies grounded in free ex-
ercise claims.  See People v. Smith, 188 N.E. 745, 745 (N.Y. 1934) (holding the neutral or-
dinance constitutional because “‘[i]t is too well settled by judicial decisions in both the 
state and federal courts that a municipality may pass an ordinance making it unlawful to 
hold public meetings upon the public streets without out a permit . . . to require discus-
sion’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 99 See infra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 105–20, 141–59 and accompanying text. 
101 Cf. N.Y.C., N.Y., PENAL CODE, tit. XIII (1865) (including unlawful assembly and rioting as 
“crimes against the public peace”).  The earliest publication of New York’s penal law was 
a draft in 1864.  The final penal code was published in 1865. 
102 See N.Y.C., N.Y., BY-LAWS AND ORDINANCES ch. XII, XXIII, XXVIII (1839) (listing ordi-
nances regulating public markets, the use of horses, and public places). 
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things in said City,” and, as such, was sufficiently vague as to arguably 
apply to the music in parades.103  Revealingly, this ordinance was sub-
sequently amended to foreclose this arguable interpretation.104 
The political and regulatory debates precipitated by the riots in 
the 1870s provide an invaluable window into the attitudes of nine-
teenth-century New Yorkers toward the importance of a robust right 
of outdoor assembly.  In 1870, a parade of Orangemen in New York 
City resulted in a riot.105  The following year, rumors surfaced that 
both Protestant and Irish-Catholic groups were preparing for armed 
battle.106 
In response, New York City’s Police Chief issued a remarkable or-
der.  He announced that the Orangemen’s parade called for July 12 
was prohibited.107  In justifying his decision, the Police Chief asserted 
unequivocally that “[a]ssemblages of any kind in places of public ac-
cess, and public street processions of every character, have never be-
come matters of popular right.”108  While “they are generally permit-
ted, and usually enjoy by popular assent, much freedom of action,” 
he insisted that this was only because American authorities were par-
ticularly lenient and liberal.109  Street processions were, in his view, 
proper objects “for police regulation and supervision” because they 
impose costs on others—“often” requiring “considerable sacrifice of 
public comfort.”110  The only real consideration, he concluded, was 
the “delicate task [of] . . . decid[ing] when . . . regulation and super-
vision shall begin, or how far it shall extend.”111  In this case, outright 
prohibition was obviously required. 
The Police Chief’s order and his comments provoked public fu-
ror.  Reporting on the debate in New York City, the Boston Daily Ad-
 
103 Id. at ch. XLIV, § 12 (emphasis added). 
104 See N.Y.C., N.Y., ORDINANCES ch. 8, art. XXIV, § 245 (1881) (clarifying that the ordinance 
“appl[ied] only to itinerant musicians and side shows, and shall not be construed so as to af-
fect any band of music or organized musical society engaged in any military or civic parade” (em-
phasis added)). 
105 See MARY P. RYAN, CIVIC WARS:  DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC LIFE IN THE AMERICAN CITY 
DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 229–30 (1997) (giving an account of the violence in 
1870 and discussing in general terms the debate that ensued about the legitimacy of eth-
nic processions in light of the constitutional right of assembly). 
106 Id. at 230.  
107 Id. at 230–31. 
108 Id. at 231 (quoted without citation); see also The Orange Procession, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, 
Issue 8, col. B, July 11, 1871, (paraphrasing the police superintendent as having said that 
“[l]egal discussions have settled that the occupation of the streets by a procession is a 
matter of usage or toleration, and is always subject to police regulation and supervision”). 
109 RYAN, supra note 105, at 231. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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vertiser related that the order “was almost universally condemned as a 
cowardly surrender on the part of the city authorities of New York.”112 
Even Irish-Catholic representatives, who supported the Police 
Chief’s decision to ban the parade, staked out a more limited de-
fense, arguing that since the Orangemen’s planned procession was 
intended to provoke a fight, it was outside the constitutional protec-
tion of peaceable assembly.113  To the degree the Orangemen antici-
pated rioting, a riot had never been constitutionally protected. 
The Police Chief was quickly overruled by New York’s Governor 
who responded to public opinion and revoked the order.  In doing 
so, he explained that the appropriate response to a real risk of vio-
lence was to promise to maintain order.114 
The views of both the Irish-Catholic representatives and the Gov-
ernor, despite their divergent conclusions, evidence the typical nine-
teenth-century understanding of outdoor assembly.  Both groups un-
derstood assembly as a privilege and immunity of citizenship, one 
that protected any peaceful gathering including outdoor gatherings 
and which, absent a credible threat of violence, did not require a 
weighing of the interests of the gatherers against the convenience of 
the public. 
The Orangemen paraded the next day with the protection of 
about three thousand police and National Guardsmen.115  Despite, or 
perhaps because of the police presence, violence ensued.  Of the six-
ty-two fatalities, fifty-five were killed at the hands of state forces.116 
The violence prompted a more extended public discussion about 
the contours of the right of assembly—most of which defended the 
right to unrestricted access to public spaces for assemblies until they 
actually became riots.  A short editorial in Harper’s Weekly defended 
 
112 The order of Superintendent Kelso of New York, forbidding the Orange procession and the Irish tar-
get-shooting excursions, was the general topic of conversation yesterday, and it was almost universal-
ly condemned as a cowardly surrender on the part of the city authorities of New York, BOS. DAILY 
ADVERTISER, July 12, 1871, Issue 9, col. A. 
113 Cf. A Fenian Manifesto, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 17, 1871, at 1 (reprinting resolutions adopted by 
the Fenian Brotherhood praising “the Municipal authorities” for banning the parade 
since they knew “that the intended procession was calculated to dangerously excite a 
large portion of the citizens”). 
114 See RYAN, supra note 105, at 231 (noting that the Governor was responding to public opin-
ion); cf. Irish Difficulty in New York:  Police Prohibition of Processions Revoked, DAILY EVENING 
BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Issue 81, col. C, July 12, 1871 (describing the scene in New York City on 
July 12, 1871, after Governor Hoffman revoked the order).  Some suggested that the 
Governor’s decision was politically motivated. 
115 See RYAN, supra note 105, at 232 (“The Times calculated the demographics of this strange 
parade as follows:  160 citizens, 800 police, and 220 soldiers of the state.”). 
116 Id. at 233. 
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the Governor’s decision, forcefully objecting to the notion that a 
peaceful parade could be suppressed in advance in response to the 
threats of hecklers.117  It dismissed the Police Chief’s original order as 
having been “made under the absurd pretext that processions in the 
streets are not matters of right, but of toleration.”118  The piece ar-
gued, further, that even in the face of a potential riot, the duty of of-
ficials is to “master[] the mob,” not to prevent it by suppressing 
speech or assembly.119  Others shared these views.  Henry Ward Bee-
cher, writing about the New York City controversy for The Yankton 
Press in South Dakota, argued, for instance, that a true vindication of 
the right of assembly required authorities to protect the peaceful as-
sembly from the mob.  Suppression was not an option.120 
This high tolerance for the irritations and turbulence that accom-
pany popular democracy, and the invocation of assembly as a privi-
lege and immunity of American citizenship, was typical and 
longstanding.  Consider the reaction of a Justice of the Peace in re-
sponse to a crowd in Northumberland, Pennsylvania during the 
Whiskey Rebellion in 1794.  The crowd had gathered to erect a liber-
ty pole to express its dismay at learning that the state militia had be-
gun its march from Philadelphia to Western Pennsylvania to suppress 
the rebellion.121  When two judges from the Court of Common Pleas 
for Northumberland County asked the Justice of the Peace, Daniel 
Montgomery, to go with them to read the riot act, Montgomery re-
plied that “the people were determined to have their grievances re-
dressed, and would erect the pole; and for his part he would put to 
his shoulder to lift or pull at the rope, if required by the people.”122  
Although Montgomery eventually went reluctantly with the judges, 
and violence did ensue, Montgomery never “ren-
der[ed] . . . assistance in preserving the peace.”123 
 
117 Plain Talk for Plain People, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 1871, at 2 (reprinting Harper’s Weekly editori-
al that interpreted the forbidding of the parade as an indication “that every public parade 
of peaceable citizens through the streets may rightfully be forbidden if a band of despe-
radoes and assassins announce that they do not choose to favor the procession”). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Henry Ward Beecher, The Orange Procession—Not the Battle of the Boyne, but the Question of 
Liberty in New York, YANKTON PRESS (Yankton, S.D.), Issue 2, col. G, Aug. 16, 1871 (arguing 
that “[n]o man has a right to be provoked at any exercise of another’s rights, which does 
not restrict his own”). 
121 Respublica v. Montgomery, 1 Yeates 419, 419 (Pa. 1795) (per curiam). 
122 Id. 
123 Id.  Montgomery was subsequently sued for failing to fulfill his official duties by “not ac-
tively assisting in suppressing a riot.”  Id.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
held that the crowd had constituted a riot given the ongoing insurrection and the pres-
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The 1875 North Carolina case of State v. Hughes evidences a simi-
lar high tolerance for the disorder associated with people congregat-
ing outdoors.124  The case arose out of a similarly politically fraught 
situation.  A crowd “assembled in the town of Oxford to celebrate the 
emancipation proclamation, and with two drums and fifes, marched 
up and down the streets for two or three hours.”125  At some point, the 
group was “told by the mayor to desist.”126  It refused.127  A constable 
arrived and also told them to stop.128  At this point, the procession’s 
leader took the initiative to test the lawfulness of the local officials’ 
orders:  “Hughes, with the procession, beating the drum, went to the 
Mayor’s to make up a case to be tried before a magistrate, to test the 
mayor’s right to forbid the procession.”129  The defendants were in-
dicted and convicted by a jury for three offenses:  riot; “common nui-
sance by the beating of drums and the blowing of fifes, and shout-
ing;” and “obstructing the streets.”130  The verdict was appealed on the 
grounds there had been no violence, although “[t]he streets [had 
been] obstructed from time to time during the interval.”131 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina overturned 
each conviction.132  Most interestingly, the court overturned the con-
viction for “obstructing the streets,” holding that since the procession 
was lawful, there needed to be evidence that the obstruction was 
more than that which “is usually incident to such assemblies” for 
there to be an indictable offense.133 
Stressing the importance of public assembly to American demo-
cratic politics, the court emphasized the need to set limits on the ex-
tension of these offenses: 
In a popular government like ours, the laws allow great latitude to public 
demonstrations, whether political, social or moral, and it requires but lit-
tle reflection to foresee, that if such acts as are here found by the jury, 
are to be construed to be indictable, that the doctrine of riots and com-
mon nuisances, would be extended far beyond the limits heretofore cir-
 
ence of arms, and, as such, ordered a trial to determine whether Montgomery had indeed 
failed in his active duty.  Id. at 422. 
124 State v. Hughes, 72 N.C. 25, 26 (N.C. 1875). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 27–28. 
133 Id. 
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cumscribing them, and would put an end to all public celebrations, how-
ever innocent or commendable the purpose.134 
Returning to New York City, it must be acknowledged that by 1872 
and in the face of an actual pattern of violence, dissenting voices to 
this tradition had emerged, but they remained in the minority.  The 
Police Chief was not without allies who agreed that parading on the 
public streets was a privilege not a right.  For example, an editorial in 
Every Saturday asserted, 
There is either a wanton or a careless confusion of terms and ideas in 
some quarters relative to the question of street parades.  The right of as-
semblage for peaceful purposes is specifically guaranteed by our constitu-
tion to all classes of citizens; but this guarantee of the fundamental law 
neither concedes nor implies the right of any body or society to occupy 
the public streets with a procession.135 
The right of public assembly, the author argued, only protected 
meetings in private halls where the group is not trespassing:  “[I]t is 
an extravagant and wholly unauthorized misuse of words to say that 
this great right of quiet assemblage, either gives or covers a right to 
monopolize the public highways.  The streets of a city are its corpo-
rate property . . . .”136 
Like the Police Chief, the author conceded that “[t]he privilege of 
parade has heretofore been allowed to everybody, and it must be so 
allowed and protected till statutes of general application have been 
passed.”137  He maintained, however, that one “ought always to keep 
in view that there is a line between absolute right and permissive 
right.”138  Public inconvenience had to be recognized as a countervail-
ing interest:  “Except on public holidays a street parade is inevitably 
something of a nuisance[,]” and “each of our large cities . . . will soon 
be compelled to prohibit all these parades . . . except those of a civic 
or military character in which everybody is supposed to participate.”139  
In a move typical of our contemporary worldview, but extremely unu-
sual for the time, the author criticized city officials for having 
“discriminat[ed] against one class of citizens.”140 
Dissenting views were not limited to the editorial pages.  The 1871 
riot prompted legislative action.141  The first government body to 
 
134 Id. at 28. 
135 Editorial, The Right of Street Parades, EVERY SATURDAY, Aug. 12, 1871, at 146. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 146–47. 
140 Id. at 146. 
141 See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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move for change was New York City’s Board of Police, which pro-
posed the introduction of a permit requirement for all street parades, 
except funeral processions and those undertaken by the National 
Guard.142  Under the proposed resolution, if permission were granted, 
then a police escort would be provided.143  Weighing in, the Mayor 
explained that he considered the “authorities . . . perfectly justified in 
forbidding processions; [the fact] that it was done in the recent in-
stance for the first time, simply show[ed] that the question was never 
before presented for decision.”144 
Although the proposal was quickly referred to a legislative com-
mittee tasked with giving a “legal opinion on the best method of doing 
away with street processions,” no ordinance materialized, and the 
matter was apparently dropped.145  Shortly thereafter, though it is not 
clear why, groups seeking to march considered themselves required 
to seek permission from the Board of Police.146 
Controversy broke out again, in December, after the Board of Po-
lice issued a notice prohibiting the International Society from under-
taking a Sunday procession to commemorate the death of recently 
executed Communists.147  “[T]he secular Press . . . with but few excep-
tions, condemn[ed] the order as a violation of the rights of the citi-
zen, [and] as ill-timed and arbitrary,”148 and the Internationalists de-
cided to parade without permission.  They were arrested.149  In 
protest, they held an indignation meeting at which, after much de-
bate, they resolved, among other things, to appeal to the Governor.150 
Pressure from the International Society soon prompted the local 
officials to back down.  In exasperation, the Police Commissioner an-
 
142 See The Recent Riot, Action of the New York Police Board as to Future Parades, Etc., MORNING 
REPUBLICAN (Little Rock, Ark.), Issue 54, col. D, July 18, 1871, (noting that the police “re-
solved, that excepting parades of the national guard and funeral processions, no proces-
sion of any kind shall be permitted to occupy the streets of New York, without permission 
from the board of police”). 
143 See id. (noting that if permission for a parade was granted “the superintendent shall give 
an escort and proper protections”). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. (emphasis added). 
146 Cf. The Red Flag, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1871,  at 1(making clear that the Communists wish-
ing to conduct a commemorative procession considered themselves required to seek 
permission from the board of police, though they disagreed with this requirement). 
147 See The Communist Parade Prohibited by the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1871, at 1 (noting that 
the Board of Police ruled “that the proposed parade of the [International] Society on 
Sunday next, Dec. 10, will not be permitted on that day”). 
148 The Internationals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1871, at 1 (quoting the Police Commissioner’s 
gloss of the press’s response). 
149 See The Red Flag, supra note 146, at 1 (documenting “the arrest of our brethren”). 
150 Id. 
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nounced that “[t]he Legislature, by such laws as may be deemed just, 
should regulate this whole subject of street processions, whether on 
week days or Sundays.”151  The Mayor similarly asserted his continued 
belief that “[a]ll street processions composed of the few or of the 
many are illegal,”152 but presented a resolution asking the Legislature 
to pass an act regulating street processions, which reaffirmed the law-
fulness of processions in the public streets subject to a set of condi-
tions, including that such processions would notify the Mayor in writ-
ing at least six hours in advance so that officials could determine 
where the procession marched and that processions would not be 
permitted on Sundays except for “funeral, or benevolent, or religious 
purposes.”153  The proposal also included a provision under which vio-
lent bystanders could be prosecuted.154 
The Governor’s broad view of the value of “occupation[s] of the 
public streets by bodies of men for the purpose of civic as well as mili-
tary processions” ultimately prevailed when the state legislature took 
up the matter in January of 1872.155  The first bill introduced in the 
legislature, which called for the regulation of processions by permit-
ting,156 was quickly shelved after being subjected to stinging criti-
cism.157 
 
151 The Internationals, supra note 148, at 1. 
152 The Internationalists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1871, at 8 (explaining further that “[c]ustom, 
usage, and toleration, both of the governors and the governed, have permitted the tech-
nical trespasses of many processions,” but this custom does not prevent the lawful prohi-
bition of a procession likely to “invite disorder”). 
153 The Internationals, supra note 148, at 1. 
154 Id. 
155 The Governor’s Message, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1872, at 1 (“The occupation of the public streets 
by bodies of men for the purpose of civic as well as military processions has been permit-
ted under a custom so long established that it has come to be looked upon as a common 
right.  It has been the practice of New York City to afford them protection by the pres-
ence and escort of part of the Police force, without reference to the occurrences which 
the demonstrations were designed to celebrate, or to the race, color or sentiments, politi-
cal or religious, of those engaging in them.  This right of procession has been considered 
to be established by custom as firmly as the right of free discussion and as is the right of 
the people ‘peaceably to assemble’ by the Constitution of the United States, and may be 
regarded, in some sense, as a practical exercise of those rights.”). 
156 See The State Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1872, at 10 (“All processions, except of the Na-
tional Guard, the Police and the Fire Department, are forbidden, unless notice of the ob-
ject, time and route be given beforehand to the Police authorities, and their written con-
sent obtained, when suitable protection shall be furnished.”).  The proposed bill also 
banned all processions, except funeral processions, on Sundays.  Id. 
157 See, e.g., Public Processions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1872, at 6 (offering a laundry list of objec-
tions to the proposed bill). 
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The new law, enacted in May 1872, constituted the first substantial 
development of the law of public assembly in New York City.158  It 
prohibited parades on Sundays except for funeral and other religious 
processions.159  Processions on streets with railway tracks were also 
regulated.160  Otherwise, organizers of any parade were required to 
provide to police authorities “written notice of the object, time and 
route of such procession or parade . . . not less than six hours previous 
to its forming or marching” in order that the police authorities could 
provide escorts “as may be necessary to protect persons and property, 
and maintain the public peace and order.”161  This final provision 
empowered authorities to “designate to such procession or parade 
how much of the street in width it [could] occupy.”162 
The new legislation was significant for what it did, but also for 
what it did not do.  Unlike the ordinances that would come later, lo-
cal officials were not given the power to grant or deny a permit.163  
The legislation did not even empower authorities to determine the 
route.  Instead, while authorities were given substantial new authori-
ty—to determine the amount of the street that could be used, to for-
bid processions on Sunday, and to ensure noninterference with oper-
ation of streetcars—they were also required to furnish whatever 
police presence was necessary to ensure public safety.164  Participants, 
meanwhile, were only required to give six hours’ notice.165 
The new act illustrates once again the value nineteenth-century 
Americans placed on the tradition of the people outdoors, notwith-
standing the very real risks of disorder, even violence, associated with 
that tradition.166  Although congested and ripe for regulation, New 
 
158 See Order of the Police Superintendent Relative to Street Parades, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1872, at 8 
(summarizing the provisions of the new law). 
159 An Act to Regulate Processions and Parades in the Cities of the State of New York § 3 
(passed May 7, 1872), reprinted in N.Y., 1 THE SPECIAL AND LOCAL LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC 
INTERESTS IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1880, at 868 (1880). 
160 Id. § 1. 
161 Id. § 2. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. §§ 1-5. 
164 Id. § 2. 
165 Id.  
166 New York City was not the only city to move to a notice rather than a permit requirement 
in its effort to enhance control over outdoor processions.  San Francisco also opted for a 
notice requirement for street parades.  Ordinance No. 1857 (New Series) § 72 (Approved 
March 26, 1912), reprinted in S.F., CAL., SAN FRANCISCO TRAFFIC ORDINANCES 20–21 
(1924).  In 1912, it passed an ordinance that predicated the lawfulness of a parade on giv-
ing authorities twenty-four-hour notice.  Id.  Unlike in New York City, in San Francisco, 
the ordinance, which was passed significantly later and at a time when a newer more cir-
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York City for a very long time chose only to interfere with those polit-
ical assemblies that had actually become disorderly.167  In fact, New 
York, despite its population and history of riots, did not require per-
mits for street parades until 1914, significantly later than other Amer-
ican cities.168  New York City’s Police Commissioner, particularly for 
the time, was a strong advocate of freedom of speech and assembly 
even for radicals, implementing a policy for Union Square in which 
his officers were “instructed . . . to intercede . . . only if obstructions 
to the streets or sidewalks resulted [from speeches in the square] or if 
the speakers incited immediate violence.”169  Although by the twenti-
eth century the city had gone a long way toward regulating outdoor 
gatherings through permits, as late as 1931, New York did not require 
permits for political gatherings on its streets.170  New Yorkers contin-
ued to have free access to public streets for purposes of holding a 
meeting or giving a political speech, so long as they acted peacea-
bly.171 
 
cumscribed conception of the right had gained traction, authorized the Chief of Police to 
“designate the street or streets such procession or parade can occupy.”  Id. 
167 For the full account of New York City’s regulatory history with respect to outdoor gather-
ings, see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 152–78 (systematically reviewing eight editions of 
the city’s municipal codes between 1823 and 1931 as well as one edition of its park regu-
lations). 
168 The new ordinance applied to any “procession, parade, or race” and required that the 
application for a permit “be made in writing . . . not less than 36 hours previous to the 
forming or marching of such procession, parade or race.” N.Y.C, N.Y., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES ch. 34, art. I, § 38(1) (1922).  It exempted certain groups—most interesting-
ly, “processions or parades, which have marched annually upon the streets for more than 
10 years, previous to July 7, 1914.”  Id. § 38(3)(c).  Finally, the ordinance laid out guide-
lines constraining the police commissioner’s decision-making.  Id. § 38(2)(a).  Prior to 
this ordinance, the city issued certificates when it had been notified of a parade (time, lo-
cation, and size) as required under the 1872 Act.  The certificate set out how much of the 
street the parade could occupy and reminded the organizers that the 1872 Act prohibited 
interfering with surface railways.  Cf. Certificate for Salvation Army Parade, July 8, 1909 
(RG. 2.12, 109/3) (on file with the Salvation Army National Archives and Research Cen-
ter, Alexandria, Va.) (noting also the prohibition on carrying red flags during a parade). 
169 DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 102 (1997); see also id. at 101–03 
(recounting New York City Police Commissioner Arthur Woods’ views and noting his tol-
erance is confirmed by contemporary newspaper reporting and internal police docu-
ments). 
170 San Francisco, similarly, maintained through the 1920s a unique 1903 ordinance exempt-
ing public meetings from its unlawful crowd provision.  Ordinance No. 833 § 1 (June 11, 
1903) (“Whenever the free passage of any street or sidewalk shall be obstructed by a 
crowd, except on occasion of public meeting, the persons composing such crowd shall disperse 
or move on when directed so to do by any police officer.” (emphasis added)), reprinted in 
S.F., CAL., POLICE ORDINANCES 13 (1924). 
171 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE POLICE AND THE RADICALS:  WHAT 88 POLICE CHIEFS 
THINK AND DO ABOUT RADICAL MEETINGS 4 (1921) [hereinafter ACLU 1921] (“New York 
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B.  Privileges and Immunities for Religious Gatherings 
Ordinances prohibiting assembly or requiring advance permission 
to gather were not consistent with the traditional regulatory approach 
to public assemblies, which targeted only those gatherings that had 
actually become violent and disruptive.  For one, the ordinances reg-
ulated gatherings that were peaceful.  For another, they transformed 
access to outdoor space from being a matter of right to being a privi-
lege dispensed by local authorities at their discretion.   
The first of such ordinances masked the full implications of this 
tension because initial reforms were circumscribed.  They applied on-
ly to the margins—to parks and religious gatherings.172  More im-
portantly still, as we will see, they were enforced only against the least 
respectable members of society.  “Good” citizens, for now, were unaf-
fected.  
As the new regulatory framework expanded from the margins to 
the center, however, its consequences became harder to avoid.  And 
state courts were soon forced to wrestle with the constitutional impli-
cations in the context of ordinances passed to suppress the Salvation 
Army’s outdoor religious missionary work.173 
The Michigan Supreme Court was the first to do so, in a case aris-
ing out of Grand Rapids.  After being repeatedly thwarted in their ef-
fort to suppress the Salvation Army in criminal court, government of-
ficials in Grand Rapids opted to introduce the city’s first ordinance to 
restrict access to public streets—one of the first such ordinances in 
the country.174  Grand Rapids’s experience of regulatory change was 
more typical in terms of its timing and context than New York 
City’s.175 
When the Salvation Army began its work in the United States in 
1880, it was a loud, subversive and somewhat shabby religious move-
 
City . . . permits meetings in the public streets and public halls without any police control 
whatever.”). 
172 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 130–34 (describing scope of earliest permit requirements for 
public gatherings). 
173 See, e.g., In re Garrabad v. Dering, 54 N.W. 1104 (Wis. 1893); City of Chicago v. Trotter, 26 
N.E. 359 (Ill. 1891); Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719 (Kan. 1888); In re Frazee, 
30 N.W. 72 (Mich. 1886).   
174 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 128–29 (demonstrating that “[v]ery few cities required a 
permit in order to assemble in public places” as of 1881).  
175 The story recounted here was developed after reading the full run of the only local news-
paper to survive for the relevant period as well as a few articles about Grand Rapids that 
appeared in the 19th Century U.S. Newspapers Digital Archive.  In addition, I was able to 
review court decisions and a few surviving court records, among other things.  Finally, 
three editions of Grand Rapids’s municipal codes between 1873 and 1929 were reviewed.  
For a full account of the methodology, see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 10–15. 
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ment.  Its arrival in Grand Rapids—the second largest city in Michi-
gan with a population of just over 50,000—in November 1883 was not 
surprisingly greeted with mixed reviews.  Although some in the com-
munity were enthusiastic, one particular member of the Grand Rap-
ids elite, Mr. D. A. Blodgett, was keen to prevent the Salvation Army 
from gaining a hold in the city.176  By 1885, he was reported to be 
“generously using considerable of his wealth in the endeavor to drive 
religious superstition (such as the ‘Salvation Army’ . . . ) from this 
part of the State.”177 
Possibly because of such sentiment, in 1883, the city’s Chief of Po-
lice forbade the Salvation Army from parading on the city’s streets, 
particularly on Sundays.178  This prohibition did not, however, put an 
end to Salvationist parades. 
The Army continued to parade in Grand Rapids for at least two 
years, thanks to the license afforded them by juries and judges.  The-
se local fact-finders repeatedly evidenced a high tolerance for the 
disorder that resulted from Salvationist street preaching.179  Local ju-
ries, in particular, repeatedly acquitted the marchers of public nui-
sance charges brought by local officials.180 
1886 saw the election of a new Mayor, who was determined to put 
an end to Salvationist parades.  Upon assuming office, he quickly an-
nounced that he was “refus[ing] to further grant the [Salvation] army 
the freedom of the city for street parades with red banners and horri-
ble music” because they were “in their present form . . . a nuisance.”181  
To support his position, Mayor Dikeman recounted an accident he 
 
176 See J.M. Jamison, Letter to the Editor, Mr. Charles Watts at Grand Rapids, (Mich.), BOS. 
INVESTIGATOR, Dec. 9, 1885, at 2 (submitted by the author on Nov. 24, 1885). 
177 Id.  (reporting Blodgett to be a millionaire lumber magnet). 
178 Latest News Items, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Issue 57, col. F, Dec. 12, 1883; see also 
Corps History, Grand Rapids Centennial Temple Corps, Writing Contest Entry 43 in Ver-
tical File Collection, Grand Rapids (Fulton Heights Citadel), Mich., Corps History at S.A. 
Archives (“Open air evangelism was an important part of the early Army.  City laws were 
printed in Grand Rapids, however, stating that The Salvation Army could march, play 
tambourines, etc. during the week, but never on Sunday.”). 
179 See In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72, 73 (Mich. 1886) (noting that “the ‘Salvation Army’ . . . had 
paraded in Grand Rapids during two years or more”). 
180 Id.  (“[T]he ‘Salvation Army’ . . . on repeated prosecutions for public nuisance, had been 
acquitted”).  The only respite from this pattern was in 1885 when the city’s “new 
Mayor . . . granted [the Salvation Army] our rights, in allowing us to march, sing and play 
on the street.”  The Michigan War, Divisional Demonstration, Victory all along the Line—
Opening of Charlotte—And Other Items of Interest—Read!  Read!, WAR CRY, May 30, 1885, at 1. 
181 No More Salvation Parades, Mayor Dikeman Refuses the Salvationists Further Use of the Streets, 
EVENING LEADER, (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Aug. 4, 1886, at 4 (emphasis added). 
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had recently witnessed that had been caused by a horse, which had 
been frightened by a Salvationist parade.182 
The Salvation Army was undeterred, promptly defying the Mayor 
and parading the streets as usual.183  The following evening, fourteen 
members of the Army, including Captain Andrew Frazee, were arrest-
ed for disturbing the peace.184 
When a hearing was held in police court the following morning, 
counsel for the Salvationist defendants moved to quash the com-
plaint, arguing that noise from “singing, shouting and playing upon 
musical instruments” could not amount to “disturbing the peace.”185  
The judge promptly ruled that it was a question for the jury.186  The 
jury, once again, acquitted all of the defendants “after deliberating an 
hour and a half.”187 
Of particular interest is the fact that the jury acquitted the Salva-
tionists even after hearing an array of testimony about the inconven-
ience and disorder caused by their repeated parades.  Mayor 
Dikeman, for example, testified that “during the past ten days” the 
parades had caused large crowds, that he had witnessed a horse 
frightened by the noise, and that he himself found the processions 
very loud, although he was not irritated by them.188  Of the twelve ad-
ditional witnesses heard, ten testified that horses were frightened by 
the noise from Salvationist parades.189  One of them stated that he 
rode his horse “on the back streets lately” because his horse had been 
frightened by a Salvation Army parade two years ago.190  Many of the 
witnesses complained of the crowds that the Army attracted.191   One 
asserted that a crowd of between “800 and 1,500 people” had amassed 
 
182 Id. 
183 Salvationists in Limbo, Fourteen Members of the Army and Seven Sympathizers Under Arrest, 
EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Aug. 6, 1886, at 4. 
184 Id.  That same evening, a second parade, consisting of “seven members of the State Holi-
ness association” was also stopped.  It had taken to the streets to express sympathy for the 
Army, after hearing of the first arrests.  Id. 
185 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
186 Id. 
187 The Happy Army, The Salvationists Are Preparing for a Great Love Feast, EVENING LEADER 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.), Aug. 13, 1886, at 4.  The case against the second parade was dis-
missed. 
188 The Salvationists, Their Examination Begun—Mayor Dikemen [sic] Tells What He Knows of the 
Army’s Parades, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Aug. 10, 1886, at 4. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
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on the streets the previous Thursday evening.192  Finally, several testi-
fied that the Army made “a great deal of noise.”193 
Having won, again, the Salvation Army immediately started to 
prepare “for a grand jubilee celebration at the barracks.”194  That 
evening the Salvation Army paraded in its usual manner.195 
Midway through, the police arrived and arrested eleven of them.196  
This time, the charge was causing a public nuisance.197  The defendants 
pled not guilty, opting for a bench trial.198  In late August 1886, they 
were acquitted when the court found that their parade was not a nui-
sance.199 
The city’s efforts to crack down on the Salvation Army had failed 
once again.  While we cannot know specifically what the Grand Rap-
ids juries and judges were thinking, one thing is clear:  they rejected 
the city officials’ view that the processions were disruptive and disor-
derly and thus worthy of suppression.  Twice in one month the city 
was rebuffed.  The evening processions, however noisy and unhar-
monious, and despite the crowds they collected, constituted neither a 
breach of the peace nor a public nuisance in the view of the local 
populace. 
These Grand Rapids fact-finders were not the only ones to reject 
municipal efforts to use criminal law to suppress Salvationists pa-
rades.  In 1893, New Jersey prosecuted a member of the Salvation 
Army engaged in an open-air meeting for disturbing the peace and 
unlawful assembly.200  The Salvation Army won its case “on grounds of 
peaceable assembly and freedom of religion.”201 
After having been repeatedly thwarted by local juries, the gov-
ernment officials in Grand Rapids turned to a legislative solution:  
the enactment of the city’s first permit requirement for public pa-
rades.  A front-page headline, announcing the proposed ordinance, 
 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Police v. Soldiers, THE EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Aug. 14, 1886, at 4. 
195 Id. (describing the procession as consisting of “nothing but the same plain old ar-
my . . . dressed about the same as for the past two years,” singing “the same songs and 
with voices about as strong as usual; played upon the same musical instruments,” and pa-
rading “the same streets”). 
196 Id. 
197 Lads and Lassies in Court, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Aug. 16, 1886, at 4 
(emphasis added). 
198 Id. 
199 Latest News Items, DAILY EVENING BULL., (S.F., Cal.), Aug. 26, 1886, at F. 
200 Edward Carey, Vignettes of Army History—‘You should be at home with your mother!’, WAR CRY, 
Apr. 19, 1980, at 5 (reference to case not included). 
201 Id. 
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read simply,  “It Means Salvation Army, An Ordinance Now Pending 
That Will Prevent Singing and Shouting in the Streets.”202 
On September 13, an ordinance, which rendered parades on the 
streets unlawful in the absence of a permit, was passed, by a vote of 
ten to four.203  The new ordinance explicitly preserved the city’s pre-
existing street regulations, including its nuisance provision.204 
During the legislative debate, only one Alderman spoke out 
against the ordinance.  He “said he was not a Salvation Army man, 
but he was opposed to curtailing any religious privileges or the per-
sonal freedom of any man.”205  His colleagues were not persuaded.  
One Alderman, in response, retorted, 
 that he was as much in favor of liberty as anybody. . . . but he did not be-
lieve this twaddle about the rights of the Salvation Army being violated.  
They had a right to worship as they pleased but not to interfere with his 
rights and make themselves a nuisance.206   
Another remarked that “the crazy crowd dancing and drumming on 
the streets—[is] enough to almost convince [me] that there is more 
than one God” and argued that “it [was] the duty of the council to 
make ordinances to secure citizens from annoyances and protect 
them from crazy fanatics and fools.”207  The debate in city council fo-
cused entirely on the Salvation Army and whether it was appropriate 
to curtail the group’s religious activities in the public streets.208 
Once the new ordinance passed, the Salvation Army, an organiza-
tion interested in making converts not law, was quick to petition the 
 
202 It Means Salvation Army, An Ordinance Now Pending That Will Prevent Singing and Shouting in 
the Streets, EVENING LEADER, (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Aug. 31, 1886, at 1. 
203 The City’s Law Makers: The Salvation Army Ordinance Passes—A New Name Wanted—People 
Who Don’t Want the Dummy Line, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Sept. 14, 1886, 
at 4.  The new ordinance provided, in relevant part, 
No person or persons, association or organizations, shall march, parade, ride, or 
drive in or upon or through the public streets of the city of Grand Rapids, with 
musical instruments, banners, flags, torches, flambeaux, or while singing or shout-
ing, without having first obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of 
said city; funeral and military processions, however, shall not be subject to the 
foregoing provisions of this section; but such processions, as well as those having 
the permit or consent of the mayor or common council, when using the public 
streets of said city, shall conform to such directions as the mayor or chief of police 
may give in relation to the streets to be used, and the portion thereof to be occu-
pied by them, and in relation to the manner of such use. 
  In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72, 73 (Mich. 1886) (quoting the ordinance) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
204 In re Frazee, 30 N.W. at 73. 
205 The City’s Law Makers, The Salvation Army Ordinance Passes—A New Name Wanted—People 
Who Don’t Want the Dummy Line, supra note 203, at 4. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
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Common Council for permission to parade the streets.  Its applica-
tion emphasized that “[t]he parades [were] held as a duty to God and 
a necessity to the good work, and ceasing the parades [would] badly 
cripple the salvation operations inasmuch as the class of people 
sought to be reached will be beyond the effect of the hallelujah 
corps.”209 
After tabling the matter for a week,210 at the Mayor’s urging, the 
Common Council voted, nine to six, to deny the Salvation Army’s re-
quest for permission to parade.211  It also “instruct[ed] the superin-
tendent of police to enforce the ordinance relative to street pa-
rades.”212 
Once again, the Salvationists’ response was to defy the ordinance 
and parade the streets with their drums and tambourines, and once 
again the marchers were arrested—this time for failing to have the 
requisite permission as required by the new ordinance.213 
Before the police court, counsel for the Salvation Army chal-
lenged the ordinance, among other things, for taking from the jury 
the question of the lawfulness of the assembly.214  The city’s charter 
typically “impowered [sic] the council to pass ordinances for the pun-
ishment of unlawful acts,” he said, and a “person arrested for an al-
leged unlawful act ha[s] a right to ask a jury to pass upon its legality.”215  
The ordinance, however, “foreclosed all inquiry into the legality of 
the act” by the jury.216  “The only questions of fact were, did they parade 
and did they have permission.”217  The attorney also made the point that 
the decision to prohibit an assembly was entirely up to the “caprice” 
of the Mayor, who “might permit the most disorderly mob to parade 
 
209 Aldermanic Wisdom, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Sept. 21, 1886, at 4.  There is 
no internal legal correspondence pertaining to Grand Rapids from this period at the Sal-
vation Army National Archives and Research Center in Alexandria, Virginia. 
210 See id. (noting that “[o]n motion of Ald. Brenner the matter was tabled for a week”). 
211 The Streak of Economy, The Aldermen Chop Down Expenses—The Dummy Line Extension—The 
Mayor Calls a Relief Meeting, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Sept. 28, 1886, at 4. 
212 Id. 
213 See The Army Again in Limbo, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Sept. 29, 1886, at 4 
(explaining that “[t]he Salvation Army defied the powers that be and the new ordinance 
last night and paraded the streets as usual” and “spent the night at headquarters”); In re 
Frazee, 30 N.W. 72, 72–74 (Mich. 1886) (noting that “[o]n the twenty-ninth of Septem-
ber, 1886, petitioner and several others were arrested for having violated the ordinance 
on the previous evening”). 
214 Will Test the Ordinance, Attorney Carroll’s Present Job—The Highest Courts Will Deal With the Sal-
vation Army Case, If Necessary, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Sept. 30, 1886, at 4. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the streets, and refuse permission to the most orderly procession.”218  
The hearing was continued after the presiding judge asked the city’s 
attorney for authorities to support the validity of the ordinance.219 
That same day, the Army’s attorney also sought a writ of habeas 
corpus from the circuit court on the ground that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional.220  When the writ was denied by a circuit judge, Cap-
tain Frazee opted to remain in prison in order to appeal the denial of 
habeas to the Michigan Supreme Court.221 
In his habeas petition to the state’s highest court, Frazee argued 
that the provision requiring advance permission to parade in the 
public streets with music and banners was void “as an unreasonable 
and unlawful interference with the streets” by the municipality and 
“outside of any inference or grant of authority in the charter.”222  
These were standard arguments about transgressing the limits of mu-
nicipal powers as defined by the city’s charter. 
The city’s primary argument on appeal was that the Salvation Ar-
my had defied the law by refusing to accept that it was making “a pub-
lic nuisance” of itself with its “instruments, drums, tambourines and 
horns and . . . loud singing and shouting on the public streets.”223  
The brief continued, 
[U]nder certain restrictions and regulations the marches of these people 
may be harm[l]ess and lawful, on the other hand left unrestrained and 
without any control over them by the City under its general police power 
to regulate the use of the public streets, their parades will unquestionably 
tend to a breach of the peace—to frighten horses, to impede the progress of travel 
and thereby endanger the public safety and perhaps ultimately result in bloodshed 
as it has been shown by counsel in the court below resulted from parades 
of this character in England.224 
While no doubt this was the view of Grand Rapids’ elected officials, 
local juries had repeatedly decided that the Salvation Army had not 
created a public nuisance through its actions. 
Oral argument on the habeas petition was held before the Michi-
gan Supreme Court on October 19, 1886.225  The argument lasted for 
 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Taken to the Supreme Court, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Oct. 7, 1886, at 4.  
The trial in police court was adjourned pending resolution of the habeas proceeding.  Id. 
222 In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72, 73–74 (Mich. 1886). 
223 Brief for Respondent at 6–7, In re Frazee, 30 N.W. at 73 (internal citation omitted). 
224 Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added). 
225 See Salvation is Free, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Oct. 20, 1886, at 4. 
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five hours.226  At its conclusion, “[T]he court rendered an order re-
leasing the prisoner, thus declaring the city ordinance . . . invalid and 
unconstitutional.”227 
The Salvation Army was quick to celebrate, parading “with the 
whole musical and spectacular paraphernalia of the order, including 
the relic of [a] famous brass band.”228  The parade was followed by a 
celebration at the barracks.  “The music was not wholly musical, but 
the fourteen members of the band showed their willingness to pro-
duce something akin to harmony.”229 
Nine days later, on October 28, the Michigan Supreme Court is-
sued an opinion explaining its decision that the ordinance was un-
reasonable and void.230  Viewing the central issue as one of municipal 
powers, the bulk of the decision was devoted to explaining why the 
ordinance was not authorized by the powers conferred by the char-
ter.231  The rest of the decision was devoted to explaining how it 
would be improper to infer such a power since the ordinance in-
fringed on constitutional rights—particularly the right of peaceable 
assembly.232 
The opinion emphasized that “[i]t has been customary, from time 
immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized countries, for 
people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, 
by day or reasonable hours at night, with banners and other para-
phernalia, and with music of various kinds.”233  The court further not-
ed that “processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations 
are resorted to for the express purpose of keeping unity of feeling 
and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce some effect on the public 
mind by the spectacle of union and numbers.”234 
 
226 Id. (noting that “[t]he arguments commence at 11 o’clock in the forenoon and the flow 
of eloquence did not cease until four in the afternoon”). 
227 Id. 
228 Celebrating Their Independence, EVENING LEADER (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Oct. 21, 1886, at 4. 
229 Id. 
230 In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72, 73–74 (Mich. 1886). 
231 Id. 
232 See id. at 74 (“We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to 
grant . . . as only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will enable the 
city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance with the limitations and condi-
tions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of law, 
which cannot be less careful of private rights under a constitution than under the com-
mon law.”). 
233 Id. at 75. 
234 Id. 
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The court explicitly acknowledged that processions create a risk of 
disorder, but it explained that such risks could be addressed when 
they actually arose, as they always had been: 
[Processions] are . . . capable of perversion to bad uses, and, when so 
perverted, may be dangerous.  When people assemble in riotous mobs, 
and move for purposes opposed to private or public security, they be-
come unlawful, and their members and abettors become punishable.  
These dangers are as well-known as the customs themselves are, and are 
sometimes very great dangers.  There may be times and occasions when 
such assemblies may for a while be dangerous in themselves, because of 
inflammable conditions among the population.  All of these things are as 
ancient as the law, and are generally within reach of the law, unless the 
law itself is, for the time, suspended by military necessity. . . . It is only 
when political, religious, social or other demonstrations create public dis-
turbances, or operate as nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some 
tangible public or private mischief that the law interferes.235 
After the decision from the Michigan Supreme Court, Grand Rapids 
abandoned its regulatory efforts. 
The Michigan Supreme Court’s tolerance of the disruption asso-
ciated with outdoor gatherings was typical of the period.  Prior to 
1897, all but one of the state supreme courts asked to review ordi-
nances requiring advance permission to gather in public places 
found the ordinances void.236 
Nineteenth-century judges were not impressed by the risk of dis-
order or the inconvenience to passers-by posed by large public gath-
erings.  Instead, they emphasized that the genius of the nation’s free 
and democratic institutions was that they allowed great latitude when 
the people came out to demonstrate in the street for political, reli-
gious, and social purposes.  As one court put it,  
The spirit of our free institutions allows great latitude in public pa-
rades and demonstrations, whether religious or political, and if they 
do not threaten the public peace, or substantially interfere with the 
rights of others, every measure repressing them, whether by legislative 
enactment, or municipal ordinance, is an encroachment upon fun-
damental and constitutional rights.237 
The 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas, in Anderson v. 
City of Wellington, is illustrative.  Like the Michigan Supreme Court in 
the Frazee Case, the Supreme Court of Kansas completely rejected the 
 
235 Id. 
236 See Abu El-Haj 2009, supra note 6, at 570 n.125 (comprehensively reviewing decisions 
from the period).  The history offered here shows that the standard account of the legal 
history has been mistaken in its analysis.  See, e.g., ZICK, supra note 7, at 183–86 (offering a 
quick summary of the standard historical account based on Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 
U.S. 43 (1897)). 
237 Rich v. City of Naperville, 42 Ill. App. 222, 223–24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1891). 
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city’s argument that the ordinance was justified because an unusual 
crowd or congregation of people upon the public streets is a disturb-
ance of the public peace or, at least, threatens a disturbance of the 
peace and, thus, threatens the good order of the community: 
A crowd of people is one of the most ordinary incidents of every-day life 
in any city of considerable size in this country . . . . it is not a fair estimate 
of the character and habits of the American people to assume that the 
public peace is threatened when numbers of them congregate.238 
Instead, it found the requirement of advance permission patently un-
reasonable because under the ordinance, “political par-
ties . . . Masonic and Odd Fellow’s organiza-
tions . . . [e]ven . . . Sunday-School children . . . [and] [t]he Grand 
Army of the Republic” would be prevented from parading the streets, 
in the manner to which they were accustomed, in the absence of “the 
written consent of some municipal officer.”239  In holding that the 
city’s charter did not confer the power to pass the parading ordi-
nance, the Kansas Supreme Court explicitly invoked the right of 
peaceable assembly as a limit on the city’s power: 
The right of the people in this state, by organization to co-operate in a 
common effort, and by a public demonstration or parade to influence 
public opinion, and impress their strength upon the public mind, and to 
march upon the public streets of the cities of the states with the usual ac-
companiments of bands, banners, transparencies, glee clubs, and all the 
accessories of public meetings, is too firmly established, and has been too 
often exercised, to be now questioned. . . .240 
In sum, while Mayor Dikeman and various members of the Grand 
Rapids Common Council considered the Salvation Army to be a nui-
sance and believed they were entitled to repress the organization, lo-
cal juries, trial judges, and ultimately the justices on the Michigan 
Supreme Court stood in their way.  In doing so, these nineteenth-
century actors evidenced an appreciation of the value of assembly to 
politics and a respect for the right to assemble as a privilege and im-
munity of American citizenship even in the face of evidence of disor-
der and inconvenience—if not actual violence.  Their views, more 
importantly, were typical of the period. 
 
238 Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719, 721 (Kan. 1888). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 722 (finding the ordinance unreasonable for its violation of “recognized rights and 
privileges”). 
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C.  Conclusion 
Through the nineteenth century, Americans vigilantly defended 
their right to assemble in public, free from prior constraints, even 
when forced to acknowledge the inconvenience and disorder associ-
ated with crowds and the risk of violence sometimes posed by them.  
Notice requirements and criminal prosecutions, if and when actual 
violence ensued, were considered sufficient. 
This high tolerance for the irritations that come with democracy 
derived from the importance placed on assembling and parading in 
public in the American political tradition.  The fact that the state su-
preme courts that reviewed the first municipal ordinances requiring a 
permit to lawfully gather on the streets consistently found them void 
is a testament to the value placed on the right of assembly at the time.  
These courts balked at the suggestion that general permit require-
ments were reasonable efforts to regulate street gatherings, emphasiz-
ing that the ordinances infringed upon important democratic and 
constitutional traditions of assembling. 
An editorial in Detroit’s The Evening News in 1901, reflected the 
nineteenth-century view well when it explained that while the main 
purpose of a road is travel, and, as such, the roadways should not be 
obstructed, the gatherings of citizens has traditionally been im-
portantly exempted from that general principle.241  In the words of its 
author, 
When the people at large want to assemble to discuss public affairs, they 
are not under any obligation to ‘hire a hall.’  The open public squares are 
theirs to use for such a purpose. . . .  [this understanding, even applicable in] 
great cities[,] . . . has come about from common sense and common cus-
tom, as derived from a broad and liberal application of the constitutional privilege 
of assembly and petition. . . . When they come out in their thousands, and 
fill the public squares for a peaceful and orderly purpose, they literally 
take possession of and make use of their own property, and, for the time be-
ing, the ordinary law of the road is suspended. . . . Some lawyers might cavil at 
this, but the custom is universal in free countries, and the well-
established custom is law.242 
This tolerance is less surprising than one might think at first.  
Aside from the fact that, as we have seen, tolerance for the inconven-
ience and risk associated with outdoor assemblies had been ingrained 
 
241 Editorial, The Law of the Road, EVENING NEWS DETROIT, May 20, 1901, at 2 (noting that as 
a general rule and “[s]trictly, the road may not be used for other purposes than those for 
which it is designed,” but “[t]here is an exception to the strict law of the road in great cit-
ies, which has come about from common sense and common custom as derived from a 
broad and liberal application of the constitutional privilege of assembly”). 
242 Id. (emphasis added). 
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in American culture since the American Revolution, nineteenth-
century Americans lived with much more chaos and disorder general-
ly.  Cities were cramped and crowded.  Pigs did the garbage collect-
ing.243  Horses, wagons, and carts filled the cities’ largely unpaved 
streets, but traffic laws were nascent.244  Perhaps more importantly, 
lives were short and fragile. 
III.  ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
The nineteenth-century worldview would change.  Under pressure 
from immigration and industrialization, the Progressive Movement 
would arise and American cities would become more orderly.  Chang-
ing conceptions of the right of assembly, however, would start with 
the Massachusetts judiciary.  Unlike other state courts, Massachusetts 
courts repeatedly upheld ordinances regulating public assemblies, 
even when those ordinances operated as outright prohibitions.245  
This view, rather than those of the other state courts, as it happened, 
was the one to be taken up by the United States Supreme Court in 
1897.246  Thereafter, state courts around the nation changed their 
tune and began upholding the new regulations.247 
Public opinion did not immediately change, though.  Americans 
continued to evidence a high tolerance for the disorder associated 
with assemblies well into the twentieth century, despite the fact that 
permit requirements, once they were held constitutional, were widely 
adopted. 
Still, public tolerance of disorder would not last forever.  As more 
extensive regulations became normalized, advance regulation of 
peaceful outdoor gatherings became more acceptable to the public.  
Our current attitudes arise out of these changes, among others. 
 
243 Hendrick Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 899, 901 (1985) (“[I]n a world 
without professional streetcleaners, a world in which private citizens were expected to 
provide the manpower . . . to remove the excrement and the wastes of urban street life, 
pigs assumed a necessary public role, particularly in wards whose residents lacked availa-
ble servants.”). 
244 See generally PETER C. BALDWIN, DOMESTICATING THE STREET:  REFORM OF PUBLIC SPACE IN 
HARTFORD, 1850–1930 (1999); CLAY MCSHANE, DOWN THE ASPHALT PATH:  THE 
AUTOMOBILE AND THE AMERICAN CITY (1995).  My own review of municipal codes from 
the period turned up a handful of early efforts to regulate specific concerns.  Traffic laws 
as we know them, however, are a result of the advent of the automobile. 
245 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 30 N.E. 79 (Mass. 1892); Commonwealth v. 
Plaisted, 19 N.E. 224 (Mass. 1889); Commonwealth v. Davis, 4 N.E. 577 (Mass. 1886). 
246 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
247 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 207–17. 
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A.  Massachusetts:  The Origin of Judicial Reconsideration of the Right of 
Peaceable Assembly 
The origins of the constitutional sanctioning of extensive regula-
tion of outdoor gatherings lie in Boston.248  Although public opinion 
in Boston was not that different from attitudes in New York and 
Grand Rapids, Boston officials at all levels consistently dismissed 
claims that efforts to regulate public assembly in any way infringed on 
traditional privileges and immunities of citizenship, even when what 
was challenged were outright prohibitions of outdoor gathering in 
certain places. 
In contrast to the views of its sister courts around the nation, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts at no point recognized, let 
alone espoused, a commitment to American traditions of outdoor 
politics and a concomitant strong conception of the right of assem-
bly.  In fact, Massachusetts housed the only state supreme court to 
consistently uphold all variations of regulations of public gather-
ings.249 
Similarly, only twice in a twenty-year period did local Boston offi-
cials acknowledge any constitutional interests at stake in the new reg-
ulations.  The first time was right at the beginning of the two-decade 
controversy that is the subject of this section.250   
When the Salvation Army arrived in Boston for the first time, in 
September 1884, the group was under the impression that official 
permission was necessary for street parades and thus refrained from 
undertaking such parades.251  This impression was quickly dispelled by 
the Mayor, when, a month later, three delegates of the Salvation Ar-
my visited his office to request a parade permit.252 
The Mayor, in what would turn out to be an outlying stance for 
Boston officials, related the classic nineteenth-century understand-
 
248 The history recounted here is based on primary research that included, inter alia, a re-
view of court decisions and records from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Wil-
liam F. Davis’s own account of the events, coverage of the controversy in many different 
newspapers using the 19th Century U.S. Newspapers Digital Archive, and critical issues of 
The Boston Daily Globe.  In addition, I was able to obtain and review the municipal code for 
Boston in 1882 and compare it to the city’s code in 1925.  For a full account of the 
methodology, see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 10–15. 
249 See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
250 The second instance is discussed infra notes 267–69 and accompanying text. 
251 The Salvation Army:  Opening of Its Campaign in Boston—Yesterday’s Meetings at the West End—
Great Crowds, but No Disorder, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 8, 1884, at 8 (noting that 
“[t]he promised street parade was postponed until this evening as, through some over-
sight, no permit had been obtained from the police authorities”). 
252 The Salvation Army: The Interposition of the Mayor and the Aldermen Sought in Their Behalf, BOS. 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 7, 1884, at 8. 
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ings of the legal parameters for public assemblies.253  He explained to 
the Salvationists that they were not required to have a permit and as-
sured them that “there could be no objection to their parading in the 
streets more than for any organized body having peaceful designs.”254  
The only role for the police, he continued, would be “to preserve the 
[public] peace and to prevent any obstruction of the streets that 
might seriously interrupt public travel.”255  When the content of this 
meeting was reported, the Boston Daily Advertiser mocked the Salvation 
Army for its “unfamiliarity . . . with our civic affairs” and for “not duly 
consider[ing] the difference between civil and military rule.”256  There was no 
major interference by the police with Salvationist parades on the 
streets of Boston that year. 
Controversy about public assembly in Boston ultimately arose not 
over Salvationist parades, but over access to the Boston Common by 
other evangelical groups.  In 1862, almost exactly fifty years after New 
York City, Boston adopted an ordinance prohibiting any person from 
“deliver[ing] any sermon, lecture, address, or discourse on the [Bos-
ton] common, public garden, public squares, or common lands of 
the city without the permission of the mayor and aldermen.”257  Until 
then, speaking on the Boston Common and in the city’s gardens and 
squares was not regulated, except through the criminal law, and 
preaching on the Common was not interfered with.258 
In 1885, for the first time, police officers assigned to the Boston 
Common were given orders to enforce the 1862 ordinance.259  In re-
sponse, on May 17, more than a dozen religious figures of various 
denominations spoke on the Common without the required permit. 
 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. (emphasis added). 
257 Br. of James F. Pickering for Plaintiff in Error at 2, Davis v. Commonwealth, 167 U.S. 43 
(1897) (No. 229).  
258 See, e.g., Preaching on the Common:  The Congregational Ministers Discuss the Question in Its Var-
ious Aspects, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 16, 1885, at 8 (“In 1862, for the first time, 
preaching upon the Common was prohibited without permission from the mayor and al-
dermen.”); Boston Common:  The Evangelical Ministers Champion Rev. W.F. Davis, BOS. DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Jan. 10, 1888, at 2 (“So far as is known this privilege [of preaching on the 
Boston Common] was valued and frequently enjoyed, and never interfered with until 
January 1862. . . .”). 
259 See Worship on the Common:  The Preachers of Last Sunday Fined Thirty Dollars Each—Their De-
fence, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 29, 1885, at 8 (paraphrasing the testimony of a police 
officer, “Have been an officer on the Common during the summer months for three 
years past, . . . but had no expressed orders to preserve the peace until within a few weeks.  
Have lately received orders from my superior officer . . . to preserve order on the Com-
mon, and enforce the ordinance bearing on the subject of preaching on the Common”). 
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Not once in the following decades would a Massachusetts court 
see any reason to be concerned about the rights of religious freedom, 
peaceable assembly or free speech.  Instead, Massachusetts courts fac-
ing criminal prosecutions under this ordinance consistently upheld 
municipal efforts to repress “objectionable people” as a lawful exer-
cise of the police power.   
This trend began right from the start, at the police court proceed-
ings surrounding the first prosecution under the ordinance. The 
criminal cases were set up to test the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance, which the ministers considered an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on religious freedoms.260  At the hearing that was held in police 
court, the trial court judge quickly dismissed their arguments, viewing 
the ordinance as a proper exercise of the police power.  The judge’s 
only articulated reservation was that the targets of the ordinance had 
not been Reverend Hastings’ respectable audience:  “Of course no 
such class of people as that represented by the defendant [Reverend 
Hastings] was involved; the ordinance was intended for objectionable people.  
If good people wish to hold services, they can very easily get a per-
mit.”261 
After a couple of ministers defied the ordinance again, a second 
police court hearing took place on May 27, 1885.262  Once again, de-
fense counsel “made an argument of over an hour’s length” against 
the constitutionality of the ordinance.263  Once again, the court sum-
marily upheld the ordinance, stating, “I know nothing of the history 
of this ordinance, and we must presume that it was enacted in the in-
terest of order, and to prevent disorder . . . . I accept the ordinance as 
not in conflict with the Bill of Rights.”264 
 
260 See WILLIAM F. DAVIS, CHRISTIAN LIBERTIES IN BOSTON:  A SKETCH OF RECENT ATTEMPTS TO 
DESTROY THEM THROUGH THE DEVICE OF A GAG-BY-LAW FOR GOSPEL PREACHERS 46 (1887) 
(quoting the “Secretary of the Y.M.C. Association” as saying,  “We have come to try 
whether Christian citizens can be robbed of their constitutional rights to worship God 
freely on common grounds of Boston . . . by a city ordinance” (internal quotation marks 
omitted); accord Reverend A.H. Plumb, Preaching on the Common:  Permits Refused, 
CONGREGATIONALIST (Bos.), Dec. 22, 1887, at 10 (“[T]he Y.M.C.A., tired of the arbitrary 
refusals of the city authorities,” wanted to “[make] a test case.”). 
261 Freedom of Worship:  Clergymen and Laymen Fined in the Police Court for Preaching on the Com-
mon, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 22, 1885, at 2 (emphasis added).  During the hearing, a 
police officer testified that the “audience was of the middle class, and well behaved, and 
made no disturbance whatever.”  Id. 
262 See Worship on the Common:  The Case of the Preachers Continued—Some New Points Claimed by 
the Defence, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 28, 1885, at 8 (describing the hearing the previ-
ous day and the events that led to the hearing). 
263 Worship on the Common, The Preachers of Last Sunday Fined Thirty Dollars Each—Their Defence, 
supra note 259, at 8. 
264 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The attitudes of Massachusetts courts did not change even when 
officials sought to implement the ordinance as an outright prohibi-
tion on outdoor preaching.  A few years later, while Boston’s Mayor 
was proudly boasting that no permit request to preach on the Boston 
Common had been denied during his tenure, the city’s independent 
Park Commission refused to grant the Y.M.C.A. (another evangelical 
group) a permit to hold open-air meetings in two of its parks.265  The 
Commissioners justified their decision to deny the Y.M.C.A. access to 
the parks by explaining that they considered the city’s parks to be 
places for quiet recreation.266 
In the spring of 1889, the Commissioners also denied the Central 
Labor Union a permit to hold a public meeting in Franklin Park on 
July 4, using the same rationale.  The labor union, however, was not 
as willing to go along, and the controversy that erupted illustrates the 
unusual attitudes of Massachusetts officials, including its courts. 
When the permit was denied, the Union’s first recourse was to the 
City’s new Republican Mayor, Thomas N. Hart.  Upon the advice of 
corporation counsel, the Mayor refused the Union’s request for him 
to overrule the Park Commissioners.  Hart’s letter to the Secretary of 
the Central Labor Union, however, expressed sympathy for the Un-
ion and acknowledged both the people’s right of peaceful assembly 
and the park’s expansiveness: 
Our Declaration of Rights (Art. 19) says:  “The people have a right, in an 
orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common 
good.”  It seems to me proper that the law-abiding people should assem-
ble, under proper rules, in the public parks which, like Faneuil Hall, be-
long to the people.  Franklin Park is large enough to hold every man, woman 
and child in Boston, and your choice of time and place is both reasonable and in 
such entire harmony with the fundamental rights guaranteed by our constitution 
 
265 See Boston Common:  the Evangelical Ministers Champion Rev. W.F. Davis, supra note 258, at 2  
(“However, Rev. . . . Deming says that in the summer of 1887[,] the park commissioners 
refused to permit the Boston Young Men’s Christian Association to hold open-air meet-
ings at the Marine Park and at Franklin Park.”). 
266 See, e.g., No Preaching in Franklin Park, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 16, 1888, at 3 (report-
ing that the park commission explained its denial of access on the grounds that “the park 
is intended to be a place of recreation for the people, and this would not be the case were 
it used for holding meetings of any sort” (internal quotation marks omitted)); The Reli-
gious Outlook, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 1, 1888, at 4 (“The refusal . . . is sought to be 
justified by the plea that such permission would defeat the purpose for which the park ex-
ists—to provide a space for rest and recreation, from noise and disturbances.” (quoting 
The Watchman) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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that I shall immediately urge the Honorable Park Commissioners to modify or re-
verse their decision of May 31, 1889.267 
The Mayor’s letter is remarkable because it was the first time since 
1884 (when Boston’s Mayor lectured the Salvation Army that they 
were free to parade the streets so long as they did not create a dis-
turbance) that a government official in Massachusetts acknowledged 
the people’s “right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble 
to consult upon the common good.”268  The letter did not go so far as 
to question the very requirement of a permit (as other state supreme 
courts had).  Still, for Boston, where official voices consistently saw no 
constitutional concerns, even when individuals were entirely prohib-
ited from speaking or gathering in public, the letter was notable. 
The Mayor’s political support turned out not to be enough to 
change the position of the Park Commissioners.  In late June, after 
some back and forth, the Park Commission issued an open letter to 
the Mayor in which it reiterated its resolve that Franklin Park was not 
an appropriate venue for public meetings.269 
The city’s organized labor responded in turn by orchestrating a 
test case after holding multiple public meetings at private venues.270  
On July 3, an official of the Central Labor Union sent notice to the 
City of its intent to challenge the law.  In an open letter, published in 
The Boston Daily Globe, the Union clarified that labor “desired [access 
to] Franklin Park because [they] believe[d they] could find listeners 
who do not usually attend labor meetings” there.271  In doing so, the 
Union explicitly invoked the traditions of street politics in Boston: 
Nearly 60 years ago the workingmen of Boston celebrated the Fourth of 
July by a procession, oration and banquet at Faneuil Hall.  The labor 
men desire to revive this method of observing the day of our country’s 
declaration of independence from monarchical control by demonstra-
tions in favor of the new declaration of economic independence.272 
 
267 Letter from Thomas N. Hart, Mayor of Boston, to Mr. Frank K. Foster, Secretary Central 
Labor Union, reprinted in Brief for Defendant at 16, Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 30 N.E. 
79 (Mass. 1892). 
268 Id. 
269 See No Meetings:  The Commissioners’ Decision as to the Franklin Park Question, BOS. DAILY 
ADVERTISER, June 27, 1889, at 8 (“The only question is whether such a meeting place 
should be established in this park, and it is with great regret that we find ourselves 
obliged to say that our judgment upon this question is not the same as your honor’s.”). 
270 See Peace with Honor, Way Opened for Honorable Compromise, Mayor Offers Oakland Garden to 
Central Labor Union for July 4, Belief that United Workingmen Will Adopt the Wisest Course, BOS. 
DAILY GLOBE, July 1, 1891, at 4 (discussing potential labor demonstration at Oakland 
Gardens on July 4). 
271 George E. McNeill, Letter to the Editor, Oakland Garden:  Arrangements Made for Labor 
Meeting—Franklin Park Idea Entirely Abandoned, BOS. DAILY GLOBE, July 3, 1891, at 1. 
272 Id. 
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The test case was carefully coordinated.  At 10 a.m. on July 4, 
Henry Abrahams, Secretary of the Central Labor Union, “and other 
prominent members” of the Union met “at Oakland Garden and 
then proceeded to Franklin Park, followed by quite a gathering.  
Here, they were met by several park policemen who displayed a copy 
of the city ordinances in relation to the park system.”273  The Union 
members were told that a gathering in the park would be a violation 
of the park rules.274  “Secretary Abrahams replied that the Central La-
bor Union was determined that the laws established by the park 
commissioners should be brought before the court in order that their 
constitutionality might be fully determined.”275 
What followed was a “quiet[ ] but technical[ ] violat[ion of] the 
law.”276  Abrahams made a brief statement to the effect “that they had 
not assembled to create a riot, nor to destroy any of the flowers, the 
shrubbery, nor adornments of the park.  They were there, however, 
to assert what, in their opinion, was a right—namely, the right of pub-
lic assemblage.”277 
On July 8, in the West Roxbury police court, Abrahams was 
charged with violating the rules of the Board of Park Commissioners 
of the City of Boston, first, by delivering an oration in Franklin Park 
“without the prior consent of the Board of Park Commissioners” and, 
second, by failing to comply with a park police officer’s request not to 
make the oration.278  As expected, the case was appealed all the way to 
the Supreme Judicial Court.279 
On appeal, Abrahams made two constitutional arguments.  He ar-
gued, first, that the park rules conferred unfettered discretion in vio-
lation of constitutional guarantees of equal protection and the rule of 
law,280 and, second, that they conflicted with the Massachusetts Bill of 
 
273 They Broke the Law and are Awaiting Developments—Central Labor Union at Franklin Park, BOS. 
DAILY ADVERTISER, July 6, 1891, at 4. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 C.F. Willard, In the Forum, Laborers’ Mass Meeting at Oakland Garden, Many Speakers Discuss 
the Eight-Hour Question, Still Claim the Right to Use Franklin Park, Test Case To Be Tried in the 
Near Future, Committee Has Laid Itself Liable to Prosecution, BOS. DAILY GLOBE, July 5, 1891, at 
10. 
277 They Broke the Law and are Awaiting Developments—Central Labor Union at Franklin Park, supra 
note 273, at 4. 
278 Before the Court, Henry Abrahams and the Central Labor Union, Testimony in Important Test Case 
Heard by Judge Howard, Technical Violation of Park Ordinances Agreed To—Appealed, BOS. 
DAILY GLOBE, July 9, 1891, at 9. 
279 See id. (noting that the city solicitor informed the judge the case would be a test case). 
280 See Brief for Defendant at 12, Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 30 N.E. 79 (Mass. 1892) (ar-
guing that “even if the Commissioners have not exceeded their delegated authority, their 
‘rule’ prohibiting the making of an oration or harangue is unconstitutional and void” be-
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Rights, which provides that “the people have a right in an orderly and 
peaceable manner to assemble to consult upon the common good.”281  
Abrahams did not object to the advance regulation of peaceable pub-
lic meetings should they be permitted to occur.282 
More specifically, Abrahams argued that since “a public meeting is a 
reasonable public use of this particular public park, it is ‘orderly’ and with-
in the protection of the Constitution.”283  He argued further that, as a 
matter of policy, open public forums for speech in the public parks 
were necessary given the increasing “masses of . . . landless” persons 
without resources to hire halls and the increased privatization of 
land, rendering a meeting on any open space likely to be considered 
trespass.284  The Park Commissioners’ decision to “prohibit[ ] orations 
and harangues in Franklin Park,” as such, amounted to an unconsti-
tutional prohibition on protected activity.285 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court summarily dismissed 
Abrahams’s constitutional arguments.286  As to the claim that the Park 
Commissioners’ actions violated the right to peaceable assembly, it 
declared, 
We see nothing in these rules inconsistent with Art. 19 of the bill of rights 
of this commonwealth, which declares that “the people have a right, in 
an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the 
common good . . . .” The defendant admits that the people would not 
have the right to assemble for the purposes specified in the public streets, 
and might not have such right in the public garden or on the common, 
because such an assembly would or might be inconsistent with the public 
uses for which these places are held.  The same reasons apply to any par-
ticular park.  The parks of Boston are designed for the use of the public 
generally; and whether the use of any park or a part of any park can be 
temporarily set aside for the use of a portion of the public is for the park 
commissioners to decide, in the exercise of a wise discretion.287  
An absolute prohibition was constitutional. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in a radical departure 
from its sister courts, consistently upheld Boston’s efforts to suppress 
 
cause the requirement of “prior consent” offends the Massachusetts Bill of Rights guaran-
tee of the rule of law and because it violates the equal protection clause of the federal 
constitution). 
281 Abrahams, 30 N.E. at 79; see also Brief for Defendant, supra note 280, at 15 (“The action of 
the Park Commissioners is obnoxious to Art. 19 of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights . . . .”). 
282 See Brief for Defendant, supra note 280, at 11 (“Rules regulating time, place, manner and 
notice to be given, would be perfectly proper.”). 
283 Id. at 15. 
284 Id. at 19–20. 
285 Id. at 11. 
286 Abrahams, 30 N.E. at 79. 
287 Id. 
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gatherings in public streets, and it did so without any mention of 
American political traditions.  It never made reference to the Masons 
or the Grand Army of the Republic, even though Boston shared this 
same history.  Commonwealth v. Abrahams was one of a series of deci-
sions involving access to public space that made no mention of the 
fact that traditionally the law interfered only when there was a breach 
of the peace and made no effort to articulate the substance of the 
right of assembly.288 
The Massachusetts high court’s consistent approval of Boston’s 
new regulatory approach significantly shaped efforts to contest the 
regulations.  For example, the court’s position enabled the city gov-
ernment, in 1888, to dismiss out of hand constitutional arguments 
made by advocates for the repeal of the ordinance governing the 
Common. 
If official attitudes to public assemblies were outliers for the peri-
od, public attitudes in Boston were not.  Although the public had 
mixed views throughout the period, on the whole, its views were not 
that different from attitudes elsewhere in the United States. 
In 1885, for example, there were rumors that the city wanted to 
deny permits to speak on the Boston Common on the ground that 
traffic to and from services would damage the lawns.289  These rumors 
provoked outrage. 
The public was appalled to hear that the city was more concerned 
about preserving its lawns than allowing public preaching.  One letter 
to the editor of a daily paper exclaimed,  
Is it not an outrage upon everyone’s common sense to claim that permits 
for preaching on the Common are refused because of the injury to the 
grass consequent?  . . . Yesterday one could observe throngs pouring over 
the grass in every direction to witness some parade . . . .290   
Another paper chided, “We cannot have preaching on Boston Com-
mon . . . because city fathers think that—the grass will be trodden up-
 
288 See Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) (holding that the legislature 
has the power to regulate the Common and thus “may . . . exercise control over the use 
which the public may make of” it); Abrahams, 30 N.E. at 79 (relying on Commonwealth v. 
Davis and Commonwealth v. Plaisted to hold that “‘the people[‘s] . . . right , in an orderly 
and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good’” was not violated 
by the park’s access rules); see also Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 19 N.E. 224, 224 (Mass. 
1889); Commonwealth v. Davis, 4 N.E. 577, 577 (Mass. 1886). 
289 See Worship on the Common, The Preachers of Last Sunday Fined Thirty Dollars Each—Their De-
fence, supra note 259, at 8; City Hall Notes, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 30, 1885, at 8.  The 
permit allowed the Y.M.C.A. to hold a weekly one-hour Sunday service on the Common’s 
parade ground for the duration of the summer. 
290 Letter to the Editor, Preaching on the Common, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 30, 1885, at 8. 
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on!  Then why are the public allowed on the grass on Memorial Day, 
or on any day when a regimental parade occurs?”291 
A few years later, in 1887, local religious sects organized to repeal 
the ordinance governing orations on the Boston Common.  Concern 
about the ordinance was revived by a certain Reverend William F. Da-
vis’s continued defiance of it.  Despite initially divided views, local re-
ligious groups eventually came together to petition the Common 
Council to repeal the ordinance even though the city was issuing 
permits more regularly.292 
Momentum for change began with a meeting of Baptists “to dis-
cuss the question, ‘Does the peace and good order of Boston Com-
mon require the imprisonment of reputable clergymen who preach 
without a permit?’”293  Among the concerns raised were doubts about 
the whether such activity disturbed the public as well as observations 
that permits were too readily denied.294 
The debate soon spilled over to the pages of local newspapers.  An 
article appearing in The Congregationalist defended the ordinance as 
necessary to preserve “the Common for its ordinary use as to light 
and air by women and children.”295  The author explained “that the 
court [had] decided, years ago, that the city had the right to regulate 
the use of the Common,” and maintained that the ordinance was 
necessary to maintain civic order: 
If it should be repealed the Common would be open as well to advocates 
of Mormonism, anarchism, socialism, spiritualism and infidelity as to the 
gospel; to mass meetings of Democrats or Republicans; and with no pow-
er anywhere to prevent such use, which might practically close the Com-
mon for its ordinary use as to light and air by women and children.  Forty 
meetings might go on side by side.296 
Two weeks later a scathing attack on this article appeared.  The 
author of the new article chastised the journal for “convey[ing] the 
idea that there is no need of agitation on the subject; that there has 
been no opposition to street preaching by the city government; [and] 
 
291 In Brief, CONGREGATIONALIST (Bos.), June 4, 1885, at 4 (emphasis added). 
292 For more details on Reverend Davis’s repeated defiance of authorities and the subse-
quent trials and public debate see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 238–39, 244–45, 283–84. 
293 Preaching on the Common:  Bowdoin Square Baptists Express Sympathy for Rev. W.F. Davis, BOS. 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 7, 1887, at 4. 
294 See id. (noting “that when the Young Men’s Christian Association applied for permission 
to preach in Franklin Park they were denied the privilege”); Plumb, supra note 260, at 10 
(clarifying that this incident occurred in the summer of 1887). 
295 Preaching on the Common, CONGREGATIONALIST (Bos.), Dec. 8, 1887, at 8. 
296 Id. 
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that [the city government] has taken no action to prevent any rea-
sonable man from preaching on the Common at any time[.]”297 
The author specifically took issue with the suggestion that the or-
dinance was necessary to maintain order, insisting that the traditional 
regulatory framework was sufficient to address the problem of disor-
der: 
[T]he statement referred to says:  If this ordinance should be repealed, 
the Common would be open to all sorts of meetings, “with no power an-
ywhere to prevent such use, which might practically close the Common 
for its ordinary use, as to light and air by women and children.”  Still 
again wrong.  The moment any assemblage becomes a nuisance, or infringes up-
on the rights of the public or the peace of society, it can be stopped.  There are stat-
utes for abating nuisances, as for suppressing blasphemous or seditious harangues.  
But it belongs to the courts, and not to any clique that may chance to get 
control of a city government, to determine what a nuisance is.298 
A few months later, the Evangelical Ministers’ Association ap-
pointed a committee to investigate the matter and to consult with 
counsel.299  The committee concluded “that the ordinance . . . [was] 
unnecessary and dangerous to liberty.”300  The ordinance, it said, “es-
tablish[ed] a censorship of speakers and preachers, [and] com-
mit[ed] to the discretion of some city official[s] the prerogative of 
determining beforehand who are fit to speak and who are not.”301  
The report formed the basis for a petition requesting the repeal of 
the ordinance.302 
In February 1888, the Committee on Laws and Ordinances held 
several hearings on the petition for repeal.303  At the second hearing, 
“every seat on the floor and in the galleries” was filled.304 
 
297 Plumb, supra note 260, at 10.  
298 Id. (emphasis added).  The author of the original piece responded in the same issue.  
A.H.Q., Letter to the Editor, CONGREGATIONALIST (Bos.), Dec. 22, 1887, at 10.  This arti-
cle anticipated the ultimate position of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:  anal-
ogizing the Common to private property, it argued that “an individual citizen, while hav-
ing certain well-defined rights in the Common, has no more right to take a portion of it 
for public meetings, without consent of the city, than he has to take Dr. Plumb’s garden 
without his consent, for the same purpose.”  Id. 
299 See Evangelical Ministers’ Association, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 7, 1888, at 5. 
300 Boston Common: The Evangelical Ministers Champion Rev. W.F. Davis, supra note 258, at 2. 
301 Id. 
302 See id. (noting that “[t]he report was accepted,” and “[a] resolution was presented provid-
ing for the appointment of a committee with instructions to petition the public authori-
ties to recall the ordinance under discussion”). 
303 For the details of this legislative debate, see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 250–58. 
304 Out-Door Preaching:  Shall It Be Prohibited on the Common?  Continuation of the Hearing by the 
City Council Committee—Mr. Whitmore’s Caustic Remarks, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Mar. 1, 
1888, at 8. 
1004 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:4 
 
The ensuing hearings reveal that local public opinion was not all 
that different from public opinion in New York City or Grand Rapids, 
but also that dissenting voices were gaining ground.  Advocates for 
repeal emphasized that the law was unnecessary while proponents of 
the ordinance warned, among other things, that “[a]narchism, social-
ism and all other isms of which the city is now free would be brought 
in if the repeal was made.”305 
Advocates for repeal emphasized that legal tools were available to 
address disorder if it actually occurred.  They argued, for instance, 
that “the enforcement of the laws against incendiary utterances” 
could be “depended upon to put a stop to teachings in favor of anar-
chists, free-love, etc.”306  One explained, 
The right of orderly public discussion is a bulwark of American institu-
tions, and must not be interfered with by any tyrannical government im-
ported from abroad.  Ample are the statute laws to repress the abuses of 
printing, and they are ample to repress the abuse of free speech.  The 
present ordinance as regards preaching on the Common, not only pre-
vents the abuse of free speech, but it prevents the use of it.307 
Defenders of the ordinance, by contrast, emphasized that 
“[r]epeal of the ordinance would lead to disorder.”308  The ordinance 
was “a wise and necessary legal restriction.”309  If respectable preachers 
were allowed to preach without a permit “every believer in the wild, 
and sometimes revolting, religious and social theories of the day” 
would also have to be allowed: 
[I]f all restraint was removed, the City Government might find it difficult 
to restrain what would be meetings of a dangerous and revolutionary 
character.  It can now guard against such risks by refusing to permit the 
meetings to be held; but if it abandoned this right, . . . the authorities, in-
stead of putting out the fire at the start, might have to wait until it was 
under good headway before they could take preventative action.310 
In late June, the Committee on Laws and Ordinances “unani-
mously reported against . . . repeal, and the board of aldermen (con-
sisting of eight Republicans and four Democrats) . . . unanimously 
accepted [the] report.”311  The Committee identified three grounds 
 
305 Id. 
306 Letter to the Editor, CONGREGATIONALIST (Bos.), Feb. 23, 1888, at 4. 
307 The Monday Lectureship:  Rev. Joseph Cook Protests Against “a Censorship of Preaching,” BOS. 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 28, 1888, at 4. 
308 Preaching on the Common, Continuation of the City Council Hearing—The Speakers, BOS. DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Mar. 8, 1888, at 1. 
309 Preaching on the Common, BOS. INVESTIGATOR, Feb. 22, 1888, at 3 (reprinting comment 
from The Boston Herald). 
310 Id. 
311 Preaching on Boston Common, CONGREGATIONALIST (Bos.), June 21, 1888, at 4. 
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offered for repeal (unconstitutional, an undue interference with free 
speech, and unnecessary) and rejected each.  In doing so, it specifi-
cally relied on an 1886 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Commonwealth v. Davis, arising out of the 1885 test cases, which had 
dismissed claims that the 1862 Boston Common ordinance was un-
constitutional and an undue interference with free speech.312  As to 
the issue of individual rights, the report was basically silent, stating 
only that it would “leave to the good sense of the public to judge 
whether, in refusing the request for repeal, the liberty of any citizen 
of Boston suffers any detriment.”313 
Once again, Boston officials were unwilling to contemplate consti-
tutional concerns.  Ignoring the constitutional interests was largely 
possible because doing so comported with the Supreme Judicial 
Court’s view.  The 1862 ordinance was not repealed. 
The relationship between this history and our contemporary views 
of outdoor assembly, as well as the constitutional right that protects 
it, is the product of a historical accident.  As it happened, the United 
States Supreme Court’s first encounter with a challenge to an ordi-
nance rendering public gatherings unlawful in the absence of a per-
mit involved the review of a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court. 
The case, Davis v. Massachusetts (1897), arose out of a second ap-
peal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court by Reverend W. F. 
Davis.314  The facts of the case were straightforward.  On June 10, 
1894, Reverend Davis gave yet another public sermon on the Boston 
Common without obtaining advance permission, and he was convict-
ed of violating the ordinance.315 
The Massachusetts high court held that since the Boston Com-
mon was the property of the city of Boston, the city could forbid or 
regulate speech on it just as “the owner of a private house [could] 
forbid [speech] in his house.”316  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then 
 
312 See id. (reporting that “the repeal was asked on three grounds” including “‘unconstitu-
tionality’ of the ordinance, which is answered by reference to the recent decision of the 
[Massachusetts] Supreme Court approving its legality” and interference “‘with free 
speech,’ as to which the committee quotes the decision, just named”). 
313 Id. (quoting report) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
314 See Massachusetts v. Davis, 167 U.S. 43, 45 (1897) (giving the procedural history of the 
case). 
315 Reverend Davis had been violating the Boston Common ordinance on and off since 1888.  
See, e.g., News in Brief, CONGREGATIONALIST (Bos.), Sept. 13, 1888, at 1 (recounting Rever-
end Davis’s continued insistence that the ordinance was not lawful but noting that his at-
torney had secured a permit for him “without [his] knowledge or consent”). 
316 Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895). 
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of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, explained that just as a 
police officer does not have a constitutional right to engage in politi-
cal activity and remain a police officer, so too there is no constitu-
tional right to speech or assembly on the Boston Common.317  In 
elaborating, he wrote, 
For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking 
in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a 
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it 
in his house.  When no proprietary right interferes, the Legislature may 
end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an 
end to the dedication to public uses.  So it may take the less[er] step of 
limiting the public use to certain purposes.318 
When the United States Supreme Court affirmed, it took up this 
language.  It explained that Reverend Davis was mistaken in his as-
sumption that he had a right “to use the common of the city of Boston 
free from legislative or municipal control or regulation.”319  No record 
evidence supported Reverend Davis’s contention that the “Boston 
Common [was] the property of the inhabitants of the city of Boston, 
and dedicated to the use of the people of that city,” including for 
“the preaching of the gospel . . . form [sic] time immemorial to a re-
cent period.”320  On the contrary, both a legislative act which lumped 
the Common with other public properties “and the ordinance 
passed . . . show an assumption by the state of control over the com-
mon in question.”321  The Court emphasized further that the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court, “in affirming [Davis’s] conviction, 
placed its conclusion upon the express ground that the common was 
absolutely under the control of the legislature.”322 
Justice Byron White, then, quoted with approval Justice Holmes’s 
reasoning.323  If the city had an absolute right to exclude public 
preaching on the Common, it followed that the municipality could 
determine the circumstances under which access was permitted.324 
 
317 See id. (citing McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (involving the 
dismissal of a police officer for cause on grounds of political activity)). 
318 Id.  Holmes’s narrow conception of freedom of speech would follow him to the Supreme 
Court.  Cf. RABBAN, supra note 169, at 132–41 (identifying Justice Holmes’s positions as 
part of an analysis of early First Amendment case law). 
319 Davis, 167 U.S. at 46. 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
323 See id. at 47 (“For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a 
highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the pub-
lic than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”). 
324 Id. at 48. 
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In this way, the views of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
became the law of the land.  Justice Holmes’s analogy between private 
and public property remains the foil for the First Amendment’s pub-
lic forum doctrine today—notwithstanding that it was both an outly-
ing legal view at the time, and more importantly, entirely unnecessary 
as the constitutionality and lawfulness of the city’s ordinance was set-
tled and the only legal issue in the case was a narrow one of statutory 
interpretation.325 
B.  Regulatory Change 
The United States Supreme Court’s approval of Massachusetts’s 
approach significantly changed the broader judiciary’s attitudes to-
wards ordinances regulating gatherings in public places.  Judicial ap-
proval of the regulatory shift toward permit requirements gave birth 
to the contemporary constitutional right of assembly, one which “is 
not absolute . . . and must be exercised in subordination to the gen-
eral comfort and convenience” of others.326  This new conception of 
the right and the more extensive regulatory landscape it engendered 
eventually gave rise to a radically less tolerant attitude within the judi-
ciary towards the disorder associated with outdoor assemblies. 
Once the United States Supreme Court appeared to have sanc-
tioned the new regulatory approach, state courts around the nation, 
including the Michigan Supreme Court, began to uphold permit re-
quirements.327  The Michigan Supreme Court followed Davis in 1901 
even though doing so required it to distinguish the Frazee Case on 
 
325 Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) (noting that the constitutionality 
of “such an ordinance . . . is implied by the former decision, and does not appear to us 
open to doubt” and that the only question presented was whether “the words ‘[N]o per-
son shall make any public address’” prohibit public preaching).  Moreover, the “right” 
under discussion in Davis was a property right since the Court had to accept the determina-
tion of the highest state tribunal that the ordinance did not infringe Reverend Davis’s 
rights of free speech, assembly, or worship as secured by Massachusetts’s constitution.  
The First Amendment did not constrain Massachusetts at the time.  It would be twenty-
eight years before the United States Supreme Court would hold that the First Amend-
ment applied to the States.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For pre-
sent purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are 
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fun-
damental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”); see also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 
U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (holding that the right of assembly is a fundamental liberty covered 
by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
326 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). 
327 See Love v. Phalen, 87 N.W. 785, 787–88 (Mich. 1901) (upholding a Detroit ordinance 
requiring a permit for public gathering). 
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flimsy grounds.328  The highest courts of Georgia,329 Pennsylvania,330 
New York331 and Illinois (in a reversal similar to that of Michigan)332 
did the same. 
In all of these cases, permits had been denied to the defendants 
expressly or implicitly because of the political views likely to be es-
poused.333  Nevertheless, the courts upheld the ordinances as lawful 
exercises of the police power, emphasizing that the United States Su-
preme Court had sanctioned Massachusetts’s approach, which dis-
missed outright the presence of any speech or assembly considera-
tions.334  By 1921, the New York Court of Appeals was able to declare, 
It is too well settled by judicial decisions in both the state and federal 
courts that a municipality may pass an ordinance making it unlawful to 
hold public meetings upon the public streets without a permit therefor 
to require discussion.335 
The new case law did not wrestle in any depth with constitutional 
considerations.  Instead, it took comfort in the tenet, “The constitu-
 
328 Id. at 787 (distinguishing the Frazee Case as pertaining to a procession on a public highway 
whereas the case at hand involved a “stationary assemblage of people” on the city’s public 
square).  
329 See Fitts v. City of Atlanta, 49 S.E. 793, 795 (Ga. 1905) (holding, inter alia, that the city’s 
ordinance declaring it unlawful to hold public meetings for political purposes in the 
streets without the consent of municipal authorities did not infringe liberty of speech). 
330 City of Duquesne v. Fincke, 112 A. 130, 133–34 (Pa. 1920) (upholding an ordinance that 
forbid the holding of public meetings in city streets without a permit on the basis of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Davis and on the ground that the Pennsylvania bill of 
rights only confers a right to assemble at a place where one otherwise has a right to be). 
331 People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 133 N.E. 364, 365 (N.Y. 1921) (upholding the validity of a 
city ordinance prohibiting gatherings on its public streets in the absence of official per-
mission and denying that the ordinance “abridge[d] the right of free speech or assem-
blage” insofar as “[p]ublic streets are primarily for public travel”). 
332 Coughlin v. Chi. Park Dist., 4 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. 1936) (“[T]he rights of peaceable assem-
bly and of freedom of speech are not infringed by the refusal of a permit to an applicant 
for the use of a park facility.”). 
333 See Atwell, 133 N.E. at 366 (citing the Mayor as saying that “he would grant no further 
permits for Socialists’ meeting while mayor”); Fincke, 112 A. at 131–32 (chastising the 
mayor for failing to respond to three permit requests “for it gave [the] appearance of 
truth to the probably unwarranted complaints” that the applications “were ignored be-
cause the mayor did not like [the applicants] or the cause they represented”); see also 
Coughlin, 4 N.E.2d at 2–3 (making it fairly clear that the denial was due to political views); 
Fitts, 49 S.E. at 794 (suggesting that the permit was denied, at least in part, due to appli-
cant’s political views). 
334 See William E. Lee, Modernizing the Law of Open-Air Speech:  The Hughes Court and the Birth of 
Content-Neutral Balancing, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1219, 1235 (2005) (“By devaluing 
open-air speech and stressing the proprietary powers of the government, Davis set the 
tone for a generation of opinions that were plainly hostile to the idea that streets were 
appropriate to use for expressive activities.”); see also Coughlin, 4 N.E.2d at 7–9 (quoting 
and relying on the Massachusetts decision); Fincke, 112 A. at 132–33 (citing the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision for support). 
335 Atwell, 133 N.E. at 365. 
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tional right of assembly . . . does not include the right to use for that 
purpose the streets and other places owned and controlled by [a] 
state or municipality, but presupposes that those who assemble have a 
right to control the place where they meet.”336  This principle was de-
fended on the ground that “[i]f this were not so, the right of assem-
bly would constitute a serious disturbance of the rights of others.”337 
Only the supreme courts of Connecticut and Florida struck down 
permit requirements after 1897.338  They did so, however, on limited 
grounds that did not take issue with the principle that a municipality 
could require advance permission for public assemblies without run-
ning afoul of the right of assembly (as preserved by either the state or 
national constitution).   
Once judicial attitudes had changed, reliance on the criminal law 
as the sole method for regulating gatherings in urban public spaces 
gave way.339  Only a handful of large American cities had permit re-
quirements in 1881.340  By the early 1920s, however, permit require-
ments for outdoor gatherings were sufficiently widespread that they 
were the focus of two American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) stud-
ies of the state of civil liberties at the time.341  A student note in the 
1921 volume of the Columbia Law Review declared that the most 
common type of municipal regulations of public assembly “vests in 
some city official or group of officials the discretionary power to grant 
permits for gatherings or processions on the public streets.”342 
 
336 ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER:  PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 480 
(1904). 
337 Id. 
338 See State v. Coleman, 113 A. 385, 386–387 (Conn. 1921) (holding that an ordinance 
which regulates access to the streets for the purpose of speaking by use of permits does 
not per se infringe the individual’s right of free speech, but striking down the challenged 
ordinance as in violation of Connecticut’s equal protection clause because it was “hope-
lessly indefinite” and thus subjected the individual to arbitrary government action); An-
derson v. Tedford, 85 So. 673, 674 (Fla. 1920) (holding Panama City’s ordinance prohib-
iting public meetings in its streets absent advance permission from local officials void 
since, inter alia, it failed to limit the licensing officials’ discretion in any way, without 
reaching the question of whether the ordinance abrogated the right of free speech). 
339 See generally Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 347–53 (noting, for example, that 
“[i]t . . . became more common for courts to rationalize the permit requirements as a 
managerial strategy”). 
340 See id. at 148 (“[F]our of the thirty-three cities in the sample had limited permit require-
ments . . . in 1881.”). 
341 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BLUE COATS AND REDS 8 (1929) [hereinafter ACLU 1929] 
(listing questions sent to the heads of police departments to gather information about 
law enforcement attitudes concerning public meetings and protests); ACLU 1921, supra 
note 171, at 6. 
342 Note, Control over Street-Meetings by Municipal Authorities, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 275 
(1921). 
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By 1930, permit requirements were a mainstay in municipal con-
trol of social and political gatherings in public places.343  The second 
incarnation of the model traffic code, which was prepared at the fed-
eral level by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1936, included a 
provision requiring permits for “procession[s], or parade[s] contain-
ing 200 or more persons or 50 or more vehicles.”344  A 1938 comment 
in the Yale Law Journal explained that “ordinances prohibiting meet-
ings in public places without a permit from some authorized munici-
pal authority”345 and “ordinances requiring permits for street pa-
rades”346 were two of the three most important forms of municipal 
regulation of speech.347 
With both criminal law and permit requirements available to 
them, city officials well into the twentieth century had the legal au-
thority (if not always the political power) to prohibit any and all gath-
erings they considered undesirable.348  Labor protests, in particular, 
through the 1930s, took place within a legal landscape that “did not 
provide . . . wide freedoms to engage in public protest” and placed 
“few legal restraints . . . on authorities or their police agents” in their 
interactions with demonstrators.349  It was not uncommon for workers 
who protested to be suppressed through outright violence.350  On oc-
casion, but only when police undertook acts that were too transpar-
ently repressive, courts would step in to protect those assembled.351 
 
343 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 148 (reporting that twenty-two of the cities in the sample 
required a permit for some public assemblies by the 1930s). 
344 MODEL TRAFFIC ORDINANCES § 42 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 1936).  The 1928 version had no 
such provision.  See, MODEL MUNICIPAL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE 5–8 (Comm. on Mun. Traffic 
Ordinances and Regulations, 1928) (tentative draft) (failing to list a provision for permits 
in the table of contents). 
345 Comment, Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England and the United States:  A Compara-
tive Study, 47 YALE L.J. 404, 413 (1938). 
346 Id. at 429. 
347 Cf. id. at 413 (identifying final category of municipal ordinances as “ordinances prohibit-
ing obstruction in the streets”). 
348 See, e.g., RABBAN, supra note 169, at 80–81 (explaining that generally “free speech fights 
followed a familiar pattern” in which “[h]undreds of Wobblies were arrested and charged 
with various offenses, such as obstructing the sidewalk, blocking traffic, vagrancy, unlaw-
ful assembly, or violating a local ordinance against street speaking”). 
349 John D. McCarthy & Clark McPhail, The Institutionalization of Protest in the United States, in 
THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SOCIETY:  CONTENTIOUS POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY 83, 86 (Da-
vid S. Meyers & Sidney Tarrow eds., 1998). 
350 Id. 
351 Accord RABBAN, supra note 169, at 107–09 (explaining that the primary constitutional con-
cern of federal investigators regarding local responses to the I.W.W. protests was com-
plete police discretion over both permits and the definition of an unlawful assembly); see 
also supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Holdover Public Attitudes 
Politically, the new regulatory regime for public assemblies re-
mained controversial.  Throughout the Progressive Era important 
segments of the public continued to claim a much broader right of 
assembly than that recognized by federal and state courts.352  Public 
support for a broad right of assembly would not last forever. 
Speakers in Detroit, for example, resisted the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s changed position in 1901.353  It did not help that Detroit’s 
Mayor refused to issue any permits under the newly passed ordi-
nance.354  Still, in Detroit as elsewhere, once the courts had sanc-
tioned the new system, the terms of debates about access to public 
space for religious, social, and political ends had forever changed. 
In 1900, Detroit, Michigan’s largest city at the time, regulated 
gatherings in its public streets and squares with an array of state 
crimes and municipal ordinances.  Three ordinances in particular 
 
352 The Detroit controversy recounted here is broadly consistent with David M. Rabban’s im-
portant study of the I.W.W. free speech fights, even as Rabban does not distinguish claims 
regarding the freedom of speech from those about the right of peaceable assembly.  See 
RABBAN, supra note 169, at 77–128 (discussing the “IWW free speech fights”).  For one, as 
in Detroit, it was local merchants who first petitioned for San Diego to pass an ordinance 
restricting street speaking, and, as in Detroit, the final ordinance was limited to a much 
smaller radius than initially requested by those merchants.  See id. at 100–01 (“By smash-
ing the windows of employment agencies . . . Wobblies themselves provoked citizens to 
request the city council for an ordinance limiting street speaking. . . . [However,] [t]he 
final version of the ordinance . . . limited street speaking in six downtown blocks rather 
than the forty-two block area request by a group of local merchants.”).  For another, at 
least some Wobblies claimed that they did not need a permit because the Constitution 
granted them a right to speak to a gathering on the street.  Id. at 84 (noting an incident 
in which, when “confronted by a police demand for a permit” to speak in public, IWW 
speakers “replied that they ‘had none save the First Amendment to the Constitution of 
the U.S.’” (internal citation omitted)); see also INAZU, supra note 92, at 44 (observing, 
based on a review of the secondary literature,  that “the people claiming the right to as-
semble insisted on a far broader purpose and meaning” than federal courts recognized 
and offering “the practices of three political movements”—the women’s movement, the 
African-American Civil Rights Movement, and the labor movement—as evidence). 
353 The history of the controversy over Detroit’s permit requirements in 1901 was developed 
after reading full runs from the relevant period of two of the city’s leading, partisan 
newspapers as well as court decisions and remaining records.  In addition, the Salvation 
Army National Archives and Research Center provided a few relevant details.  Finally, 
three editions of the city’s municipal code between 1884 and 1936 were reviewed.  For a 
full account of the methodology, see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 10–15. 
354 Only one permit was ever issued under the city’s original ordinance requiring a permit to 
assemble on the Campus Martius, the city’s largest square.  First Permit Issued Under Cam-
pus Ordinance Yesterday:  Acting Mayor Magee Had the Honor of Doing It—Permission Given to 
State Troops to Parade With Band, DETROIT NEWS—TRIBUNE, Feb. 23, 1902,  at 5 (reporting 
that on February 22, 1902, while Mayor Maybury was out of town, Acting Mayor Magee is-
sued a permit to the state troopers to parade with a band through the public streets on 
Washington’s Birthday as required by state law). 
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targeted disorder on the city’s streets.  A first covered routs and riots 
as well as noise and other sources of disruption.355  A second targeted 
individuals and crowds that interfered with pedestrian traffic.356  A 
third prohibited crowds that obstructed travel and individuals that 
loitered in the city’s center.357  Detroit did not regulate gatherings in 
its parks, and advance permission was not required prior to gathering 
in public.358 
That year, Detroit passed a fourth ordinance.359  Reflecting ele-
ments of the traditional nineteenth-century worldview, the new ordi-
nance targeted disruptive crowds in the central business district.360  At 
the same time, it significantly expanded the scope of what was con-
sidered “disruptive.”361  The 1900 Campus Martius ordinance, as 
passed, essentially defined certain crowds as per se nuisances and 
thus beyond constitutional protection. 
The main source of pressure for new regulation was owners of 
businesses on the city’s central square, Campus Martius, who were 
frustrated about the impact of open-air assemblies on their Saturday 
night business.362  As one early editorial put it, 
Those who block the streets there night after night, making it difficult for 
theater-goers and intending customers of down-town merchants to reach 
their destinations, are a very small percentage of the population of the 
city, and are infringing in a manner wholly unjustifiable upon the rights 
of the majority. 
 
355 DETROIT, MICH., REV. ORDINANCES ch. LXIII, § 2 (1884) (“Any person or persons who 
shall make or assist in making any noise, disturbance, or improper diversion, or any rout 
or riot, by which the peace and good order of the neighborhood are disturbed, or shall 
be guilty of disorderly conduct, shall be punished . . . .”). 
356 Id. at § 6 (“Persons shall not collect, stand in crowds, or remain loitering on the sidewalks, 
or at the corners of the streets, so as to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians, or in 
front of any church, any public hall or place of worship during service, or the gathering 
or departing of the congregation.”). 
357 Id. at ch. XXXIII, § 18 (“It shall be unlawful to gather in crowds on any sidewalk or in any 
street so as to obstruct travel over and along such sidewalk or in said street, and no person 
shall stand or remain idly loitering upon the sidewalks or streets adjacent to the City Hall 
building or in front of any church, public halls, theatre, opera house, hotel or restaurant, 
or upon the Campus Martius, or upon Woodward avenue from the City Hall to Jefferson 
avenue.”). 
358 See id. at passim (detailing restricted activities but not requiring advanced permission for 
public gatherings). 
359 DETROIT, MICH., COMPILED ORDINANCES, ch. 52, § 15 (1904) (prohibiting the act of gath-
ering a crowd “by the use of words, singing, beating of drums, or other noises”).  
360 Id. 
361 Id. 
362 Hypocrisy of The Evening News Illustrated:  Editorials From That Paper Show How It Stood a Few 
Months Ago on the Campus Question, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 13, 1901, at 1 (quoting the 
Editorial, Nothing to Do with Freedom of Speech, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Sept. 27, 1900). 
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. . . [T]here is no desire to interfere with peaceable assemblies for any 
lawful purpose; but there is a determination to restore the most promi-
nent and important of the city’s squares to the purposes for which it was 
designated and to permit free and untrammeled passage to those who 
are making their way from one part of town to another.363 
Advocates for the new ordinance argued that the regular Campus 
crowds were a public nuisance and, therefore, not constitutionally 
protected.364 
It was not until 1901 that Detroit adopted its first permit require-
ment for gatherings in public.365  Regulatory change was, once again, 
prompted by a riot—this time one brought on by a political show-
down between Detroit’s Democratic Mayor and the newly appointed 
Republican Police Commissioner, over the latter’s efforts to clear 
regular crowds on the Campus Martius.366 
Despite passage of the 1900 Campus Martius ordinance, business 
interests remained dissatisfied because city officials did not enforce it.  
In 1901, when the city’s first Police Commissioner was appointed, the 
businesses on the Campus seized the opportunity to press their com-
plaints afresh.367  Upon taking office, in response to a formal petition 
from these local businesses, the new Police Commissioner announced 
that he intended to “rigidly exclude Tom Bawden, the single tax 
speaker” from speaking on the Campus at night.368  Bawden, unde-
terred, defied the warning. 
 
363 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
364 Id. (arguing that “talk of freedom of speech and the right of assembly . . . is wholly aside 
from the real question involved” because “[t]he fact of the matter is that the nightly array 
of shouting evangelists and lecturers has become a public nuisance”). 
365 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 304–05. 
366 The new office of Police Commissioner was adopted as part of a restructuring of city gov-
ernment imposed by Republicans in the state capitol—one which sought temporarily to 
remove various offices from the control of the city’s mayor and city council for partisan 
ends.  See Id. at 294–95 (discussing the “restructuring [of] Detroit’s city government” by 
Republicans that was “intended to be a political blow to Detroit’s current Democratic 
Mayor”). 
367 Id. at 288–89.  
368 Bawden Defiant, Single Tax Orator Says Commissioner Andrews Can’t Bluff Him Out, The Man 
from Macomb Corners Does Not Like Bawden’s “Attacks on Prominent Citizens,” EVENING NEWS, 
DETROIT, May 9, 1901, at 7; Saw His Duty and Did It, Commissioner Andrews Squelched the 
Campus Nuisance, Complaints of Property Owners Did Not Fall on Deaf Ears, Squad of Police Pre-
vented Crowds from Obstructing the Highways, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 9, 1901, at 1 (discuss-
ing approvingly the Commissioner’s response to the petition of “property owners and 
storekeepers”).  The Salvation Army and a certain Will Allen, he allowed, would be spared 
unless he “receive[d] complaints from persons competent to make such complaints.”  
Bawden Defiant, supra. 
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No violence occurred when the police sought to disperse 
Bawden’s crowd that first night.  And in fact, the public’s reaction was 
mixed.369 
Nevertheless, the city’s Democratic Mayor saw a political oppor-
tunity.370  Claiming the high ground, the Mayor announced that he 
would stand on the Campus Martius, himself, to secure the people’s 
constitutional right of peaceable assembly.  Reflecting the classic 
nineteenth-century worldview, he proclaimed:  “The people have the 
right to assemble on the streets, and so long as they are not creating a 
disturbance the only province of the police is to see that a way is kept 
clear, so that traffic is not obstructed.”371  In line with traditional tol-
erance for the inconveniences associated with crowds, the Mayor spe-
cifically denied that the crowds on the Campus were nuisances.372 
When ten to twelve thousand appeared on the Campus Martius 
that night, geared up by the controversy, the police overreacted and a 
riot ensued.  The riot followed an address by the Mayor to the crowd 
about traditional privileges and immunities of American citizenship: 
Fellow citizens:  This is a peculiar night—a night that will long be re-
membered in the history of Detroit.  When I heard that last night men 
were being driven about like cattle, I made up my mind that I would be 
with them to-night.  (Cheers.) . . . I will not uphold rioting and I dispar-
age bitter speech.  But, my friends, I will always be found upholding that 
right of every American citizen—free speech.  (Cheers.)  The birth of our 
republic grew out of just such gatherings as this and gathered for the 
same causes.  Sacred old Boston common had been used as a public 
meeting spot for years, until one day the minions of King George drove 
the crowds from it and—the American revolution followed, giving to us 
all the liberties which are now in jeopardy.373 
The speech went on to accuse the Police Commissioner of using the 
Campus ordinance passed in 1900 for a purpose to which it was never 
intended:  “I signed the Campus ordinance and I am familiar with its 
provisions and its intent.  It was aimed at loiterers only.  As for men 
gathered to discuss peaceful topics, there is no law under heaven to 
stop it” so long as one “keep[s] open a suitable passage way.”374 
 
369 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 289–92.  
370 Bawden Crowd Kept A-Moving, But the Salvation Army Audience Was Not Disturbed, Andrews’s 
First Attempt to Clear the Campus A Failure, The Big Crowds Cheered Bawden and Jeered at the 
Commissioner of Police, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, May 10, 1901, at 8. 
371 Maybury to Be There Tonight, the Mayor Advises the People That They Have the Right to Assemble 
on the Campus for Peaceful Purposes, He Says They Would Be Justified in Resenting Police Interfer-
ence—Criticises Commissioner Andrews’s Display of Authority Last Night, EVENING NEWS, 
DETROIT, May 10, 1901, at 1. 
372 See id. (denying that significant complaints about the crowds had been made to him). 
373 Mayor Addressed the Crowd in Bawden’s Favor, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 11, 1901, at 7. 
374 Id. 
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After the Mayor’s speech, everything quickly spun out of control.  
The ensuing riot raged for about four hours.  No one was killed, but 
seventeen were injured.375  The riot was even reported in The New York 
Times.376  The following morning, Detroit’s papers were filled with the 
sober, half apologies of partisan politics and the remarks of a Mayor 
who could hardly contain his glee at having embarrassed the new Po-
lice Commissioner.377 
The riot prompted a prolonged debate in city papers and legisla-
tive halls—one that ultimately led to the city’s first permit require-
ment for outdoor gatherings.378  One aspect of the debate is particu-
larly worth noting.  The Detroit Free Press printed a letter to the editor, 
responding to the Mayor’s speech, in which the author pointed out 
that the Mayor (as we know) was misinformed about the status of 
speeches and gatherings on the Boston Common:  Not only did Bos-
ton require those wishing to speak on the Common to obtain a per-
mit, but the ordinance had been upheld by both the state’s highest 
court and the United States Supreme Court (as we have seen).379 
Relatively quickly, a legislative compromise was reached in the 
form of an ordinance, which was virtually identical to the ordinance 
governing the Boston Common.380  The new Detroit permit require-
 
375 See Ten Thousand in a Fierce Riot in Detroit:  Men and Boys in Running Fight with Police—
Populace Objected to Order Forbidding a Single-Tax Exhorter to Speak, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1901, 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0C1EF7385A16738D
DDA80994DD405B818CF1D3. 
376 Id. (describing the scene as one in which “men and boys ran riot in the main streets of 
[Detroit] for more than three hours, and a continual running fight with police, both 
mounted and on foot, caused an exciting time in the heart of the city to-night”). 
377 See, e.g., Riot Raged in the Streets:  Squad of Police Assaulted by Howling Thousands on East Fort 
Street, Pelted with Stones, They Fired Their Revolvers in the Air, but the Crowd Only Jeered, Two 
Hundred Blue Coats, Sent to Their Assistance, Dispersed the Disturbers—Culmination of the 
Bawden Incident, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 11, 1901, at 1 (reporting that Commissioner 
Andrews made a formal statement announcing his “deep[ ] regret” about the “unfortu-
nate occurrences of last night” but placed blame for the riot on the Mayor’s irresponsible 
speech, and commenting further that “[w]ithout the support of the mayor I do not feel 
called upon to enforce an ordinance that subjects to needless danger both the depart-
ment under me and the citizens of this city”). 
378 Early reporting indicated that both Police Commissioner Andrews and Mayor Maybury 
supported the new ordinance.  See Mayor’s Permit May Be Required Hereafter by Speakers on the 
Campus:  New Ordinance Will Be Introduced in the Council by Ald. Koch Tonight, EVENING 
NEWS, DETROIT, May 14, 1901, at 1 (“The new ordinance, it is said, has received the sanc-
tion of both Commissioner Andrews and the mayor.”). 
379 See Herbert E. Boynton, Letter to the Editor, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 12, 1901, at 12 
(concluding that, given the results in Boston, “the mayor could not do a better public 
service than to assist in preventing the nightly disturbances on the Campus Martius by fol-
lowing the lead of the official of the city of Boston”). 
380 See Koch’s Campus Ordinance, It Provides a $100 Fine or 90 Days Imprisonment for Violations, 
EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, May 20, 1901, at 2. 
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ment, known as the Koch Campus ordinance, was passed over the 
Mayor’s veto.381  In a letter addressed to the Common Council ex-
plaining his veto decision, the Mayor emphasized his objection to an 
across-the-board permit requirement.382  He explained that he con-
sidered “the ordinance . . . so restrictive of fair play, free speech and 
the general public concern as to be unreasonable in its terms.”383  Fi-
nally, he reminded readers that “[o]n many public occasions and in 
political campaigns particularly, addresses are often delivered upon 
public streets and grounds, and at convenient hours without restrict-
ing public use.”384  The best course, he argued, would be proper en-
forcement of the 1900 Campus Martius ordinance.385 
Even after the Koch Campus ordinance passed, the regular speak-
ers on the Campus, like the Mayor, continued to assert a more robust 
entitlement to access to the square.386  The stakes for local speakers 
were high.  The local Salvation Army, for example, had been told that 
no permits would be forthcoming.387 
 
381 The ordinance was passed, in amended form, on June 11, 1901.  See Mayor to Issue Permits:  
Campus Ordinance Passed by Common Council, One Night a Week the Limit for All, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, June 12, 1901, at 12 (“An  amendment to the Campus ordinance was finally 
agreed to and adopted by the common council last night . . . .”); see also Over Mayor’s Veto:  
Koch’s Campus Ordinance Passed by Council, Ald. Smith Starts His Movement for Investigation of 
the City’s Alleged Coal Combine, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, June 19, 1901, at 7 (“The common 
council this morning passed Ald. Koch’s Campus ordinance over the mayor’s veto.”). 
382 See Unidentified Newspaper Clipping attached to Letter from Major W.F. Jenkins to 
Colonel Higgins (June 25, 1901) (RG. 2.15 143/7) (on file with the Salvation Army Na-
tional Archives and Research Center, Alexandria, Va.) (arguing that the ordinance is un-
reasonable due to its restrictiveness and should be reconsidered); see also Mayor Did Not 
Want to Be Bothered to Death:  Has Vetoed Ordinance Regarding Campus Martius Permits, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 16, 1901, Part III at 3 (“Mayor Maybury has decided to veto 
Ald. Koch’s amendment to the campus ordinance . . . . He stated that in his opinion the 
amendment is not only worthless, but unreasonable . . . .”). 
383 Mayor Did Not Want to Be Bothered to Death:  Has Vetoed Ordinance Regarding Campus Martius 
Permits, supra note 382, Part III at 3; see also Veto Goes In:  Mayor Maybury Doesn’t Like the New 
Campus Ordinance, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, June 16, 1901, at 6 (indicating that Corpora-
tion Counsel was consulted in reaching this conclusion). 
384 Mayor Did Not Want to Be Bothered to Death:  Has Vetoed Ordinance Regarding Campus Martius 
Permits, supra note 382, at 3. 
385 Unidentified Newspaper Clipping, supra note 382, at 6 (noting that “[t]he only reason” it 
had been ineffective to date in dealing with disorderly parties and those interfering with 
the rights of property-owners was “due to the fact that the attempt to enforce it was in a 
manner which was resented very effectively and properly by Citizens.” (internal quota-
tions marks omitted)). 
386 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 305–11.  
387 See Letter from Major W.F. Jenkins to Colonel Higgins (June 25, 1901), at 1–2 (RG 2.15, 
143/7) (on file with the Salvation Army National Archives and Research Center, Alexan-
dria, Va.) (noting that the Mayor was unwilling to issue the seven permits requested by 
the Salvation Army).  In this letter, the local officer also wrote, 
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The dissenters’ views were quickly endorsed by a local judge.  The 
critical decision arose out of an action against Tom Bawden.388  His 
only defense was the unconstitutionality of the new ordinance: 
an unwarranted infringement of the personal liberty of the citizen of the 
city of Detroit, who has of common right the privilege of peaceably addressing his 
fellow citizens upon any subject they care to hear him upon, so long as said 
speaker does not produce disorder, nor conduce to or provoke riot, but behaves 
himself in a lawful manner . . . .389 
During oral argument, Bawden’s attorney dramatically claimed that 
the permit requirement resulted in a republic without free speech.390 
 On August 6, the Recorder’s Court held that even though the 
Campus Martius was not a public highway, under the rationale of the 
Frazee Case, “this ordinance is void, so far as it applies to the Campus 
Martius, also as to the streets, where no riot or disturbance is created, 
as unreasonable, and against common right that has obtained for 
centuries in every English-speaking city.”391  Judge James Phelan ob-
served, first, that “[t]he name itself implies a home for the people.  
Its literal meaning being a field for the people.”392  He emphasized, 
further, that “history shows that it was used for no one purpose often-
er than the assembling of its citizens where any person whom the 
people would listen to was permitted to address them.”393  Therefore, 
“[i]n this respect the people of this city have superior rights in the 
 
You will see by the ordinance that it practically sweeps us off the street entirely and 
we are not proposing to take any notice of the said ordinance . . . . It is certain if 
the ordinance stands then it is death to our open air fight because if we get be-
yond the 1/2 mile limit of the City Hall then we get beyond our present radius of 
operation all together . . . . [P]lease don’t surrender our right to stand where we 
have stood for these last 16 years.   
Id. Between 1890 and 1920, state and local subdivisions of the Salvation Army regular-
ly consulted with headquarters in New York City whenever legal matters arose.  Many 
of these inquiries involved municipal repression of open-air work.  The letters usually 
asked for both technical advice about legal precedents and strategic advice about how 
to proceed with local officials. 
388 Judge Phalen [sic] Declares New Ordinance Unreasonable:  Tom Bawden Was Discharged in the 
Recorder’s Court This Morning—Case Will Be Appealed to Supreme Court, EVENING NEWS, 
DETROIT, Aug. 6, 1901, at 5. 
389 Id. (as characterized in the opinion of the court) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
390 See Freedom of Speech:  Ed Greece’s Strong Appeal to Judge Phelan, Tom Bawden Claimed Right to 
Violate the Campus Permit-Ripper Ordinance, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Aug. 2, 1901, at 5 
(“Attorney Greece made a strong appeal for the rights of citizens and told the court very 
plainly that things were going to the dogs in the Detroit division of this glorious republic 
where the free and the brave must get a permit before they can open their mouths.”). 
391 Judge Phalen [sic] Declares New Ordinance Unreasonable:  Tom Bawden Was Discharged in the 
Recorder’s Court This Morning—Case Will Be Appealed to Supreme Court, supra note 388, at 5 
(quoting the opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
392 Id. (quoting the opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
393 Id. (quoting the opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Campus Martius than in an ordinary highway, in that in a highway the 
public generally has only an easement or right of passage therein.”394  
In his view, the long-tradition of public gathering on the square was 
particularly relevant:  “For almost half a century this public place has 
been used by speakers, political, secular and religious; no riot has ev-
er arisen therefrom; no great inconvenience arises from the exercise 
of this right.”395   
In a dramatic change of direction, Judge Phelan’s ruling was re-
jected by the Michigan Supreme Court, which upheld the ordinance 
as a lawful exercise of the city’s municipal powers.396  In a formalist 
move, the court distinguished its earlier Frazee Case on the ground 
that it applied to processions whereas the newer ordinance covered 
stationary addresses.397  The court found that the ordinance present-
ed a reasonable managerial solution to popular demand on a limited 
resource (public space) and dismissed the suggestion that the ordi-
nance was “directed against freedom of speech,” finding, instead, that 
it was “simply directed to the method of using a public space, and is 
no more a curtailment of the right of free speech than would be an 
ordinance that prohibited the making of public addresses in the cor-
ridors of the city hall.”398  The decision was significantly influenced by 
the views of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Massachu-
setts, which it quoted extensively.399 
The Michigan high court rendered this judgment notwithstanding 
that it had been made fully aware of three critical facts:  first, that De-
troit’s Mayor refused to grant any permits and, as such, the ordi-
 
394 Id. (quoting the opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
395 Id. (quoting the opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
396 Love v. Phalen, 87 N.W. 785, 786 (Mich. 1901).  Review took an unusual turn.  Instead of 
pursuing an appeal, Corporation Counsel requested and received from the Michigan Su-
preme Court an order to Judge Phelan to show cause as to why mandamus should not be 
issued to compel him to hear various cases he had dismissed under the ordinance.  See 
Campus Case in Lansing:  Counsel Tarsney Will Ask for an Order on Judge Phelan Today, 
EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Sept. 24, 1901, at 5.  For additional details of the procedural 
wrangling, see Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 323–27. 
397 Love, 87 N.W. at 787 (“We think, in his application of the Frazee Case to the case at bar, 
counsel has misunderstood the former case.  The question in that case was, who may 
travel in the highways?  The question in this case is, who may occupy the public spaces in 
the city . . . .”).  This was apparently the primary distinction argued by Detroit’s Corpora-
tion Counsel.  Cf. Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 1, Love, 87 N.W. 785 (“[T]he on-
ly point Mr. Tarsney makes use of to differentiate this case from the Frazee Case is that the 
Frazee Case applied to processions o [sic] moving people in the public highway, and that 
in this case the person making the address is stationary . . . .”).  Corporation Counsel’s 
brief is no longer available. 
398 Love, 87 N.W. at 787. 
399 Id. at 787–88. 
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nance, in practice, amounted to a total prohibition on assembly in 
the covered district;400 second, that the high court of Massachusetts 
stood alone in upholding “what is known as the Salvation Army legis-
lation contrary to all the other States”;401 and third, that the United 
States Supreme Court decided Davis without reference to constitu-
tional considerations about speech and assembly because it affirmed 
the Massachusetts court “squarely upon the principles which underlie 
private property alone.”402 
Although the Michigan Supreme Court’s reversal in Love v. Phalen 
(1901) was a reflection of the new state of the law, important constit-
uents continued to resist the attitudes that the judiciary propounded.   
Still, the terms of resistance had significantly changed.  For example, 
while the Salvation Army was the first to resist the court’s decision, it 
initially did so by engaging in gatherings that were not technically 
covered by the ordinance (e.g. processions without music).403  Others 
followed suit, and talk quickly surfaced about amending the ordi-
nance.404 
 
400 See Pound Appointed:  He Will Represent Judge Phelan in Supreme Court Proceedings, Judge Phelan 
Gives Reasons Why Campus Defendants Should Not Appear for the Court, EVENING NEWS, 
DETROIT, Sept. 28, 1901, at 6 (“The mayor, upon his part, having once vetoed the ordi-
nance, declines to issue any permits, he having made public proclamation of his intended 
acts in this regard, which is fortified by the further fact that no permits have been issued 
by the mayor since the adoption of this ordinance.” (quoting opinion of Judge Phelan) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
401 Supplemental Brief for Respondent, supra note 397, at 18–19, 21. 
402 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).  This point was returned to in the reply brief and made even 
more explicit, noting that the United States Supreme Court “has never decided” whether 
“such an ordinance . . . infringe[s] the United States Constitution in that part affecting 
free speech . . . and cannot well be called upon to unless it arises in the City of Washing-
ton.”  Supplemental Brief for Respondent, supra note 397, at 4–5. 
403 See, e.g., Editorial, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Nov. 7, 1901, at 2 (explaining that the Salva-
tionists had parades but “played no drums, blew no trumpets and engaged in no exhort-
ing”); Salvation Army Making a Loop on Cadillac Square, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Nov. 9, 
1901, at 1 (noting that “[i]nstead of standing still to collect a crowd, they kept on the 
march”). 
404 See Campus Was Clear:  Evangelists Honored the Supreme Court Decision Last Night, EVENING 
NEWS, DETROIT, Nov. 6, 1901, at 2 (noting that “Will Allen and the other Salvationists are 
considering an effort to have the ordinance so amended that public speaking shall be al-
lowed from 8 to 10 in the evening”); The Volunteers of Salvation Become Volunteers Militant, 
EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Nov. 13, 1901, at 1 (describing one parade of the Volunteers of 
America which included “beating an empty tin . . . pan with a poker”); Were On Parade:  
Both Brands of Salvationists Marched the Streets, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Nov. 10, 1901, at 5 
(describing how others engaged in defying the ordinance); see also A Mass Meeting:  Will 
Allen Asks Permit to Hold One on the Campus, Proposed to Agitate for an Amendment to the Cam-
pus Ordinance, Permitting Public Meetings, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Nov. 18, 1901, at 1 
(“Evangelist Will Allen this morning appealed to the mayor for permission to hold a mass 
meeting on the Campus next Saturday night for the purpose of discussing a new Campus 
ordinance . . . .”). 
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Political pressure would ultimately make some difference.  Within 
a few months of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision, the Salva-
tion Army launched an all-out campaign of resistance.405  The new 
campaign began in January 1902 with the arrival from Indianapolis of 
Major Blanche Cox.406  Determined to secure a place for open-air as-
sembly within reach of the people the Army sought to convert, Major 
Cox began holding outdoor services without a permit at various loca-
tions within the half-mile circle covered by the Koch Campus ordi-
nance, although not on the Campus Martius itself.407  Between Janu-
ary and April, when the Koch Campus ordinance was amended, 
Major Cox was arrested more than eight times.408  Other members of 
the Salvation Army as well as the city’s regular street speakers were al-
so arrested during this period.409 
 
405 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 323–33.  
406 Id. at 323.  
407 See Blanche B. Cox, Letter to the Editor, Maj. Cox’s Position:  Did Not Insist Upon Campus 
Meetings, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 10, 1902, at 5 (“From the first I have not sought to 
hold meetings on the Campus, and have never yet stood there.”).  Unfortunately, the le-
gal records of the Salvation Army do not shed any light on the decision to bring in Major 
Cox.  It is likely, however, it was undertaken reluctantly.  Correspondence relating to simi-
lar controversies in other localities makes clear that the Army considered defiance of lo-
cal law an option of last resort.  This was partly strategic and partly a product of the fact 
that their leader, General Booth Tucker, disapproved of law breaking.  The Salvation 
Army was dedicated to reforming sinners and law-breakers; modeling law breaking was 
somewhat inconsistent.  See, e.g., Letter from Staff Capt. Ferris to Commander Booth 
Tucker (Jan. 24, 1899) (RG. 2.15, 143/8) (on file with the Salvation Army National Ar-
chives and Research Center, Alexandria, Va.), at 1 (explaining that Commander Booth 
Tucker believed in avoiding conflict given the organization’s efforts to formulate a policy 
of self-denial).  What likely tipped the scale was the fact that that access to the public 
squares near City Hall in Detroit was being denied outright.  General counsel consistently 
considered the complete denial of the right to preach in public worth fighting.  See, e.g., 
Letter from Major Ferris to Major J.N. Parker  (Oct. 9, 1899) (RG. 2.15, 143/8) (on file 
with the Salvation Army National Archives and Research Center, Alexandria, Va.), at 1 
(expressing willingness to fight for “rights that we are deprived of”). 
408 See, e.g., Complaint Against Maj. Cox, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Jan. 30, 1902, at 5 (report-
ing a complaint filed against Major Cox for addressing the public without a permit); Sym-
pathy for Maj. Blanche Cox:  Imprisoned Salvationist Has Many Friends Who Call Her Arrest an 
Outrage, Marine City Man Sends Her a Check for $10—New Complaint Made Against Crawford, 
EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Feb. 19, 1902, at 1 (quoting letters “protesting against the arrest 
and imprisonment of Maj. Blanche Cox”); Mayor Will Give No Permits Now:  Maybury Dis-
pleased Because Maj. Cox Went on the Campus, As a Result Whatever Meetings Are Held Sunday 
Will Be Without His Sanction—Complaint Issued, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Feb. 21, 1902, at 
12 (reporting Major Cox’s arrest the previous night). 
409 See, e.g., Tom Bawden Goes To Prison:  Prefers House of Correction to Giving Up Fifteen Single Tax 
Dollars, Evangelist Will Allen Was Also Convicted in Short Order, Both Were Given 15 Days in 
House of Correction as Alternative—Allen Pays Under Protest, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Mar. 
15, 1902, at 1 (reporting the conviction and sentencing of Tom Bawden for making a 
public address without permission). 
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The media attention given to these colorful arrests and to Major 
Cox’s sentences to the workhouse bolstered pressure for legislative 
reform.410  The Evening News, in particular, was quite willing to run sto-
ries humanizing and pitying the “Heroic Young Woman.”411 
By the end of February, the Salvation Army, with the Volunteers of 
America and several other evangelical preachers, had petitioned the 
Common Council to repeal the ordinance—an action undertaken at 
the Mayor’s suggestion.412  Shortly thereafter, 700 members of a local 
Methodist church “unanimously adopted resolutions requesting the 
common council to revise the [Koch] Campus ordinance” to permit 
open-air services by the Salvation Army and others.413 
The legislative strategy was paired with a litigation strategy.  The 
attorney, who had served as independent counsel for Judge Phelan, 
sought to convince the Michigan Supreme Court to revisit its deci-
sion—without success.414 
When the Common Council was formally presented with the peti-
tions calling for the repeal of the Koch Campus ordinance on Febru-
ary 25, there were over one thousand signatures attached.415  The 
 
410 See, e.g., Major Blanche Cox A Martyr to Her Religious Convictions:  Heroic Young Woman Goes to 
the House of Correction for Four Days Rather Than Surrender Her Salvation Army Principles, Judge 
Phelan Reluctantly Imposed a Fine of $10 for Violation of the Campus Ordinance, but the Major 
Smilingly Said She’d Prefer the Prison, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Feb. 17, 1902, at 1 (quoting 
Major Cox as stating that “we never pay fines” as “[w]e have much better use for our 
money” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
411 See id. (using the phrase “Heroic Young Woman” in a title to describe Maj. Cox); see also 
Major Cox in Isolation:  Salvation Army Martyr Remains Alone From Morning Till Night, Plucky 
Woman Preserves Brave and Cheerful Spirit in House of Correction, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, 
Feb. 18, 1902, at 1 (sympathetically reporting that Maj. Cox spends her days in prison “in 
dignified retirement,” but also in complete isolation). 
412 See Petition to Repeal Campus Ordinance:  Mayor May Give Permits to Speak Sunday, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Feb. 21, 1902, at 5 (“The members of the Salvation Army, the Volunteers, Al-
len Rescue Mission and other citizens and taxpayers have prepared a petition to the 
common council to repeal the Campus ordinance.”). 
413 Revise the Ordinance:  Cass Avenue Methodists Adopt Resolutions on Campus Legislation, 
EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Feb. 24, 1902, at 2. 
414 See Campus Law Again Upheld:  Supreme Court Affirms the Sentence of Maj. Blanche Cox, But the 
Major Says She Will Not Stop Her Work, Hints That the Case May Be Taken Up to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Mar. 13, 1902, at 1 (describing the reasoning of the case); 
Says Maj. Cox Is Not Criminal:  Attorney Pound Urges that She Cannot Legally Be Imprisoned, Ask-
ing Writ of Habeas Corpus He Says It Is No Crime to Break City Ordinance, EVENING NEWS, 
DETROIT, Mar. 7, 1902, at 1 (detailing the attorney’s switching focus to the nature of the 
penalty); Taken Under Advisement:  Maj. Cox Habeas Corpus Proceeding at Lansing, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Mar. 2, 1902, at 10 (describing the attorney’s arguments). 
415 See Storm of Protest:  Council Unwilling to Repeal Campus Ordinance, Plan to Give Up Part of Ca-
dillac Square Park, M.C.R.R. Given 48 Hours to Repair Bridge, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 26, 
1902, at 5 (“The agitation in favor of amending the Campus ordinance received a healthy 
boost last evening, when three resolutions containing an aggregate of over 1,000 names 
were introduced before the common council . . . .”). 
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Committee on Ordinances held a legislative hearing at which the 
primary objective of the outdoor evangelists was to secure the ability 
to hold services on the Campus.416  Businesses on the Campus strongly 
opposed any change that might return the crowds of the past.417  As 
such, a key consideration at the hearing was the possibility of dedicat-
ing a portion of Cadillac Square, a square within the half-mile radius 
of City Hall, to open air services.418 
Throughout the campaign, concerns raised about the permit re-
quirement were limited to worries about officials abusing their per-
mitting powers.  Neither the Salvation Army nor anyone else who ad-
vocated for more access to Detroit’s central square questioned the 
power to regulate through permits.419  In Detroit, as elsewhere, consti-
tutional questions about the permits had come to focus exclusively on 
the question of unbridled discretion.420  Those who advocated against 
a permit system did so on the grounds that it gave the mayor free 
reign to refuse permits.421  Proponents argued that permits would 
provide a mechanism to allow “legitimate organizations the right to as-
semble.”422 
 
416 See Crack at Maybury, Bro. Will Allen Says He Changes His Mind Too Often, EVENING NEWS, 
DETROIT, Feb. 27, 1902, at 2 (“[B]rother Allen and Maj. Johnson of the Volunteers of 
America, urged that the Koch Campus ordinance be modified so as to permit religious 
bodies to hold open air meetings on the Campus.”). 
417 See Opposed to Any Change:  Campus Merchants Want the Ordinance Left Alone, No Trouble Now 
in Keeping the Streets Clear, Council Committee Hears Arguments for Amendments, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, Feb. 27, 1902, at 5 (“[T]he merchants on the Campus . . . are all bitterly opposed 
to any movement that may possible mean the return to conditions that existed on the 
public square last summer.”). 
418 See Storm of Protest:  Council Unwilling to Repeal Campus Ordinance, Plan to Give Up Part of Ca-
dillac Square Park, M.C.R.R. Given 48 Hours to Repair Bridge, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 26, 
1902, at 5 (discussing the argument of one alderman “who favored giving the lower part 
of Cadillac square over to those who desired to hold outdoor meetings”). 
419 This was certainly the case among legal experts by the early 1900s.  See, e.g., FREUND, supra 
note 336, § 480 (assuming the validity of “proper regulations”). 
420 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 336–38. 
421 Id. at 323, 327–31.  
422 People Want Law Modified:  Council Committee Met An Enthusiastic Crowd Last Night, Over-
whelming Sentiment Was in Favor of Repeal or Change in the Campus Ordinance, EVENING NEWS, 
DETROIT, Mar. 21, 1902, at 4 (emphasis added).  A subsequent hearing was held in 
March.  See Up to Maybury:  Aldermen Want His Views on the Hugh Guy Investigation, Ald. 
Magree Opens His Fight for a Revision of the Koch Ordinance—Doty in the Common Herd, 
EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Mar. 19, 1902, at 5 (describing the meeting the previous night).  
At that hearing, which approximately three hundred people attended, “[w]ith perhaps 
one or two exceptions, all appeared to be in favor of repealing or amending the campus 
ordinance so as to give the Salvation Army and others the right to assemble and talk in 
any part of the city except the campus.”  Amend Campus Ordinance:  Prevailing Sentiment at 
Public Meeting Last Night, About 300 Met with a Council Committee, Aldermen Took the Matter 
Under Advisement, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 21, 1902, at 10. 
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On April 7, 1902, the Koch Campus ordinance was amended.423  
The amended ordinance confined the space within which public 
gatherings would be prohibited by splitting the covered half-mile ra-
dius from City Hall into two regulatory spaces.424  In the first, which 
included the Campus Martius, no permits would be granted.425  Else-
where within the half-mile radius, regular speakers could obtain per-
mits.426  In a nod to the continued validity of the Frazee Case, the ordi-
nance did not cover processions. 
While the newspapers seemed generally satisfied with this out-
come, the Salvation Army was not.427  Major Cox explained that there 
was nothing in the ordinance to require the Mayor to issue permits to 
the Salvation Army near its hall.428  More importantly, the areas for 
which permits were not required were empty spaces where it was 
pointless for the Salvation Army to do its work.429 
As in Boston, however, the tide had already turned.  In 1912, the 
Koch Campus ordinance was amended to include parades.430  By 
1930, permits were also required for gatherings in the city’s parks.431  
These ordinances were all additions to the city’s code which contin-
ued to include ordinances of the nineteenth-century variety—
 
423 See Signed Ordinance:  Mayor Maybury Satisfied with Revised Campus Law, Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
Co. After Being Refused a Permit Violated the Ordinances, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Apr. 7, 
1902, at 6 (“Mayor Maybury decided this noon to sign the amended Campus Ordi-
nance . . . .”). 
424 Detroit, Mich., THE COMPILED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF DETROIT OF 1904, ch. 53, Use 
of Certain Streets, Parks and Public Places, §§ 1–2.  
425 Id. § 1.  
426 Id. 
427 See Editorial, EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Apr. 2, 1902, at 2 (“As the Koch, or Campus, ordi-
nance now stands, it is a great improvement over the original.”); No More Meetings on Cam-
pus:  Ordinance Was Amended and Passed by Council, Permits Necessary on Five Specified Streets, 
Drum and Horn Can Be Used During Parades, Beamer Disgusted by the Asphalt Plant Delay, Mo-
ran and McCurdy Nominations Were Held Up, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 2, 1902, at 1 (noting 
that the amended ordinance “is believed . . . will be satisfactory to all concerned”). 
428 See Major Cox Is Not Satisfied:  Necessity of Permits in Revised Campus Ordinance Objected to, 
Mayor Given Power to Issue Permits on Advice of Police Commissioner With Certain Streets Barred, 
EVENING NEWS, DETROIT, Apr. 2, 1902, at 5. 
429 Id. (“The major is especially disappointed because the measure prevents us from speaking 
in front of our hall . . . . The side streets where we may hold open air meetings without 
permit are of no value, as we must be where the crowd is.”). 
430 DETROIT, MICH., THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, ch. 198, § 1 (1936) (“No 
person shall in or upon any of the public streets . . . within the one-mile circle from the 
City Hall, make any public address, beat drums, blow horns, or hold any parade or proces-
sion, except . . .  (emphasis added)) (amended Mar. 5, 1912). 
431 Id. at ch. 164, § 24 (“No parade, procession, exercises or other activities which result in 
the congregating together or [sic] a large number of people shall be permitted within 
said park or boulevards without a permit having been obtained therefore from the Com-
missioner.”). 
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covering disorderly conduct, routs, and riots as well as ordinances 
covering traffic-impeding crowds.432 
The changed stance of the Michigan Supreme Court made this 
result possible.  Still, the fact that state courts consistently upheld the 
lawfulness of permit requirements in circumstances of outright re-
pression significantly limited their ability to confer legitimacy on the 
new regulatory approach. 
Constitutional debates remained, although they took place out-
side of courts and were largely limited to concerns about the arbitrary 
and capricious ways in which the permitting power often was exer-
cised.433  No one argued for a return to the nineteenth-century ap-
proach of regulating disruption when it actually occurred, but con-
cerns about official caprice frequently led to suggestions that 
municipalities return to permit-free open-air speaking.434  Important 
legal authorities advocated permanently designated public forums.435  
Meanwhile, the ACLU argued that cities should replace permit re-
quirements with notice requirements under which “the police might 
designate another location if it appeared that traffic would be inter-
fered with.”436 
D.  From Repression to Permission:  The Taming of the People Outdoors 
In the mid-twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court 
began to institute more constraints on official discretion.  New consti-
tutional constraints provided legitimacy to permit regimes but ironi-
 
432 Id. at ch. 137, §§ 2, 6; see also id. at ch. 164, § 21 (covering disorderly conduct in parks).  
The 1900 Campus Ordinance was also still on the books.  See id. at ch. 197, § 12. 
433 See James M. Jarrett & Vernon A. Mund, The Right of Assembly, 9 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 1, 33–34 
(1931) (discussing the Supreme Court’s determination that the right to assembly is not 
absolute and characterizing the difficulty with respect to the right of assembly as the dis-
cretion afforded officials in distinguishing between lawful and unlawful assemblies); ac-
cord RABBAN, supra note 169, at 110 (noting that by the early twentieth century “[v]irtually 
everyone . . . agreed that public speaking could be limited by reasonable regulations,” 
even as disputes arose over which restrictions were reasonable). 
434 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 342–44.  
435 See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE INQUIRING MIND 150–55 (1928) (noting that the 
problem of municipal censorship when speaking in outdoor spaces is regulated by per-
mits and advocating the introduction of a version of Hyde Park, wherein “so long as the 
gates remain open, any one can speak without any official’s license”); Richard C. Barrett, 
Limitations on the Right of Assembly, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 180, 192 (1935) (articulating concern 
about subjecting “the right or privilege of assembly to the uncontrolled discretion of an 
administrative official” and recommending, among other things, that every community 
provide a place for people to hold meetings without the need for permission). 
436 ACLU 1929, supra note 341, at 16–17. 
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cally may have reduced the public’s tolerance for unfettered and 
spontaneous assemblies.   
The United States Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century 
was instrumental in legitimating the permit system.  A series of deci-
sions rendered by the Court put an end to constitutionally authorized 
outright prohibition of assemblies and enabled the development of a 
more elaborate and routinized permitting regime.437 
The first move in this direction took place in 1939, although ini-
tially it was only a change in the formal law.  In Hague v. Committee for 
Industrial Organization, the United States Supreme Court reintro-
duced into constitutional law the principle that the use of “streets 
and parks . . . for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions” was a longstanding 
privilege and immunity of citizenship.438  Municipalities were no long-
er able to prohibit assemblies in their streets and parks at will.439    In 
particular, the Court underscored that arbitrary, capricious, and dis-
criminatory licensing restrictions would not be tolerated.440   
While Hague reinstated the presumption that assemblies in public 
are lawful as a matter of constitutional law, it did not require a return 
to the antecedent legal regime, which regulated only assemblies that 
were actually disruptive and only after they had begun.  Massachusetts 
v. Davis was distinguished rather than overruled.441  In fact, shortly 
thereafter, the Supreme Court held that permit requirements for 
public assemblies were presumptively constitutional.442 
 
437 See Clark McPhail et al., Policing Protest in the United States:  1960–1995, in POLICING 
PROTEST:  THE CONTROL OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 49, 58–59 
(Donatella della Porta & Herbert Reiter eds., 1998) (describing the role of the United 
States Supreme Court in the development of the modern regulatory approach to demon-
strations). 
438 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
439 Id. 
440 Id. 
441 See id. (“We have no occasion to determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the Davis case 
was rightly decided, but we cannot agree that it rules the instant case.”).  The ghost of 
Massachusetts v. Davis reared most recently in a state court opinion regarding Occupy Bos-
ton in which the judge asserted that “‘[t]he State, no less than a private owner of proper-
ty, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated’” and that this justified the lawfulness of criminal prosecution for trespass or 
unlawful assembly against those engaged in the occupation of Dewey Park.  Occupy Bos. 
v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, slip op. at 14–15 (Mass. Super. Dec. 7, 2011) (quoting 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)). 
442 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (holding that the government constitu-
tionally can predicate the lawfulness of assembly on obtaining advance permission in cas-
es involving no record or evidence of official discrimination). 
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Even so, government officials did not eagerly abide by Hague’s 
new constitutional requirements, and permits did not play a large 
role in the southern civil rights movement.443  Throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, southern officials routinely prohibited assemblies.444  They 
were even able on occasion to obtain injunctions from local courts to 
do so.445  More frequently, they resorted to alternative strategies—
harassment through criminal law and intimidation through vio-
lence.446 
Even in Washington, D.C., the permitting processes for marches 
on the National Mall were not elaborate during the Civil Rights Era.447  
The “primitive permit system” that did exist allowed for a great deal 
of official discretion which was exercised in highly political ways.448  
Thus, observers have noted that “the outcome of negotiations involv-
ing the civil rights and antiwar demonstrations was more a function 
of who was negotiating . . . than it was of the permit system itself.”449  
In the early period, the White House was a key player.450 
During this period, the Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed that it 
was unconstitutional to invoke crimes such as disorderly conduct, 
breach of the peace, and obstructing public passage to suppress the 
freedom of speech and assembly.451  But once again, it failed to 
 
443 That being so, where permit requirements were in place, southern officials certainly used 
them.  See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 148 (1969) (reviewing 
the conviction of the petitioner for violating a permit ordinance). 
444 See McPhail et al., supra note 437, at 51 (explaining that in the 1960s, “[t]he right to pro-
test was denied and permits were not issued”). 
445 See, e.g., Steven E. Barkan, Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement, 49 AM. SOC. 
REV. 552, 555 (1984) (“State and federal judges in the South also aided the social control 
effort when they granted injunctions that limited or banned civil rights activity.”). 
446 See id. (describing how criminal law, police, and prisons impacted civil rights protests). 
447 See McPhail et al., supra note 437, at 59–60 (noting that in the early 1960s “there was but a 
mere semblance of the permit system now in place”). 
448 Id. at 60. 
449 Id. 
450 See id. (commenting on “[t]he dramatic differences in the negotiations for permits for 
Martin Luther King’s 1963 March on Washington, with the support of the Kennedy ad-
ministration . . . [and those] for the 1967 March on the Pentagon, with opposition from 
the Johnson administration”). 
451 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 (1966) (Fortas, J., plurality opinion) (noting 
that it was “the fourth time in little more than four years that this Court has reviewed 
convictions by the Louisiana courts for alleged violations, in a civil rights context, of that 
State’s breach of the peace statute” and that “[i]n the three preceding cases the convic-
tions were reversed”); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552, 558 (1965) (holding that the 
State infringed appellant’s rights of free speech and free assembly by convicting him of 
breaching the peace and obstructing passages while participating in a peaceful march 
and demonstration against segregation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 
(1963) (holding that a conviction for breach of the peace where defendants were march-
ing peacefully to publicize dissatisfaction with racial segregation “infringed [their] consti-
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reestablish the old constitutional order in which only assemblies that 
were actually disruptive could be regulated.  Instead, it reaffirmed the 
reasonableness of regulation in the name of order so long as regula-
tory choices were made by statutes, not local officials, and official dis-
cretion was sufficiently cabined.452  Squarely addressing the issue in 
Cox v. Louisiana, the Court declared, 
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our demo-
cratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to 
express may address a group at any public place and at any time.  The 
constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized 
society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be 
lost in the excesses of anarchy.  The control of travel on the streets is a 
clear example of governmental responsibility to insure this necessary or-
der.  A restriction in that relation, designed to promote the public con-
venience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses of discrimi-
natory application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of 
some civil right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to pro-
tection.  One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red light be-
cause this was thought to be a means of social protest.  Nor could one, 
contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in the middle 
of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or as-
sembly.  Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to 
keep their streets open and available for movement.453 
Meanwhile, the police tended to overreact to crowds in a form of 
order maintenance that has aptly been described as “marked by ‘esca-
lated force.’”454  In the North, it was not uncommon for assemblies to 
degenerate into violence—often at the hands of police.455  The vio-
lence at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago is only 
 
tutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for re-
dress of their grievances”); see also Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969) 
(reversing conviction for disorderly conduct where petitioners engaged in peaceful and 
orderly march). 
452 See Gregory, 394 U.S. at 118 (Black, J., concurring) (“Plainly, however, no mandate in our 
Constitution leaves States and governmental units powerless to pass laws to protect the 
public from the kind of boisterous and threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility 
of spots selected by the people either for homes, wherein they can escape the hurly-burly 
of the outside business and political world, or for public and other buildings that require 
peace and quiet to carry out their functions, such as courts, libraries, schools, and hospi-
tals.”); see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969) (explain-
ing that under “the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years . . . a 
law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a li-
cense, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, 
is unconstitutional”). 
453 Cox, 379 U.S. at 554–55. 
454 McPhail et al., supra note 437, at 50. 
455 Id. at 54–55. 
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the most memorable of these events.  Those who lived through the 
period are quick to remember many others.456 
Civil rights marches and Vietnam protests, in this fraught context, 
made it difficult for Americans to ignore the risks associated with po-
litically fraught outdoor protests.  No amount of singing could dis-
guise the terrifying nature of civil rights marches in the South and 
the constant threat experienced by those who participated.  Similarly, 
every time the National Guard was called out—whether to Little Rock 
or Kent State—the risk of state violence was present.  Moreover, not 
all Americans backed down in the face of state violence, which too 
heightened anxiety, as mainstream citizens balked at the violence of 
the Black Panthers and the Weathermen.  The period was also 
marred by a series of high profile political assassinations.   
Litigation over the Civil Rights Movement, which frequently high-
lighted, if only implicitly, the degree to which Movement participants 
were under constant threat of violence by southern officials, forced 
the Court to elaborate Hague’s promise to curtail official discretion, 
and ultimately gave rise to the public forum doctrine, which remains 
the primary constitutional framework within which regulatory action 
can take place.457  The notion that procedure could both contain vio-
lence and enhance legitimacy gained ground.458 
Permit requirements, as we know them, were a legislative response 
to the violence (largely at the hands of government officials) that oc-
curred during marches in the 1960s and 1970s.459  The impetus to de-
velop more elaborate permit requirements to be implemented in a 
more bureaucratic fashion—ones that complied with the new consti-
tutional constraints—grew out of public dismay at violence on the 
streets but also at outrageous disregard of First Amendment rights 
and led to the creation of a series of investigative commissions.460 
 
456 This was also the era of urban riots, which fit the same pattern.  See id. (discussing urban 
riots of the 1960s). 
457 See id. at 57–59 (explaining that “the arrest of of [sic] protesters, and the denial of 
demonstration permits produced a series of legal challenges” out of which the public fo-
rum doctrine, which creates constitutional constraints on the regulation of public assem-
blies today, arose). 
458 Id. 
459 Id. 
460 See id. at 58–59, 61 (discussing violence and the meaning of the First Amendment and 
commenting that “it is obvious that the courts were important in shaping the dimensions 
of the shift between the two forms of protest policing” and that “these evolving constitu-
tional principles had to be implemented in practical situations, and that is where the 
evolving protest permit system assumed central importance in turning those lofty princi-
ples into practical bureaucratic guidelines for managing protest”). 
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The result was the intricate legal regulation with which we have all 
become familiar.  While in 1959, only one page in the Federal Regis-
ter was required to detail the law governing parades and public meet-
ings in the National Park Service’s jurisdiction, by 1993, there were 
seven pages of requirements.461  The National Park Service’s devel-
opment of a more elaborate permitting system was a key turning 
point, as that federal agency’s approach was subsequently adopted in 
other localities.462 
The emergence of this less confrontational order maintenance 
approach in the 1970s and 1980s increased government control over 
crowds.463  It emphasized managing the time, place, and manner of 
gatherings but in practice frequently worked to distance protestors 
from their audiences.464  Both officials and assemblers, ultimately, 
were forced to operate within a narrower definition of “peaceable.” 
Recent years have seen authorities use their legal powers more ag-
gressively.465  In particular, since the 1999 protests against the World 
Trade Organization in Seattle, “authorities [have become] much 
more aggressive in their use of such discretion to place and displace 
protest groups.”466  Boston’s “‘designated demonstration zone,’” 
which, according to the court that upheld it, resembled nothing oth-
er than an internment camp, has become the new normal.467  This 
approach has been characterized in the sociological literature as one 
of “strategic incapacitation” and for reasons that should now be clear, 
has generally been upheld in federal courts.468   
Part of a larger trend in policing and criminal punishment that 
emphasizes risk management through information and incapacita-
tion, the policing of demonstrations has increasingly been intolerant 
of disruption.  This intolerance, in turn, has manifested itself in in-
 
461 Id. at 61. 
462 Id. at 49, 59–64. 
463 McCarthy & McPhail, supra note 41, at 234 (explaining that the ‘negotiated management’ 
approach to regulating demonstrations, which relies heavily on the permitting process, 
has resulted in a near absence of fatalities and significant injuries at protests, it has also 
given “authorities great discretion in determining which places [are] actually available for 
protest”). 
464 See id. at 234–35.  For more on the ways that officials seek to control protest through time, 
place, and manner regulations see Abu El-Haj 2009, supra note 6, at 544–45, 548–54.  
465 See Lesley J. Wood, Breaking the Wave: Repression, Identity, and Seattle Tactics, 12 
MOBILIZATION 377, 379–82 (2007) (describing series of Seattle-style protests and aggres-
sive police responses to them). 
466 McCarthy & McPhail, supra note 41, at 232–34. 
467 Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 
(D. Mass. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Bl(A)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
468 See McCarthy et al., supra note 8, at 279 n.8 (summarizing and citing new literature). 
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creased micromanagement of protest through surveillance, preventa-
tive arrest and detention, the use of barricades and other forms con-
tainment, and the use of force in the last instance.469 
CONCLUSION 
Like the gatherings described earlier, most outdoor assemblies of 
citizens are insignificant in the grand scheme of American political 
history.  As a political practice, however, gatherings of people are 
not.470 
Outdoor assembly has been an integral component of American 
politics time out of mind.  Groups, not individuals, exercise power in 
a democracy.471  Elections are one way to aggregate citizens to effect 
political change, but they have their limits.  For one, they are “a sin-
gularly blunt instrument for the communication of information.”472  
For another, they are rarely experienced as collective acts, at least in 
the modern era.473 
Outdoor assembly complements voting in a number of important 
ways.  Public protest can increase the odds that electoral victories re-
turn desired political changes.  For example, newfound political sway 
of northern Blacks in the post-war period combined with the strategic 
use of public protest to create the successes of the Civil Rights Move-
ment.474  Similarly, increasing electoral power of Latino citizens has 
placed immigration reform on the national agenda today; at the same 
time, it has emboldened disenfranchised, undocumented workers to 
 
469 See Alex S. Vitale, The Command and Control and Miami Models at the 2004 Republican Na-
tional Convention:  New Forms of Policing Protests, 12 MOBILIZATION 403, 405–06 (2007) (sit-
uating recent protest policing strategies in wider policing trends). 
470 For a different accounting of the range of values served by public assembly, see 
SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 47–52 (summarizing the value of as-
sembly as articulated by international and European human rights law). 
471 Cf. Reverse-Engineering Chinese Censorship, HARV. MAG. (Sept. 2013), available at 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/09/reverse-engineering-chinese-censorship (report-
ing a study showing that “the Chinese government is not interested in stifling opinion, 
but in suppressing collective action,” as such, “[w]ords alone are permitted no matter 
how critical and vitriolic,” while “mere mentions of . . . any large gathering not sponsored 
by the state, whether peaceful or in protest . . . are censored immediately”). 
472 SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY:  CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 24 
(1995). 
473 For a description of the festive, social quality of early American elections, see Abu El-Haj 
2011, supra note 6, at 14–15. 
474 See, e.g., TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT:  ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY 
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 42–43 (2011). 
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publicly protest, along with their enfranchised supporters, for fairer 
working conditions.475 
The complementary function of public assembly is not limited to 
the marginalized within our society.  Mainstream political activists, 
most recently the Tea Party, frequently support their electoral strate-
gies with outdoor gatherings.476 
Outdoor assembly also has its own distinctive attributes as a form 
of political participation.  For participants, public assemblies are fre-
quently powerful experiences in and of themselves.  This appears to 
be a product of the fact that they are unique in being, by definition, 
political experiences that take place in person with others.  This col-
lective experience frequently proves to be a profound one for the in-
dividuals participating.477  Such collective political experiences 
strengthen the likelihood of future civic and political engagement.478  
Ideas and political commitment alone turn out to be poor motivators 
for political engagement.  Assembling is a critically important form of 
politics because it provides opportunities to strengthen, even create, 
 
475 See Julia Preston, Showing Grass-Roots Support for Immigration Overhaul:  Local Events Help 
Organizers Display Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at A11 (explaining the conscious 
decision of immigration reform advocates to hold small May Day protests across the coun-
try and the ways some undocumented workers have felt emboldened by strong Latino 
turnout in the 2012 election to join protests, even in the face of increased deportation); 
accord McCarthy & McPhail, supra note 349, at 108 (noting that public “[p]rotest has long 
been perceived as ‘politics by other means’” insofar as it “provides the less powerful an al-
ternative way of influencing public decisions”). 
476 See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF 
REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 86–87 (2012) (explaining how outdoor gatherings created 
momentum for the Tea Party). 
477 See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY:  CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 184 (2012) (noting that collective protests have traditionally cre-
ated “enduring bonds of solidarity” and offering as examples marches in San Francisco 
for gay rights; prayers on the Mall in Washington, D.C. by evangelicals; and the drowning 
of tools by autoworkers in Flint, Michigan (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting one participant in Oc-
cupy Wall Street as saying, “The thing that was special about Occupy was that people used 
their bodies to create a safe space to talk and to listen.  Being able to go there, to Liberty, 
and be part of that safe space, was wonderful for me and a lot of people.  I vote, I do 
phone calls for campaigns, I have money, but nothing changes.  We occupied that space 
for democracy, for politics, for discussion”). 
478 Cf. Debra C. Minkoff, Producing Social Capital:  National Social Movements and Civil Society, in 
BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE:  CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL CAPITAL DEBATE IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 183, 189 (Bob Edwards et al. eds., 2001) (summarizing sociological literature 
as illustrating ways “that involvement in social movements can be a mechanism in the cre-
ation of solidarity and the deepening of collective identities that anchor individuals in 
participatory cultures”); see also Abu El-Haj, supra note 10, at 76-87, 91-93 (reviewing soci-
ological literature that shows that relationships far more than ideas explain the decision 
to take civic or political action). 
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personal relationships that are likely to encourage additional civic 
and political participation.479 
Finally, outdoor assemblies have been important sites of dissent 
throughout American history.  Small acts of taking to the streets serve 
as placeholders for the remote possibility of social and political 
change through collective action.  They echo the momentous 
marches that gave rise to the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.  By 
doing so, they maintain the possibility of transformative political as-
semblies in the future.  They preserve the promise of fundamental 
change in the name of self-governance, ensuring the power to end a 
much despised international conflict such as Vietnam or the power to 
found the first republic in the modern world. 
To serve its unique function in our democracy, outdoor assembly 
must be allowed to be disruptive.  Gathering outdoors, particularly in 
busy urban spaces, is inevitably messy and inconvenient as a result of 
the competing demands on such spaces.  For at least some assem-
blies, however, the reasons go deeper:  Disruption is an essential ele-
ment of both the practice and the political sway of taking to the 
streets to dissent.480  As with a general strike in the labor context, dis-
ruption of ordinary patterns of life is frequently a central aim of polit-
ical protest.  The ability to bring a city to a standstill is the ability to 
make elected officials take notice.  It forces recognition and compels 
attention.  Disorder is only exacerbated when crowds take to the 
streets spontaneously in response to current events, yet such gather-
ings are at the core of what the right of peaceable assembly pro-
tects.481 
Preserving the intrinsic and instrumental value of peaceable as-
sembly to our democracy requires tolerating its associated disorder—
 
479 See, e.g., SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 476, at 93 (noting that local Tea Party groups 
were often founded by organizers who had met for the first time at “rallies or other pro-
test settings”). 
480 See McCarthy & McPhail, supra note 349, at 108 (noting that the power of public protest 
“deriv[es], importantly, from [the] ability to disrupt normal routines”). 
481 See, e.g., Ian Lovett, Call for Calm as Los Angeles Girds for More Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2013, at A12 (reporting that, in response to a recent court decision, “[a] group of about 
150 mostly young people broke away from a peaceful demonstration” and proceeded to 
“[run] through the streets, blocking traffic, hitting cars, assaulting pedestrians and ran-
sacking businesses,” at which point the police sought to stop the demonstration); Adam 
Nagourney, Prayer, Anger and Protest Greet Florida Verdict:  Renewed Radical Debate, President 
Urges Nation to Accept Acquittal of Zimmerman, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at A1 (recounting 
that “[a]s dusk fell in New York, a modest rally that had begun hours earlier in Union 
Square grew to a crowd of thousands that snaked through Midtown Manhattan toward 
Times Square in an unplanned parade” and that “[h]undreds of bystanders left the side-
walks to join the peaceful demonstration, which brought traffic to a standstill”). 
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from trampled grass to disrupted traffic.  If outdoor assembly is not to 
be sapped of its worth, we must even tolerate some risk that violence 
will break out, although the evidence is that most protest events are 
orderly and peaceful.482 
Focused as they are on public assemblies as a form of speech, con-
temporary courts are unable to countenance the value of disrup-
tion.483  Disorganized, uncivil, and incoherent speech, while frequent-
ly protected by the courts, does not obviously further First 
Amendment interests in democratic deliberation.  Unable to see the 
distinct qualities of assembly and hence why the right of assembly 
should work differently, courts tend to uncritically accept govern-
ment officials’ efforts to minimize the inconvenience associated with 
gatherings by placing conditions on permits granted.  They are thus 
prone to conclude, for instance, that “[i]t seems unlikely that the 
First Amendment requires” North American Trade Organization del-
egates, baseball fans, and city residents to tolerate disruption or to 
compromise public safety “in order that an organization’s desire to get its 
message out in what some perceive as a more visible fashion be accommo-
dated.”484 
To suppose that outdoor assemblies are primarily about com-
municating messages is to miss a fundamental point.  As Ashutosh 
Bhagwat recently noted, 
In the typical modern protest or assembly utilizing the public forum, 
speeches are no doubt made and signs are waved, but they are hardly the 
main point of the exercise.  After all, most of the speeches are inaudible 
and the signs often illegible.  The point, rather, is the assembly itself.  
 
482 See, e.g., SAMPSON, supra note 477, at 188 (emphasizing that “[a]lthough protest events 
present a challenge to the existing social order and sometimes entail disruption or vio-
lence (by either protestors or responding authorities), most are orderly and peaceful”). 
483 See, e.g., Dinler v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 7921(RJS)(JCF), 2012 WL 4513352, at *25 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Writ large, the chaos on East 16th Street could have paralyzed the City 
and denied its residents access to the emergency services on which lives depend.  The 
protestors simply had no right to hold ambulances, cabs, and commuters hostage by stag-
ing an impromptu parade in the middle of Manhattan.”). 
484 In re Denial of Parade Permit Application of Coal. Against the NATO/G8 Poverty & War 
Agenda, No. 12 PA 02, slip op. at 22 (Chi. Dep’t of Admin. Hearings Mun. Div. Mar. 29, 
2012) (emphasis added) (holding that insofar as adequate alternative means were availa-
ble to CANG8 the city’s denial of a permit for its preferred marching routine, which 
would have blocked two of Chicago’s major thoroughfares, was constitutional); see also 
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 194 (arguing that today First Amendment law does not 
support a right to march on a public highway insofar as a highway is unlikely to be con-
sidered a public forum);  cf. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 108 (M.D. Ala. 1965) 
(authorizing a fifty-two mile, twenty-five thousand person march from Selma to Mont-
gomery to take place over four days on Alabama’s main highway). 
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The fact of a large public gathering forms a sense of solidarity, helps to 
influence public opinion, and sends a message to political officials.485 
Being together as a crowd—with its inevitable inconvenience and 
mess, even risk of violence—is a large part of the point of outdoor as-
sembly.  As one prominent political scientist has explained, 
 [M]ovements that make an imprint do more than communicate.  They 
also threaten to exert a distinctive kind of power that results from 
refusing co-operation in the routines that institutionalized social life 
requires.  That is the power that workers wield when they walk off the 
job, or that students muster when they refuse to go to class, or that 
tenants have when [they] refuse to pay the rent, or that urban crowds 
exert when they block streets and highways.486 
In deciding that the First Amendment protects orderly expression, 
not disorderly conduct, courts have undermined the value of assem-
bly as a political practice by “rob[bing] challengers of their ability to 
disrupt—or threaten to disrupt—public order as a means of creating 
negative inducements to bargaining on the part of their oppo-
nents.”487 
Our notions of the right of public assembly today are akin to no-
tions of free speech in the early twentieth century when the Supreme 
Court considered advocacy of lawlessness to be unprotected.  During 
that period, the Court held that there was no constitutional violation 
in suppressing speech that arguably had a tendency to produce law-
lessness or violence.488  Today, a similar constitutional understanding 
applies to assemblies. 
 
485 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1016 (2011). 
486 Francis Fox Piven, Occupy’s Protest Is Not Over. It Has Barely Begun, GUARDIAN, Sept. 17 
2012, http://www.guardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/17/occupy-protest-not-over. 
487 Doug McAdam, The Future of Social Movements, in FROM CONTENTION TO DEMOCRACY 229, 
234 (Marco G. Giugni, et al., eds. 1998); see also id. at 232 (observing that social move-
ments, like political parties and unions before them, are losing their radicalness, and as a 
result there has been a “sharp decline in [their] effectiveness as a means of mobilizing 
political leverage”); McCarthy & McPhail, supra note 349, at 84 (noting that protest has 
“become institutionalized and therefore routinized, predictable, and, perhaps as a result, 
of diminishing impact”).  Of course, courts alone are not responsible for this effect.  See 
generally ZICK, supra note 7, at 5–7, 36–42 (exploring range of relevant changes that ac-
count for the state of contemporary public assembly, perhaps most importantly the 
changing architecture of public places); Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. 
L. REV. 581, 584 (2006) (exploring and “highlighting the significance of place” and spa-
tial tactics “to expressive and associative rights”). 
488 See RABBAN, supra note 169, at 132–46 (describing the “bad tendency” case law); cf. Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that the First Amend-
ment protects even advocacy of violence so long as the speech is not “directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is [not] likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion”). 
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Out of a fear of even a tiny risk of mayhem, the courts allow states 
to define unlawful assembly and riot broadly, ensuring that they can 
capture assemblies that once would have been considered peacea-
ble.489  Perhaps more detrimentally still, given its broad effect on 
peaceable assemblies, courts consent to the regulation of virtually all 
outdoor assemblies in advance through an array of time, place, and 
manner regulations.  Willingly accepting virtually any proffered gov-
ernment interest, the courts legitimate pervasive regulation that con-
tains, even quashes, the spontaneity, disorder, and inconvenience as-
sociated with outdoor gatherings, as the Occupy movement’s 
experiences amply demonstrate. 
The freedom of assembly, like the freedom of speech, must allow 
breathing room for collective action in the name of self-
determination.  Creating breathing room requires keeping in mind 
the “huge debt this nation owes to its ‘troublemakers.’”490  As Judge 
Jed S. Rakoff recently noted, 
From Thomas Paine to Martin Luther King, Jr., they have forced us to fo-
cus on problems we would prefer to downplay or ignore.  Yet it is often 
only with hindsight that we can distinguish those troublemakers who 
brought us to our senses from those who were simply . . . troublemakers.  
Prudence, and respect for the constitutional rights to free speech and 
free association, therefore dictate that the legal system cut all non-violent 
protestors a fair amount of slack.491 
The right of assembly is textually limited to “peaceable assembly.”  
Peaceable, however, is not self-defining.  It can be construed, as we 
have seen, more or less broadly in law and in practice.  What consti-
tutes a riot?  Must violence be actual or imminent to constitute an un-
lawful assembly, or is the mere tendency to produce violence suffi-
 
489 See generally Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1, 10–33, 42–66 (2012) (demonstrating ways that modern statutory definitions of in-
citement-to-riot and riot criminalize attenuated risk of violence, essentially criminalizing 
the production of fear by large groups, and arguing that in many instances the statutes 
criminalize conduct that likely is constitutionally protected under the right of assembly). 
490 Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); accord Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963) (“The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a 
State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.  [A] function of free 
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.  It may indeed best serve its 
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi-
tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.  Speech is often provocative and challeng-
ing. . . . That is why freedom of speech . . . is . . . protected against censorship or punish-
ment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive 
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. . . . There is no room 
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view.”) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
491 Garcia, 865 F. Supp. 2d. at 482. 
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cient?  Does property damage constitute violence?  How extensive do 
permit requirements need to be to ensure that assemblies are peace-
able?  The textual limitation only entails that constitutional protec-
tion does not extend to violence—that unlawful assembly and riot 
mark the outer bounds of the constitutional right.492 
Contemporary law, however, interprets the constraint of 
peaceability very broadly, and the public to date has not seemed par-
ticularly troubled by this choice.  Even protestors largely embrace the 
orderliness—perhaps out of fear of drawing out state violence.  Un-
like previous generations, including those in 1960s, protestors today 
are typically reluctant to confront officials when they disagree with 
the terms set for their protest.  According to one report, when a lead-
er of the Chicago People’s Convention Coalition during the 1996 
Convention “asked the twenty-odd people in his group whether they 
would risk arrest by leaving the sidewalk and marching down Michi-
gan Avenue,” the response was “[a] loud ‘no.’”493  When his co-
organizer “shouted, ‘Into the streets,’ . . . no one followed.”494  At that 
point, the first guy said “‘Well, guys, we’ve got the permit for the 
sidewalks.  Shall we just do that?’”495 In fact, protestors who refuse to 
obtain required permits or who embrace disruption are actively mar-
ginalized.  Groups, such as ACT-Up, Queer Nation, and Operation 
Rescue, that consciously choose to defy local time, place, and manner 
regulations, are frequently vilified,496 and police frequently curtail 
their actions with the use of force even when they fall short of vio-
lence against persons or property.497 
 
492 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 n.4 (noting that “[s]tatutes affecting the right of assem-
bly, like those touching on freedom of speech, must observe the established distinctions 
between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action”); accord NAACP v. 
Claibourne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First Amendment does not 
protect violence.  Certainly violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, and the 
use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the 
guise of advocacy.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
493 McCarthy & McPhail, supra note 349, at 84 (noting that during the 1996 Democratic Na-
tional Convention in Chicago “for the most part protesters were willing to accept the 
tight restrictions imposed on the ‘time, place, and manner’ in which they could demon-
strate” even those that displaced and caged them). 
494 Id. 
495 Id. 
496 Cf. id. at 101–02. 
497 See John Noakes & Patrick F. Gillham, Police and Protestor Innovation Since Seattle, 12 
MOBILIZATION 335, 336 (2007) (noting that “[f]or those protestors willing to cooperate 
with authorities, police still employ negotiated management tactics,” but for those com-
mitted to “direct-action . . . [and] to disrupt[ing] the operations of their target, police 
[have] adopted new tactics to control them”). 
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Contemporary attitudes stand in stark contrast to those of genera-
tions of Americans before us.  As we have seen, as late as the Progres-
sive Era, Americans defended their right to assemble in public free 
from prior constraints, even when the risk of violence was painfully 
real.  Outraged citizens challenged the new regulatory regime in 
court into the mid-1880s.  More surprisingly, they repeatedly won.  All 
but one state supreme court to review the newly established permit 
requirements struck them down.  These courts soundly rejected the 
suggestion that official permits were a necessary and constitutional 
means to control the potential disruptions associated with traditional 
street politics.  Only the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
otherwise.498 
This high tolerance in the nineteenth century for the irritations 
that accompany democracy derived from the importance placed in 
the American constitutional and political tradition on assembling and 
parading in public.  It was bolstered, in turn, by a robust conception 
of the right of assembly in which access to public spaces for political 
purposes was presumed.499 
None of this is meant to deny that in many, possibly most, ways 
our current constitutional sensibilities are more normatively appeal-
ing.  For one, nineteenth-century officials differentiated between cat-
egories of gatherings.  Certain forms of outdoor gatherings were 
viewed as more central to the constitutional tradition and thus more 
worthy of protection.  New York City initially distinguished between 
religious and nonreligious gatherings.  Other cities tended to distin-
guish between parks and streets.500  For another, music, while part of 
American traditions of democratic politics, was not constitutive of any 
constitutional right.501  When nineteenth-century state courts were 
asked to rule on municipal ordinances requiring permits to play mu-
 
498 See supra notes 245, 286–88, 316-18 and accompanying text (discussing outlying views of 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court).  
499 Nineteenth-century American law was much closer to contemporary international law in 
this regard.  See SUPPRESSING PROTEST 2012 REPORT, supra note 2, at 54–61 (explaining 
that international law requires officials to tolerate disorder and incidental violence when 
the right of assembly is exercised and generally frowns upon extensive advance regula-
tion). 
500 Abu El-Haj, supra note 20, at 130–35. 
501 Writing in 1895, the California Supreme Court was explicit about the rationale:   
The cases cited [by the Petitioner] all deal with ordinances regulating the 
right of the people to have processions or parades in the streets; . . . But the 
proposition that a man has a natural, ingrained, inviolate, common-law or 
constitutional right to beat a drum on the traveled streets of a city has no 
foundation in reason or authority.  
 In re Flaherty, 38 P. 981, 983–84 (Cal. 1895). 
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sical instruments on the streets, they almost uniformly upheld 
them.502 
Most importantly, there is no question that the rights of dissenters 
are more broadly protected today than in any previous period of 
American history.  Nineteenth-century authorities, as we have seen, 
routinely and without a second-thought, distinguished between the 
rights of established, law-abiding groups and individuals and those 
considered to be fringe.  The need to maintain neutrality between cit-
izens was not considered pressing.  In fact, the hostility of nineteenth-
century government officials toward evangelicals and their practice of 
preaching outdoors lies at the origins of our current regulatory 
framework in which permit requirements for outdoor gatherings play 
a central role.  Boston officials clearly considered all evangelicals dis-
ruptive, although they did—for a time at least—hold to a distinction 
between gatherings in the city’s parks and processions on its streets, 
which were permissible as a matter of right, as the Salvation Army was 
schooled when it first arrived to the city.503 
Still, the history of outdoor assembly in the nineteenth century il-
lustrates that changes in public attitudes and law (legislative, adminis-
trative, and constitutional) have not come without costs.  While wide-
spread intolerance for the inconvenience, disorder, and risks of 
violence associated with outdoor assembly is understandable, it facili-
tates a constitutional order that undervalues outdoor assembly, partly 
because it underappreciates the dynamics of political participation. 
While unlawful and violent actions on the part of gatherers obvi-
ously must be addressed, a robust right of assembly would seem to 
require a recalibration of the balance.  In order to protect the im-
portant avenue of political participation it was established to protect, 
the right of assembly must be reconceived to require the public to 
tolerate the irritations posed by outdoor assembly, including associat-
ed risks of violence.504  How this should be accomplished doctrinally 
 
502 See, e.g., id. at 984 (upholding ordinance requiring a permit to beat drums on public 
streets); People v. Garabed, 45 N.Y.S. 827, 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1897) (upholding 
a conviction under an ordinance that included prohibitions on beating drums and tam-
bourines in public). But see In re Gribben, 47 P. 1074, 1078–79 (Okla. 1897) (holding that 
Oklahoma City was without power—express, implied or essential to further the purposes 
of the municipal corporation—to pass an ordinance that prohibited drumming and mu-
sic on the city streets or sidewalks to the extent that it annoyed or disturbed others). 
503 See supra notes 251–56 and accompanying text.  
504 Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (“The ordinance . . . violates the 
constitutional right of free assembly and association . . . [because] mere public intoler-
ance . . . cannot be the basis for abridgment of these constitutional freedoms;” in particu-
lar, a state may not “make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its 
exercise may be ‘annoying’ to some people.”). 
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would need to be worked out.  It will require some mechanism for 
forcing authorities to address violence only when the risk is substan-
tial and immediate, rather than well in advance as we are prone to 
do.505  That said, the Brandenburg framework might not work well in 
the assembly context given the unique dynamics of groups, including 
ones that are outdoors.506   
Whatever the precise solution, one thing is clear:  we need to 
move closer to a regime that focuses on real risks of violence rather 
than on disorder and illegality.  A robust right of assembly would also 
require government officials to scale back the strategic use of misde-
meanor offenses to harass those exercising the right. 
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, protecting the unique 
attributes of public assembly as a political practice likely requires a 
constitutionally imposed obligation to be more circumspect in setting 
limits on an assembly’s right to disrupt in advance.  While the whole-
sale abandonment of time, place, and manner regulations would 
frankly be foolish in our contemporary, congested cities, the form ad-
vance regulation currently takes is overbroad and under protective of 
the value of having citizens congregating outdoors for political ends.  
Again, doctrinal details would need to be worked out.  Perhaps, a no-
tice requirement would be sufficient in most circumstances, as it is 
under international law, to address reasonable concerns of disorder.   
A new balance could take many forms, but the thumb on the scale 
would be in favor of access as requested.  Where permit requirements 
remain and are challenged, the new balance would also require 
courts to take a harder look at proffered government interests.  Even 
more importantly still, when considering the adequacy of available 
alternatives, courts would need to focus on the adequacy of alterna-
 
505 Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963) (“The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular 
views. . . . For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, 
courts, or dominant political or community groups.” (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted)). 
506 Cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty’s Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels?:  The Limits of the Right of 
Assembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1381, 1394–95 (2012) (“Groups are dangerous.  A group of 
individuals who start off merely discussing the propriety or need for violence, as an ab-
stract matter, can evolve into a group planning violence quite easily.  Moreover, the very 
fact of a group, an assembly, arguably makes that transition easier.  Individuals who inter-
act with each other regularly, especially in some isolation from the broader community, 
can build up a set of shared, dissident values which can diverge dramatically from com-
monly held social beliefs. In general, we celebrate such diversity, but when those values 
touch on violence, this can be a profoundly dangerous process.  Members of a group that 
endorses violence can build up each other’s beliefs, form a sense of solidarity, and ulti-
mately push each other on into a commitment to action.”). 
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tive opportunities to assemble, because the act of assembling is much 
more than the dissemination of a message.507 
While constitutional change is difficult, thankfully, it is not the on-
ly option.  Public perception of the value of assembly plays a role in 
how the term peaceable has been defined legislatively as well as in how 
government officials ultimately enforce the law on the books.  Were 
the public to find more tolerance for outdoor assembly, including the 
disruption it entails and the marginal risk of violence associated with 
it, legislatures might be persuaded to repeal or scale back permit re-
quirements.  The crimes of unlawful assembly, riot, and disorderly 
conduct, at least in the context of protected First Amendment activi-
ty, could also be redefined legislatively.  Similarly, changes in public 
attitudes might influence judges to be more mindful of the value of 
troublemakers in our democracy. 
Legislative reforms will not occur, however, until the public redis-
covers the value of public assembly and recalibrates the balance be-
tween order and politics.  Changing public attitudes requires articu-
lating the value of public assembly and therefore of the right of 
peaceable assembly.  Although a number of factors explain our new 
attitudes, one that should be acknowledged is that the complete non-
violence of the Civil Rights Movement, which brought forth many 
positive changes in our constitutional and political culture, also set 
up a perhaps unreasonable standard for the peacefulness of assem-
blies.508  While the Civil Rights Movement’s strategy of drawing out 
the violence of the segregationist South through peaceable assembly 
and civil disobedience was certainly politically necessary and effective, 
it has left the public culture with a mistaken view that public assembly 
does not need to be disorderly to be effective and has limited our vi-
sion of the worthy protestor to the perfectly peaceful protestor with 
justice on his side.509 
 
507 Although largely overshadowed by free speech and expressive conduct claims, a handful 
of advocates for Occupy did invoke the right of peaceable assembly itself and tried to ar-
gue that the relevant question was the adequacy for purposes of assembly of alternative 
locations.  See, e.g., Defendants’ Corrected Motion to Dismiss at 2, 17, 24–25, Common-
wealth v. Hill, No. 11 CR-5534 (Bos. Mun. Ct. Central Div. Suffolk Cnty.) (on file with au-
thor) (arguing that the city unconstitutionally charged defendants with trespass and un-
lawful assembly insofar as they were exercising constitutionally protected rights, including 
the right of assembly). 
508 Cf. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 116–18 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (de-
scribing the peacefulness of a civil rights march). 
509 Cf. ZICK, supra note 7, at 142–43 (recognizing the disruptive aspect of outdoor assembly 
while holding up an ideal of nonviolence after describing in depth the Civil Rights 
Movement’s uses of outdoor space for political ends); Barkan, supra note 445, at 559–60, 
562 (describing effective, peaceful civil rights marches). 
